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Abstract
The search for an appropriate approach to pricing capacity access in telecom-
munication capacity networks has evolved variously in the literature through
rate of return regulation, the E¢ cient Component Pricing Rule, price-cap reg-
ulation (RPI-X) and cost-based regulation, based on e¢ cient forward-looking
costs - all in search for an approach that would send signals for e¢ ciency to the
users of the access infrastructure and thereby facilitate the longer-term e¢ cient
development of access networks. In some literature and indeed in practice this
search has for the time being settled on FL-LRIC,1 a cost-based access price,
which has been widely advanced as an e¤ective instrument for incentive regula-
tion. An emerging debate in the literature questions the versatility of FL-LRIC
from the standpoint of option-theoretic considerations. An issue at the cen-
tre of the debate is the versatility of FL-LRIC in responding to the stochastic
processes that dene downstream value. More specically, whether, in view
of the option-theoretic considerations, FL-LRIC is distortionary and whether
such distortions, if any, are su¢ ciently material to adversely a¤ect competitive
outcomes.
This thesis contributes to this debate, which sits at the interface of the the-
ories to access pricing and option pricing, by taking it beyond the qualitative
conjectures in literature and makes contributions on the following fronts. First,
it develops a framework for valuing the exibility of adapting to downstream
value, and tests the neutrality of FL-LRIC as an approach for pricing capacity
access, based on evidence from the analogue and ADSL platforms, using numer-
ical methods. Second, it develops closed-form option-theoretic generalizations
of the value of such exibility, in the two platforms.
The theoretical framework underpinning this thesis is option pricing theory.
This theory is used because of its capacity to conceptualize and quantify the
value of exibility. This study uses data from the analogue and ASDL capac-
ity access platforms in the UK. Maximum Likelihood Estimation is used to
calibrate the stochastic di¤erential equations describing downstream value and
the value of the underlying contingent claims are estimated using risk-neutral
valuation measures. From the standpoint of option pricing theory and based
on UK evidence we nd that: (i) FL-LRIC is distortionary; and (ii) the level
of the distortions, imply the existence of a strong incentive for ine¢ cient entry.
1Forward-looking Long-run Incremental Costs.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Background
The liberalisation of the telecommunications industry saw the emergence of
competition between and within di¤erent technology platforms. Prior to the
1980s telecommunication companies were operated as vertically integrated mo-
nopolies. The 1980s and 90s saw radical policy changes that were aimed at
increasing e¢ ciency through privatisation, liberalization and increased com-
petition. In Europe, the UK took the lead in liberalising and privatising its
national carrier, and introducing a duopoly in 1984. The duopoly was a pre-
cursor to a subsequent more competitive market structure. Other members
of the European Community gradually followed suit with policy changes that
introduced competition in the 1990s. In the US, the Telecommunications Act
of 1996 provided a framework for local and intrastate competition. Across
both sides of the Altantic, mandatory unbundling1 was introduced as part of
the wider initiatives to introduce competition in the parts of the xed-wire
network where replication of infrastructure is not readily feasible.
The rationale for mandatory unbundling is that while competition is desir-
able in retail and capacity markets, entry is however not readily feasible because
of barriers to entry (Hausman and Sidak, 2005). More specically, the case for
mandatory unbundling has been argued for, rst, on grounds that by allowing
third-parties to rent bottleneck facilities at an initial stage of competition, they
are provided with an impetus for subsequent investment in their own facilities,
creating in the process, rival networks hence facilities-based competition. In the
same vein, Cave and Vogelsang (2003) argue that entrants do not emerge at
the outset as fully edged facilities-based competitors. They argue that com-
1Mandatory unbundling is an involuntary exchange between an incumbent network op-
erator and third parties (access seekers) where the latter are granted access to the formers
capacity network, on terms and conditions which may be determined by a regulator.
1
petition evolves as third-parties purchase incumbentsnetwork elements and
resell retail products. Gradually entrants replace the incumbentsnetworks el-
ements with their own elements. Pursuing a similar argument, Bauer (2005),
and Hazlett and Bazelon (2005) observe that the goals of third-party access
products such as unbundled local loops is the introduction of facilities-based
competition. Second, the case for mandatory unbundling has been argued for
on the grounds that competition between an incumbent and access seekers, and
between access seekers, puts downward pressure on retail prices and provides
incentives for innovation (Hausman and Sidak, 2005).
The case for mandatory unbundling is however not without opposition. Its
opponents have argued that such intervention diminishes an incumbents in-
centive to maintain and improve its infrastructure because the incumbent is
deprived of the full value of its investment. They have further argued that the
short-term benets from competition may be lower than the long-term harm
from reduced innovation. The sharp divide in the arguments on the merits of
mandatory unbundling dominates debate in the literature and has given rise
to a urry of empirical research to test the e¢ cacy of unbundling. This body
of research has looked at the e¤ect of various policy variables on investment
and service penetration. The empirical evidence on the impact of unbundling
is not entirely conclusive but suggests that this initiative has not convincingly
achieved its intended objectives.
Equally unsettled is the issue about how to price access. The search for an
appropriate approach to pricing has evolved variously in the literature through
rate of return regulation, the E¢ cient Component Pricing Rule, price-cap reg-
ulation (RPI-X) and cost-based regulation, based on e¢ cient forward-looking
costs (FL-LRIC)2 all in search of an approach that would send signals for
e¢ ciency to the users of the access infrastructure and thereby facilitate the
longer-term e¢ cient development of access networks. In some literature and
2Forward-looking Long-run Incremental Costs.
2
indeed in practice3 the search for an approach to pricing access has for the
time being settled on FL-LRIC, which is advanced in a considerable body of
literature as an e¤ective instrument for incentive regulation in telecommuni-
cation access networks. Its proponents have argued that access seekers pay a
price, and access providers receive a price that corresponds to the costs that
the latter imposes on access infrastructure. In this respect, it is argued that
FL-LRIC is not only equitable to the access provider but induces entry from ac-
cess seekers who are either equally or more e¢ cient than the access provider in
the intermediate services market (Sappington and Weisman, 1996; Vogelsang,
2003).
A key debate in the literature questions the versatility of FL-LRIC from
the standpoint of option-theoretic considerations. Hausman (1999) is one the
pioneers of this debate. The subsequent papers by Economides (1999), Haus-
man and Myers (2002), Alleman (2002), Alleman and Rappoport (2002, 2005,
2006), Vogelsang (2003), Pindyck (2005a, 2005b, 2007) and Cave (2006) add to
the debate. An issue at the centre of the debate is the versatility of FL-LRIC in
responding to the stochastic processes that dene downstream value. Of par-
ticular importance is the question about the value of the exibility to respond
to downstream stochastic processes.
3In the EU for example, the European Commission in its Recommendation 98/195/EC
of 8th January 1998, on the subject of interconnection in a liberalised telecommunications
market, recommended the use of long-run average incremental costs as a basis for setting
interconnection charges. The European Parliament and Council subsequently in Directive
(2000) 384 on access to, and interconnection of, electronic communication networks and
associated facilities, also adopted FL-LRIC as basis for setting interconnection prices. In No-
vember 2000 the European Regulatory Group (ERG) endorsed FL-LRIC as basis for setting
interconnection prices. According to the ERG most of its members have introduced FL-
LRIC. Further, the European Parliament and Council, in Directive 2002/19/EC on access
to, and interconnection of electronic networks and associated facilities, stipulated cost-based
access prices as a means of regulating capacity access.
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1.2 Motivation and Research Questions
While the debate in the literature provides important qualitative conjectures
about the potential shortcomings of cost-based price regulation on grounds
of the asymmetrical distribution of risk in the access market, it falls short of
providing rigorous quantitative option-theoretic arguments, nor any empirical
evidence founded on the stochastic dynamics that dene downstream value.4
Hence the literature still lacks a rigorous analytical framework for analyzing
the distortionary e¤ect, if any, of costbased access prices, from the standpoint
of option-theoretic considerations. In particular, still lacking is a framework
that maps the stochastic dynamics of value to contingent claim pricing theory.
Therefore the basis for addressing the fundamental question about whether
the value of the exibility to respond to downstream stochastic processes is
signicant relative to the nancial equilibrium of access seekers, and whether
therefore any such value if unpriced adversely inuences market outcomes, is
lacking. This research is motivated more immediately by these questions and
the challenges they pose. More broadly, this motivation emanates from a keen
interest in the emerging application of nance theory to the regulation of net-
work industries.
These questions take the centre stage in the regulation of capacity access in
telecommunications for a number of reasons. On one hand, from a theoretical
standpoint, a material overstatement of access prices reinforces the dominant
position of the incumbent, puts upward pressure on the price of downstream
products and distorts the competitive neutrality between alternative technology
platforms - a material understatement of access prices encourages ine¢ cient en-
try, sties the ability of an incumbent to sustain and improve its infrastructure
and distorts the competitive neutrality between competing technology plat-
4Pertinent considerations include the properties of the evolution of net average down-
stream value of an activated exchange line, including its drift and volatility; intensity of
exchange line activation, including its drift and volatility; the price of access to the Sub-
scriber Network; the price of market risk; and the price of the risk of default.
4
forms.
One the other hand, from the standpoint of empirical evidence, rst, a
number of studies show that the price of access to the local loop is positively
correlated to inter-platform competition (see Crandal et al., 2004 and Waver-
man et al., 2007). The broader signicance of this conclusion are ndings that
show that inter-platform competition has a signicantly positive impact on
network di¤usion (see Distaso et al., 2000; Deni and Gruber, 2005; Aron and
Burnstein, 2003). More generally there is widespread consensus in the litera-
ture that a mere resale of an incumbents services does not create value (Cave
2006). Further, other studies show that access seekers did not climb the lad-
der of investment from unbundling initiatives as would be expected under the
stepping stone hypothesis (see Crandall et al., 2004; Hazlett, 2005; Hausman
and Sidak, 2005). Second, even if subsidized entry is suggested on grounds that
it stimulates competition, it has been argued that the terms of access should
mirror a voluntary exchange and reect the full economic cost of the underlying
service. This thesis contributes to this debate.
More specically, the purpose of this thesis is three-fold. First, to develop a
framework for valuing the exibility of adapting to downstream value, and to
test the neutrality of FL-LRIC as an approach for pricing capacity access, based
on evidence from the analogue platform, using numerical methods. Second,
to develop a framework for valuing the exibility of adapting to downstream
value, and to test the neutrality of FL-LRIC as an approach for pricing capacity
access, based on evidence from the ADSL platform, using numerical methods.
Third, to develop closed-form option-theoretic generalizations of the value of
such exibility, in the two platforms. The results from the numerical methods
provide a check on the results from the closed-form analytical solutions and
vice-versa.
The theoretical framework underpinning this study is contingent claim pric-
ing theory. This theory is used because of its capacity to conceptualize and
quantify the value of exibility. Contingent claim pricing theory nds its ori-
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gins in Black and Scholes (1973) and the subsequent enhancements in Merton
(1973). This study draws on Black (1976) who shows how futures prices can be
used to price contingent claims, based on arbitrage arguments. The contribu-
tion by Black is particularly important in commodity markets where futures and
forward prices are either observable or can be reasonably inferred. Contingent
claim pricing theory has been applied using the risk-neutral pricing principle
developed by Harrison and Kreps (1979), and Harrison and Pliska (1981, 1983).
In applying risk-neutral pricing, the market price of risk is taken to be a handle
which links the P -dynamics to theQ-dynamics of downstream value. Maximum
Likelihood Estimation is used to calibrate the stochastic di¤erential equations
describing downstream value.
1.3 Contributions and Limitations
On original contributions, rst, this study provides a rigorous analytical frame-
work, founded on the stochastic dynamics of downstream value, for evaluating
the symmetry of FL-LRIC. Second, this study provides empirical evidence on
the symmetry or otherwise of FL-LRIC access prices based on evidence from
the analogue platform. Third, it provides similar evidence from the ADSL
platform. These contributions set this study apart from previous studies and
take the debate in the literature beyond the current qualitative conjectures.
Fourth, it develops closed-form option-theoretic generalizations of the value of
such exibility, in the two platforms. These analytical solutions generalize the
results and provide an option-theoretic approach for pricing access where third
parties have the leverage of adapting to downstream stochastic value. In this
regard too, this study is signicantly di¤erent from previous research in the
eld.
On policy implications, this study informs regulatory policy on the versa-
tility of the contemporary approach used in the telecommunications industry
to price access. Turning to directions for regulatory policy, the results point to
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three possible remedies. First, binding the access seekers, through space and
time to an extent necessary to eliminate one-sided advantages through some
form of take-or-pay arrangements, or some variation of this type of contract.
Second, migrating to a pricing mechanism that is sensitive to the value of the
exibility to adapt to downstream stochastic processes, through space and time.
A third possible policy remedy is co-investment where the incumbent and the
access seekers would jointly own access infrastructure and jointly share the
upside and downside potential.
While this study contributes to the debate, it is however constrained by
the limitations of data in the public domain. The study could be improved
in number of ways if the availability of data was not a limitation. First, this
study assumes that the distribution of the alternative states of exchange lines is
uniform throughout the market studied. However relevant evidence shows that
the extent of competition varies from exchange to exchange. More specically,
cable had 95%+ presence in service areas covered by 48 local exchanges; 65-95%
presence in the service areas covered by 816 exchanges; 30-65% presence in 293;
5%-30% in 164; and up to 5% in 4,266, at the time of this study. Overall 857
exchanges included in the rst two clusters serve 45% of the delivery points in
the UK (Ofcom, 2006). Therefore subscribers have a choice of more than one
access platform in about one half of the downstream market and the magnitude
of the risk of stranded assets varies from exchange to exchange. This suggests
that the stochastic state of exchange lines and therefore the value of exibility
will vary also from exchange to exchange. Therefore a more appropriate way to
structure the study would be to stratify the various exchanges areas based the
stochastic dynamics of the exchange lines. This is has not been done because
of the lack of data.
Second, this study assumes a representative portfolio of exchange lines
through space and estimates option values from this standpoint. In practice
however access seekers have the leverage to work their way through space and
cherry pick high-end subscribers with high and stable demand. Therefore the
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results from the study should be seen as a conservative estimate of the dis-
tortionary e¤ect of FL-LRIC. Third, with respect to the ADSL platform, this
research is conned to wholesale access for the 8 mbit/s end-user capacity be-
cause of lack of data on other capacities. While this capacity accounts for 43%
of the UK market (see Ofcom, 2007), the research could be extended to other
capacities if data was not a constraint. Fourth, because of the unavailability
of data at more frequent intervals, this study uses quarterly data and monthly
data points are estimated by interpolation. While this approach has been used
by researchers in the face of data constraints, for example, Henisz and Zelner
(2001), it nevertheless adds noise to the data set.
The study points to two directions for future research. First, studying the
e¤ect of the distortionary e¤ect of cost-based access prices where third par-
ties purchase only a subset of network elements required to provide end-to-end
connectivity. Now while this is study is based on the case where a third-party
purchases end-to-end connectivity, it is however recognized that an access seeker
may opt to purchase only subset of the network elements required to provide
end-to-end connectivity, and supplement these with their own elements. Such
an alternative results in a risk prole that di¤ers from that studied here and
presents an area for further research. The second possible direction for future
research is studying the e¤ect of cost-based access prices, if any, on the regu-
lation of Next Generation Networks (NGNs). Now the migration from legacy
to NGNs is the most signicant technological transformation of telecommuni-
cation capacity networks in recent times. NGNs are a single IP-based network
with distributed network intelligence and access that allows seamless access to
any application in any geographic area. Unlike legacy networks which provide
a series of separate products using di¤erent technology platforms, NGNs are
capable of delivering multiple products (voice, data, video etc.) on a single
platform. The migration is in its rudimentary stages and full deployment in
European countries is expected by 2020. The migration entails considerable
investment and brings with it new dimensions of risk. Substantial segments
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of the NGN access infrastructure will however not be readily replicable and
incumbents will continue to exercise considerable market power in the access
market. Third-party mandatory access to economic bottlenecks will continue
to facilitate competition. The primary challenge of third-party access regula-
tion is to create access regimes that facilitate innovation and investment, and
ultimately facilities-based competition.
1.4 Organization of Thesis
Chapter 2 reviews the literature on the broader context of the research questions
and includes a discussion on ex-poste regulation, the rationale for mandatory
unbundling, empirical evidence on the e¤ect of policy variables on facilities-
based competition and network penetration, mandatory vertical separation,
and theoretical approaches to access pricing. This chapter concludes with a
review of the literature on access pricing and the value of exibility. Chapter
3 is a literature review on the theoretical framework underpinning the analysis
in this study i.e. option pricing theory. The research design and methodology
are covered in Chapter 4. The coverage in that chapter includes a discussion on
the research paradigm, analytical framework, and the structure of the study.
In Chapter 5, a framework for valuing the exibility to adapt to downstream
stochastic processes in analogue capacity markets is developed, and evidence
from the in the UK, is used to test whether FL-LRIC, as a method for pricing
access in telecommunications capacity markets, has a distortionary e¤ect that
is signicant. In Chapter 6, a framework for valuing the exibility to adapt to
downstream stochastic processes in the ADSL capacity markets is developed,
and evidence from the UK is used to test whether FL-LRIC, as a method
for pricing access in telecommunications capacity markets, has a distortionary
e¤ect that is signicant. Closed-form analytical solutions are developed in
Chapter 7. These solutions, rst, generalize the results and provide an option-
theoretic framework for pricing access where third parties have the leverage
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of adapting to downstream stochastic value. Second, these solutions provide a
basis for checking the results produced by the numerical methods in Chapters 5
and 6. Chapter 8 presents the results and includes a discussion. The conclusion
is in Chapter 9.
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Chapter 2
Mandatory Unbundling and Access Pricing
2.1 Introduction
The immediate literature that this thesis builds on is that on capacity ac-
cess pricing in telecommunication access markets and option pricing theory.
The broader relevant literature is that on vertical integration, market power
and anti-competitive behaviour; regulatory remedies including mandatory un-
bundling of telecommunications capacity networks, and vertical separation; and
access pricing. This chapter reviews the immediate and broader body of lit-
erature. On vertical integration, the literature emphasizes weighing its pro-
competitive benets and anti-competitive e¤ects. While mandatory unbundling
is advocated where there exist enduring bottlenecks, empirical evidence on its
e¤ect on investments and network penetration is not entirely conclusive but
point to two directions. First, that inter-modal competition has positive and
signicant impact on service penetration. Second, the price of access to the local
loop is positively and signicantly correlated to facilities-based deployment.
The search for an approach to pricing access in unbundled networks has for
the time being settled on cost-based access prices based on e¢ cient forward-
looking costs, FL-LRIC,1 in a considerable body of literature, and in fact in
practice. An emerging debate questions the versatility of this approach to pric-
ing on account of option-theoretic arguments. These arguments however see
a transition in the characterization of the anomaly attributed to cost-based
prices. This transition has three key strands of arguments. First, that sunk
costs truncate cash ows and result in an asymmetrical distribution of risk. Sec-
ond, regulatory prescriptions give rise to investment inexibility and therefore
1Equivalent terms in some jurisdictions include Total Element Long-run Incremental Costs
(TELRIC) and Total Service Long-run Incremental Costs (TSLRIC).
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have an opportunity cost from a real options perspective. Third, the asymmet-
rical exibility to adapt to downstream stochastic processes at the level of an
exchange line has value.
This study builds more immediately on the third tier of the debate in the
literature by carrying out an empirical investigation to test the symmetry of
FL-LRIC. More specically, the purpose of this study is three-fold. First, to
develop a framework for valuing the exibility of adapting to downstream value,
and to test the neutrality of FL-LRIC as an approach for pricing capacity access
using numerical methods, from the standpoint of option pricing theory, in the
analogue platform. Second, to develop a framework for valuing the exibility
of adapting to downstream value, and to test the neutrality of FL-LRIC as
an approach for pricing capacity access using numerical methods, from the
standpoint of option pricing theory, in the ADSL platform. Third, to develop
closed-form option-theoretic generalizations of the value of such exibility, in
the two platforms.
The questions that this thesis addresses are important from a theoretical
standpoint, for a number of reasons. A material overstatement of access prices
reinforces the dominant position of the incumbent, puts upward pressure on
the price of downstream products and distorts the competitive neutrality be-
tween alternative technology platforms - a material understatement of access
prices encourages ine¢ cient entry, sties the ability of an incumbent to sustain
and improve its infrastructure and distorts the competitive neutrality between
competing technology platforms. Section 2.2 reviews the literature on ex-post
regulation, Section 2.3 discusses the rationale for mandatory unbundling and
also reviews empirical results on its e¤ect on facilities-based competition and
network penetration, Section 2.4 discusses ex-ante regulation and mandatory
vertical separation, Section 2.5 discusses theories to pricing access and Section
2.6 discusses access pricing and the value of exibility.
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2.2 Vertical Integration and its Competitive E¤ects
The question about the pro and anti-competitive e¤ects of vertical integration
continues be at the centre of the debate in antitrust and regulatory literature.
In the last four decades the debate has seen gradual shifts starting with the
rather restrictive views on vertical integration in the 1970s. The foreclosure
doctrine, which dominated the thinking then, conjectured that the owner of
a bottleneck facility has the incentive to leverage its market power from the
bottleneck segment to the adjacent competitive or potentially competitive seg-
ments. Foreclosure is discussed in the literature as taking either of two forms:
raising rivalscosts or reducing rivalsrevenues the former encompasses ceas-
ing to supply downstream rivals or doing so at anti-competitive prices i.e. in-
put foreclosure. Reducing rivalsrevenues entails barring a¢ liated downstream
rms from obtaining supplies from independent upstream rms. One of the
pioneering applications of the foreclosure doctrine was in Terminal Railroads
Association v. USA (1912). The doctrine subsequently found application in
landmark cases including Brown Shoe Co. v. USA (1962).
In what is commonly referred to as the Chicago School critique, researchers
for example, Posner (1976), challenged the foundations of the foreclosure doc-
trine arguing that, where there exists a vertically integrated rm with market
power in the bottleneck segment, there exists only one market for the nal good
and hence only one monopoly prot to be earned. A vertically integrated rm
can earn the monopoly prot by exerting its market power in the bottleneck
segment. Such a rm does not therefore have an incentive to distort down-
stream competition (see Riordan and Salop, 1994; Rubinfeld and Singer, 2001;
and Church, 2004). Imperfect competition in the downstream market therefore
only adversely a¤ects the prots of the monopoly supplier. On the basis of this
argument, vertical integration can only be motivated by the need to enhance
e¢ ciency. This view dominated much of anti-trust arguments in the 1980s for
example, in the US, the 1982 and 1984 non-horizontal merger guidelines were
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largely founded on this premise.
The Chicago School critique was subsequently found to be wanting because
the assumptions underlying the critique that the monopoly service provider
was protected by barriers to entry and was unregulated, that there was per-
fect competition in the downstream market and that inputs were used in xed
proportions were overly restrictive. In the absence of these restrictive assump-
tions the single monopoly prot theory does not hold instead it is argued that
vertical integration can be motivated by monopoly power, economic e¢ ciencies
or both (see Church, 2004). This forms a key tenet of the Post-Chicago cri-
tique. The Post-Chicago critique, while not entirely discounting the Chicago
School critique, emphasizes both competitive and anti-competitive e¤ects of
vertical integration (Riordan and Salop, 1994 and Cooper et al., 2005). The
potential benets from vertical integration are seen to include superior coordi-
nation in the production chain, elimination of double-marginalization, reduced
cost of capital from diversication and a stronger commitment to sunk capital.
The potential anti-competitive harm is seen to include the extremes of market
power, for example, foreclosure to access inputs or customers (Hazlett, 2002).
The Post-Chicago critique provides key tenets of antitrust and regulatory prac-
tice today where the emphasis is on weighing the pro-competitive benets of
vertical integration against its anti-competitive e¤ects. See, for example, the
EU guidelines on non-horizontal merger guidelines of 2000 and the US guide-
lines on non-horizontal merger guidelines of 1997. In telecommunications, the
key ex-post remedy for foreclosure is resolution under competition law. The key
ex-ante regulatory remedies include structural remedies such as mandatory ver-
tical separation, behavioural remedies such as mandatory unbundling with or
without regulated access prices; and access quality control (Farrel and Weiser,
2003).
In the EU, the rulings in the landmark cases Bronner (Oscar) GmbH & Co v.
Mediaprint GmbH & Co (1998) and Sea Containers Ltd v. Stena Sealink Ports
(1995) provide much of the binding legal precedence with respect to the frame-
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work of third-party access to a bottleneck facility (essential facility)2 under EU
competition law. The overriding principle established in the rulings is that an
entity controlling a bottleneck facility should provide access to such a facility
on reasonable terms, if it is feasible to do so. These and subsequent rulings
culminated in a specic criteria for assessing allegations of abuses of dominant
positions with regard to third-party access to bottleneck facilities. The key con-
siderations in establishing a case of abuse of dominance are whether: (i) access
is essential for competition in the relevant market; (ii) there is su¢ cient capac-
ity for access to be provided; (iii) the facility owner is failing to satisfy demand,
blocking the emergence of a new product or service, or impeding competition
in an existing or potential market; (iv) the potential customer is prepared to
pay a reasonable price; and (v) there is no objective reason to refuse access.
In the US, the essential facilities doctrine provides the basis in common law to
provide access. In telecommunications, the doctrine found application in MCI
Communications Corp. v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co.(1983). In this
case it was ruled that to prove an abuse of a dominant position the aggrieved
party needs to show: (i) control of the essential facility by a monopolist; (ii)
a competitors inability to practically or reasonably duplicate the essential fa-
cility; (iii) the denial of the use of the facility to a competitor; and (iv) the
feasibility of providing the facility.
While the essential facilities doctrine presents a front in common law to
address abuses of market power that have occurred, ex-ante regulation presents
an administrative front to address potential abuses of market power. Ex-ante
regulation in telecommunications is in the main a¤ected through either manda-
tory unbundling or vertical separation, with or without price controls. The
case for ex-post regulation has been argued for on grounds of the risk regula-
tory failure of ex-ante regulation. It has been argued that ex-ante regulation
depends on the ability of the regulator to reasonably accurately synthesize the
2A bottleneck facility is an input required by a competitor to compete in a downstream
market (or a neighbouring market), where it is not economically or physically feasible to
duplicate such facility see Whish (2003).
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direction of technological developments and their corresponding commercial im-
plications. This is a di¢ cult task given the uidity of technological changes in
telecommunications.
The case for ex-post regulation has been further argued for on grounds of
information asymmetry between operators is lower than that between regulators
and operators. This coupled with the threat of law and the surveillance imposed
on the access provider by other operators in the access market have been argued
to be adequate to put pressure on a dominant rm to behave competitively. On
the other hand, some researchers have argued for ex-ante regulation on grounds
of its relative advantages in the speed of execution and technical expertise. The
next section discusses ex-ante regulation and mandatory unbundling.
2.3 Ex-ante Regulation and Mandatory Unbundling
2.3.1 Unbundling: Rationale
Mandatory unbundling of xed-wire telecommunication networks is discussed
in a considerable body of literature as a regulatory intervention for promoting
competition in retail and capacity markets. The rationale for this interven-
tion is that while competition is desirable in these markets, entry is however
not readily feasible because of barriers to entry which include scale economies,
sunk costs and rst-mover advantages (Hausman and Sidak, 2005). The case
for mandatory unbundling has been argued for, rst, on grounds that it facili-
tates platform competition through the ladder of investmenthypothesis. The
premise of this argument is that by allowing entrants to rent bottleneck facil-
ities at an initial stage of competition, they are provided with an impetus for
subsequent investment in their own facilities, creating in the process, rival net-
works hence facilities-based competition. This argument, also referred to as the
"stepping stone" hypothesis, is perhaps best articulated by Cave (2006). In the
same vein, Cave and Vogelsang (2003) argue that entrants do not emerge as at
the outset as fully edged facilities-based competitors. They argue that compe-
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tition evolves as entrants purchase an incumbents network elements and resell
its retail products. Gradually the entrants replace the incumbents networks
elements with their own elements. Second, the case for mandatory unbundling
has been argued for on the grounds that competition between an incumbent and
access seekers, and between access seekers, puts downward pressure on retail
prices and provides incentives for innovation (Hausman and Sidak, 2005).
The case for mandatory unbundling is however not without opposition. Op-
ponents of mandatory unbundling have argued that such intervention dimin-
ishes an incumbents incentive to maintain and improve its infrastructure be-
cause the incumbent is deprived of the full value of its investment. They have
further argued that the short-term benets from competition may be lower
than the long-term harm from reduced innovation. The sharp divide in the
arguments on the merits of mandatory unbundling dominates debate in the
literature and has given rise to a urry of empirical research to test the e¢ -
cacy of unbundling. This body of research has looked at the e¤ect of various
policy variables on investment and service penetration. The empirical evidence
on the impact of alternative regulatory prescriptions is however, in the main,
non-conclusive. We consider a cross-section of key studies in this area.
2.3.2 Unbundling and Service Penetration
Murillo and Gabel (2003) investigate how policy variables including unbundling,
ownership and competition impact broadband deployment. The other indepen-
dent variables considered include retail price, number of registered domain name
servers and demographic factors including income, education, penetration of
narrowband and access to personal computers, among others. The study uses
cross-sectional data from 135 countries. The study nds that income, retail
price, ownership and competition are important drivers of broadband di¤u-
sion. The study however nds that unbundling is not a signicant driver of
broadband di¤usion.
Kim et al. (2003) investigate the e¤ect of policy variables, retail price, price
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of dial-up service, income, preparedness, competition and population density
on broadband di¤usion. The study uses cross-sectional data from 30 OECD
countries. This study nds that the most consistent factors that explain broad-
band di¤usion are the drivers of cost and the preparedness of a country. Policy
variables including unbundling, competition and government funding do not
exhibit a signicant inuence on broadband di¤usion. While unbundling had a
positive e¤ect on adoption, this was not signicant. Further, while not signi-
cant, the more intense is competition, the less intense is broadband adoption.
Wallsten (2005) investigates the e¤ect of policy and demographic variables
on broadband penetration (ADSL, cable and total deployment) based on US-
evidence. The study uses state-level cross-sectional data covering the period
1999 to 2004. On policy variables, the study investigates whether unbundling
through UNE-P and through resale impact broadband penetration. In addi-
tion to the policy variables, the study investigates the e¤ect of public rights of
way, municipal restrictions, availability of loans and tax incentives on service
penetration. The study nds that the concentration of UNE-P leased lines is
negatively and signicantly correlated to ADSL rollout. This nding supports
the view that unbundling deters investment by the incumbent. The concen-
tration of UNE-P lines on total broadband penetration and cable penetration
is however not signicant. Further, the study nds that the concentration
of lines used by access seekers under the resale programmes is positively and
signicantly correlated to total and ADSL broadband penetration. The con-
centration of resale lines is however only weakly positively correlated to cable
penetration.
Wallsten (2006) investigates whether policy options including full unbundling,
bitstream access, sub-loop unbundling, collocation (remote and virtual co-
mingling), regulation of line rental and collocation charges, and demographic
factors including telephone line per capita and GDP per capita impact penetra-
tion and delivery speeds available to subscribers. The study is based on cross-
sectional panel data covering the period 1999-2003 from 30 OECD countries.
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This study is di¤erentiated from previous studies, rst, because it distinguishes
the various forms of unbundling (full unbundling, bitstream access, sub-loop
unbundling). Second, because it considers the e¤ect of policy and demographic
factors not just on penetration but also delivery speeds. The study nds that
population density has a positive and signicant impact on penetration and
connection speeds. The study also nds that the e¤ect of full unbundling on
deployment is ambiguous with the relevant coe¢ cients ranging from positive
and signicant to negative and signicant depending on model specications.
The study nds that sub-loop unbundling has a negative and signicant impact
on deployment. Bitstream access is found to have an insignicant e¤ect on pen-
etration. Co-mingling is found to generally have a positive e¤ect on penetration
and virtual collocation the opposite e¤ect. Regulatory approval of collocation
charges is found to have a negative e¤ect on deployment.
Aron and Burnstein (2003) investigate the inuence of availability, competi-
tion and demographic inuences on broadband deployment.3 The study is based
on US evidence and uses state-level cross-sectional data from 46 states. The
demographic variables considered include education, tele-density, and length
of access lines, among others. The study nds that inter-modal competition
positively and signicantly impact broadband adoption. In fact they nd that
the impact of competition almost entirely eliminates the impact of availability.
Deni and Gruber (2005) investigate the e¤ect of the concentration of intra-
platform competition, concentration of inter-platform competition, proportion
of incumbent lines, tele-density and central o¢ ce upgrade on broadband deploy-
ment. The study is based on US evidence and uses state level cross-sectional
panel data covering the period 1999 to 2004. They nd that there is a positive
and signicant correlation between inter-platform competition and broadband
deployment. They also nd that intra-platform competition has a positive and
signicant impact on broadband deployment but this e¤ect dissipates rapidly.
3Availability is measured by the relative coverage of either ADSL or cable services and
competition is measured by the proportion of the subscriber base served by both ADSL and
cable.
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While the e¤ect of the broad policy variables is necessarily of interest, of
relevance too is the e¤ect of the narrower prescription embodied in the price
of access. Eisner and Lehman (2001), Crandall et al. (2004), Ford and Spiwak
(2004) and Waverman et al. (2007) look at the impact of access price on dif-
fusion. Now Eisner and Lehman study how access prices interact with three
forms of competitive entry resale, UNE-based and facility-based entry. The
study is based on state-level cross-sectional data from 48 states in the US. The
variables considered include UNE prices, population density, resale discounts
and employment, among others. They nd that facilities-based entry is nega-
tively correlated to the level of UNE prices. They however nd that the e¤ect
of UNE prices on resale and unbundling is ambiguous. The study by Crandall
et al. (2004) also investigates the impact of price on di¤usion. The study uses
state-level cross-sectional panel data, from two sources (incumbents and FCC)
and covers the period 2000 and 2001. Using the two data sets, the study nds a
positive and signicant correlation between the log of the ratio of facility-based
lines and UNE lines. Further the study nds that the growth of facilities-based
lines was higher in the states where the cost of UNEs was higher relative to the
cost of facilities-based lines.
Waverman et al. (2007) study the impact of LLU prices on broadband
adoption using cross-sectional panel data covering the period 2000 to 2006 from
12 OECD countries. More specically, the study looks at how the price of LLU;
the level of competitor lines o¤ered over PSTN, incumbent DSL lines and non-
DSL lines; availability of bitstream access; and market concentration of LLU,
impact broadband adoption. The study nds that LLU prices are postively and
signicantly correlated to the level of subscribers using alternative platforms 
in summary, a 10% reduction in LLU prices gives rise to a 18% decrease in the
number of subscribers using alternative platforms. The authors conclude that
low LLU prices deter facilities-based competition. Distaso et al. (2006) study
the impact of inter and intra-platform competition on broadband di¤usion using
evidence from 14 European countries. They nd that the correlation between
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inter-platform competition and broadband di¤usion is positive and signicant.
They however nd that the correlation between intra-platform competition and
broadband di¤usion is not signicant.
Ford and Spiwak (2004) investigate how broadband adoption is impacted
by local loop access costs and prices, per capita income, availability (percentage
of zip codes in a state that have at least one provider of broadband services),
competition (dened as the proportion of zip codes in a state with at least four
service providers), relative proportion of rural population and the number of
large cities in a state. The study is based on US evidence and uses state-level
cross-sectional panel data covering the period 2002 and 2003. The study nds
that both availability and competitiveness primarily depend on the relative
proportion of rural population, time and the price of the unbundled loop. It is
shown that the price of access to the local loop is negatively and signicantly
correlated to both availability and competitiveness.
Hazlett (2005) reviews the US access market in the period 1999 to 2004.
He observes that during this period UNE-P lines emerged to dominate the
portfolios of access seekers. During this period UNE-P lines grew by over 300%
and facilities-based lines grew by just 20%. In fact the number of non-cable
facility-based lines decreased from 4.1 million to 3.2 million during this period.
Hazlett nds that the correlation between the growth of UNE-P lines and non-
cable facilities-based competition is -0.99 and concludes that UNE-P lines crowd
out facilities-based competition. Of interest too is that during the period 1999
to 2004, while the lines operated by access seekers reected a continuous period-
to-period increase, the level of their non-cable facilities-based lines showed a
decline bringing to doubt the stepping stonehypothesis. Hazlett also nds
that investments by incumbents and access seekers are negatively correlated to
the growth of shared lines (coe¢ cient of correlation for the period 2000 to 2003
is -0.94). Hazlett also nds that the rate of deployment of DSL increased after
the repeal of the mandatory line sharing requirements in the US.
Crandall et al.(2004) present data showing that UNE lines in access seekers
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portfolios increased from 24% in 1999 to 55% in 2002. This indicates that access
seekers did not migrate to facilities-based competition as would be envisaged
under the ladder of investmenthypothesis. Hausman and Sidak (2005) follow
the evolution of lines operated by 17 access seekers in 2000 and nd that 25%
of these increased the proportion of facility-based lines in their portfolio 50%
of the rms maintained about the same proportion of facilities-based lines.
Some rms went bankrupt and others decreased their share of facilities-based
competition.
The above studies show mixed results. Three possible reasons are adduced
to explain this. First, the dynamics of supply and demand in a complex indus-
try, as is the case with broadband, could be more complicated than what econo-
metric models are able to capture. Second, the varying conditions of supply
and demand between countries and between states may possibly render over-
simplistic the assumption that a single model is suitable in all circumstances.
Third, the length of time covered by the time series data is in some cases very
short, for example, refer to Ford and Spiwak (2004) and Crandall et al. (2004).
This limits the traction required to decipher cause and e¤ect linkages. Lastly,
the variety of models presented by the various researchers illustrate that even
at a conceptual level there is no agreement on the constituent drivers of supply
and demand. Now case study research, for example, Aizu (2002), has been used
to grapple with the complexity of the subject matter. This has provided some
persuasive analysis of the dynamics of broadband deployment in Korea, Hong
Kong, Singapore and Japan.
Despite the mixed results, two fairly persuasive results emerge from the
studies. First, that inter-modal competition has positive and signicant impact
on broadband di¤usion (see Aron and Burnstein, 2003 and Deni and Grubber,
2005). Second, the price of access to the local loop is postively and signi-
cantly correlated to facilities-based deployment (see evidence from Crandall et
al., 2004 and Waverman et al., 2007).4 This read together with the data pre-
4The e¤ect of unbundling on di¤usion is ambiguous refer to Murillo and Gabel (2003),
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sented by Crandall et al. (2004), Hazlett (2005) and Hausman and Sidak (2005)
about the less than satisfactory migration from service-based to facilities-based
competition suggests that the inuence of price, in particular its symmetry or
otherwise, presents an interesting area for further enquiry. Could it be that an
articial suppression of the price of the local loop explains the suppression of
facilities-based competition? This question gives a broad context to the subject
of this research an enquiry into the symmetry or otherwise of FL-LRIC.
2.4 Ex-ante Regulation and Vertical Separation
Mandatory vertical separation is a regulatory intervention for promoting com-
petition in retail and capacity markets. It has been argued that mandatory
unbundling cannot ensure equality of access because it gives an incumbent con-
icting incentives. While equality of access is a prerequisite for achieving the
objectives of mandatory access, the access provider benets from discrimina-
tory practices. For example, an integrated access provider benets from delays
in providing access services, degradation of access quality or price discrimina-
tion. Mandatory vertical separation is suggested in the literature as a remedy
where there exists a persistent bottleneck in a network and where traditional
regulatory prescriptions, for example mandatory unbundling, cannot provide
remedies for abuses of market power (see Crandal and Sidak, 2002).
Mandatory vertical separation overcomes the risk of leveraging market power
by putting the retail arm of the incumbent on the same footing as its down-
stream competitors. Therefore the incentive to provide preferential treatment
to downstream competitors is, in theory, largely eliminated. Proponents of
vertical separation argue that it provides a level playing eld by eliminating
incentives to discriminate in the downstream market through for example, in-
creasing rivals costs. In e¤ect vertical separation aligns the interests of the
access providers with those of downstream competitors. The case for vertical
Kim et al. (2003), Wallsten (2005) and Wallsten (2006).
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separation has also been argued for on the grounds that the provision of ac-
cess is necessarily complex and providing such access by an integrated rm will
necessarily be litigious. Vertical separation considerably reduces the need for
expensive litigation. Further, vertical separation eliminates incentives to cross-
subsidize between upstream and downstream markets. Equally importantly,
vertical separation eliminates the risk of free riding by entrants and reduces the
burden of regulation (see de Bijl, 2005).
Vertical separation takes three main forms. First, accounting separation,
under which the downstream and upstream arms of an integrated entity main-
tain independent accounting records. Accounting separation however is merely
a booking-keeping undertaking and its impact on corporate behaviour is nec-
essarily minimal. Second, functional separation, where the downstream and
upstream arms of an integrated rm are separated into two independent divi-
sions or legal entities with separate management and assets, but with the two
arms having the same ownership. Functional separation merely relocates the
upstream arm of a business to a point outside the immediate inuence of the
downstream business or vice versa. Ultimately, however the downstream arm
remains subject to the same overall corporate authority as the retail arm and
therefore both arms are necessarily tied to the same overall corporate objec-
tives. The e¤ectiveness of functional separation must therefore be necessarily
weak.
The third form of vertical seperation is structural separation, under which
the downstream and upstream arms of an integrated rm are separated into two
independent legal entities with separate ownership. Structural separation sends
strong signals because it completely separates the downstream and upstream
functions it is however not without costs. Such separation entails forgone ad-
vantages of coordination and forgone economies of scope. Structural separation
is not only a necessarily costly and disruptive process but also one that in-
creases the cost of capital because of the loss of the advantages of coordination
and because the forgone economies of scope increase the underlying business
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risk. Further, structural separation removes the single point of accountability
that subscribers would otherwise look up to. In addition, vertical separation
eliminates the advantages that a vertically integrated rm would have to bun-
dle services (see Crandal and Sidak, 2002). Utimately, one therefore needs to
weigh the benets and costs of separation and only pursue such separation if
its benets outweigh its costs. Empirical evidence on the overall e¤ect of the
various forms of vertical separation is still lacking in the literature and opens
an interesting area for research.
2.5 Ex-ante Regulation and Pricing Access
2.5.1 Rate-of-Return Regulation
Rate-of-return regulation also known as cost-of-service regulation was widely
applied across most network industries prior to the mid-1980s. Under this
approach, the price of access is set ex-ante at a level that compensates the
service provider for both operating and capital costs. The recovery of capital
costs is based on the rate base (stock of capital assets required to deliver the
service) and the applicable rate of return. This rate is equivalent to that would
be earned by investments with a similar risk exposure. The rate base will
usually be based on historical costs with common costs allocated on the basis
of either output, attributable costs or revenue. Proponents of rate of return
regulation have argued that this approach bases prices on cost causality and is
therefore equitable. They argue further that rate-of-return regulation provides
incentives for improvements in e¢ ciency and productivity given that prices
during a regulatory lag are xed thereby providing an impetus to reduce costs
and maximize prots. Unlike the price-cap approach to regulation, rate of
return regulation has a handle on the totality of the nancial equation dening
value for the service provider and therefore provides a more comprehensive
means for inuencing the behaviour of a service provider.
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Rate of return regulation however lost much of its appeal from the mid-
1980s because of concerns about its ine¢ ciency. Rate-of-return regulation is
seen to be ine¢ cient because of the Averch-Johnson e¤ect (see Averch and
Johnson, 1962). The reasoning here is that rate-of-return regulation gives a
service provider the incentive to unjustiably expand the rate base and thereby
increase the regulated price. Kahn (1988) discusses the Averch-Johnson ef-
fect using evidence from the electricity industry. Kahn observes that suppliers:
resisted the adoption of cheaper and more e¢ cient technology, avoided cost-
e¤ective measures like leasing when this was warranted, failed to coordinate
to purchase electricity from other suppliers even when this was cost-e¤ective,
avoided peak-load pricing and adopted unnecessarily high standards of reliabil-
ity.
Rate-of-return regulation has other perverse incentives. E¢ ciency and pro-
ductivity gains are translated into lower prices in the next regulatory lag thereby
discouraging any such improvements in the rst place. Rate of return regula-
tion is also ine¢ cient at the operating level the assurance to recover oper-
ating costs discourages improvements in e¢ ciency and productivity. Further,
rate-of-return regulation discourages investment in new technology where such
technology reduces the rate base of the service provider. Lastly, rate-of-return
regulation has the further drawback of the regulatory burden associated with
rate setting. Mathios and Rogers (1989) provide evidence that shows that
telephone tari¤s were higher in the states that used rate-of-return regulation
relative to those that used price-cap regulation.
Economic theory suggests that the allocation of common costs on the basis
of output, attributable costs or revenue does not maximize welfare. To this ex-
tent the rate-of-return regulation fails the welfare test. Ramsey prices provide a
formulation that ensures that sunk costs of a multi-product rm are recovered
while at the same time simultaneously ensuring that consumer surplus is maxi-
mized. This is achieved by marking up the prices of the various products above
marginal cost in inverse proportion to the respective price elasticities. Despite
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its widespread recognition in economic literature, Ramsey prices have however
not found practical application because of the di¢ culties associated with de-
termining price and cross-price elasticities. A further limitation of Ramsey
prices lies in its implied inequities. In e¤ect, in certain circumstances, products
which are social necessities but which have low price elasticities absorb a larger
proportion of common and joint costs relative to those products with higher
price elasticities but which may not be social necessities. The subject of the
allocation of joint and common costs with respect to pricing in a multi-product
rm continues to be at the centre of controversy between economic literature
and public policy. While economic literature has advocated the maximization
of consumer surplus, public policy has leaned towards equity, as measured by
cost causation, or approximations of such causation.
2.5.2 The E¢ cient Component Pricing Rule
The E¢ cient Component Pricing Rule (ECPR), as an approach to pricing ac-
cess, has been widely discussed in the literature and in fact at some point found
its way into practice in some jurisdictions, for example, New Zealand. ECPR
was rst proposed by Willig (1979). Its advocates theorize that, because the
access provider provides upstream inputs used by its downstream rivals, the
price of a unit of access should equal the incremental cost of providing one unit
of access plus the opportunity cost of providing access. The theory however
holds where: the access providers price is based on the marginal pricing rule;
the access providers and access seekers services are perfect substitutes; there
are constant returns to scale for both the access provider and access seeker; the
access seeker has no market power; and the access providers marginal cost of
production can be accurately observed. Doane et al. (1996) propose M-ECPR,
a renement of ECPR. M-ECPR has identical conceptual underpinnings to
ECPR only that under the former, the access price is based on the lowest price
of the downstream good, where such lower price is available from an alternative
access provider.
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Its advocates argue that ECPR ensures e¢ cient entry and is equitable to an
access provider because it prices access at incremental cost and takes account
of the opportunity cost for providing access; is non-discriminatory because the
provision of access does not encroach onto the access providers net income;
ensures that access is only sought by rms that are equally or more e¢ cient
than the access provider;5 and the incentive of access provider to invest in
infrastructure is not distorted because the access providers pre-entry prots is
preserved (see Sidak and Baumol, 1994 and Baumol et al., 1997).
ECPRs drawback is that it bases the access price on the access providers
pre-entry prices which are unlikely to be e¢ cient. These pre-entry prices
will mostly likely correspond to historical costs and harbour the inuence of
monopoly ine¢ ciencies. The historical costs will have imbedded ine¢ ciencies
and will not reect the most e¢ cient use of current and anticipated technology.
ECPR in e¤ect therefore protects pre-entry technology and productivity and
does not provide incentives to adapt the most e¢ cient technology. Neither does
ECPR provide incentives for the most e¢ cient use of such technology.
Economides and White (1995 and 1998) provide proof of the general inef-
ciency of ECPR. The essence of this proof is that ECPR perpetuates high
prices which result in the loss of consumer surplus and social welfare relative
to prices that reect social economic costs. Economides (1997) argues that
the shortcomings of ECPR and M-ECPR lies in the fact that these approaches
to pricing are based on private and not social opportunity costs. Economides
observes the private opportunity costs of a monopoly will necessarily reect
higher prices associated with imbedded ine¢ ciencies and monopoly prots and
argues that such opportunity costs do not reect social opportunity costs, which
should equate to the e¢ cient use of resources by society. He further argues
that an access provider should not be compensated for its private opportunity
costs but rather the social opportunity costs because higher prices implied by
5For if an access seeker was less e¢ cient than the access provider then entry would be
unprotable.
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ECPR result in consumer welfare loss. In the US, the Federal Commission of
Communication in assessing the merits of ECPR in its First Report on the
implementation of the 1996 Act, concluded that:
ECPR is an improper method for setting prices of interconnection
and unbundled network elements because the existing retail prices that
would be used to compute incremental opportunity cost under ECPR
are not cost-based. The ECPR, however, will serve to discourage com-
petition because it relies on the prevailing retail price in setting the
price which new entrants pay the incumbent for inputs. While ECPR
establishes conditions for e¢ cient entry given existing retail prices, as
its advocates contend, the ECPR provides no mechanism that will force
retail prices to their competitive levels.
A further weakness of ECPR is that a decrease in the cost of transform-
ing the upstream products does not translate in a corresponding decrease in
the price of the downstream products. In fact a decrease in the cost of transfor-
mation does not necessarily result in a decrease of the access price. Lastly, an
access price that is bloated with historical ine¢ ciencies and monopoly prots
will be above the e¢ cient cost of access. The higher the di¤erential between
the ECPR-determined access price and e¢ cient costs, the higher will be the
incentives to duplicate the access network, albeit even if ine¢ ciently.
The retail-minus approach to pricing is built on the ECPR. Retail-minus
provides a safeguard against margin squeezes (see King and Maddock, 2003).
A margin squeeze arises when a vertically integrated supplier leverages its mar-
ket power in the upstream market to remove or constrain competition in the
downstream market in this case by squeezing the margins of downstream com-
petitors. A margin squeeze is said to occur when the aggregate of the access
price and the e¢ cient costs of transforming the upstream product exceed the
price of the downstream product. In essence a retail-minus price is the retail
price less the costs that would be avoided by a service provider if it ceased
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to provide the retail service. Avoided costs therefore include all those costs
associated with the retail activity. Kaserman and Mayo (1997) and Beard et
al. (1998) provide a ner interpretation of the avoided costs under retail-minus
pricing. They interpret avoided costs to include three components: (i) incre-
mental cost at the retail stage incurred by an e¢ cient supplier, (ii) additional
costs incurred at the retail stage which are attributable to ine¢ ciencies, and (iii)
economic prot earned by the access provider for the retail activity. Kaserman
and Mayo (1997) and Beard et al. (1998) term this denition of the retail-
minus price, the Avoided Cost Pricing Rule (ACPR). ACPR has the thrust of
ECPR while the broad principles are the same under the two approaches, the
former assumes an e¢ cient supplier while the latter does not. Overall while
retail-minus pricing has the advantage of simplicity and a lighter regulatory
burden, the most signicant drawback of retail-minus pricing is that it assumes
the prevailing retail prices are competitive.
2.5.3 Price-cap Regulation
The dissatisfaction with the weak signals for e¢ ciency under rate of return
regulation ushered in the era of incentive regulation. As implied by its name,
incentive regulation is intended to provide incentives for e¢ ciency and produc-
tivity improvements to service providers with signicant market power. One of
the pioneering banners of incentive regulation was price-cap regulation, which
provides a ceiling for the regulated prices. The most common approach to
price-cap regulation has been the RPI-X model which allows regulated prices
to increase by the rate of ination less the X-factor which captures e¢ ciency
and productivity gains. In theory this should be calibrated such that the access
providers and consumers share the gains from improvements in e¢ ciency and
productivity. Littlechild (1983) is credited for giving prominence to price-cap
regulation in network industries. Following Littlechilds work, RPI-X regulation
was initially applied in telecommunications industry in UK. Subsequently price-
cap regulation was used in the water, electricity, natural gas and transportation
30
sectors in the UK. RPI-X regulation then found its way to other jurisdictions
outside the UK, for example, access regulation in telecommunications in the
US. In putting forward a case for RPI-X regulation, Littlechild, argued that
this form of price regulation is superior to alternative forms of price control
from the standpoint of considerations including: protection against monopoly,
provision of incentives for e¢ ciency and innovation, reduction on the burden of
regulation and promotion of competition. In supporting price-cap regulation,
Acton and Vogelsang (1989) observe:
Thus, rather than creating regulation based on the premise of an om-
niscient regulator being able to set optimal prices based on full knowl-
edge of costs and demand, a more realistic regulatory goal is to design
incentive mechanisms for the regulated rm that will lead it to maximize
societys objectives (whether these are e¢ ciency, distributive, or other
objectives) while pursuing its self-interest. Price caps are viewed as an
attractive means for implementing such incentive schemes, although we
must acknowledge that maximizing a social objective function potentially
places even greater informational burdens on the regulator.
RPI-X however has a number of drawbacks. First, the measurement of
e¢ ciency and productivity, in markets where the dynamics of supply are char-
acterized by complexity, is problematic. This is the case in telecommunications
capacity access where technology, tra¢ c and other factors impacting on e¢ -
ciency and productivity are uid. Second, price cap regulation decouples prices
from costs. Now the nancial equation dening equilibrium returns of an access
provider, the primary input for decision making, is a composite of prices and
costs. By having a handle only on prices and not costs, price-cap regulation
is rendered a weak tool for modulating behaviour in the access market. Fur-
ther, because it does not have a handle on all the drivers of value, price-cap
regulation does not provide the tools to ensure that the returns accruing to the
access seeker correspond to what would be attained in a competitive market.
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Accordingly therefore, price-cap regulation necessarily leads to an exposure to
windfalls for either the access providers or access seekers and is thereby likely to
provide distorted signals for e¢ ciency. MacDonald, Norsworthy and Fu (1994)
suggest that the practical problems associated with implementing price-cap
regulation explain its slow adoption in telecommunication access markets. Ev-
idence on the e¤ect of incentive regulation has been contradictory. Shin and
Yang (1993) nd that incentive regulation gives rise to higher costs. Tardi¤and
Taylor (1993), and Schmalensee and Rohlfs (1992) nd that incentive regulation
gives rise to higher productivity. Greenstein et al. (1995) nd that incentive
regulation results in higher levels of investments in infrastructure. Tardi¤ and
Taylor (1993) however nd that there is no statistical evidence to support the
claim that incentive regulation gives rise to higher levels of investments in in-
frastructure. Brown et al. (1989) discuss the UK experience with respect to
quality deterioration. Brennan (1989) discusses the adverse e¤ects of price-cap
regulation on quality of service.
2.5.4 Cost-based Regulation
In some literature and indeed in practice the search for an approach to pricing
access has for the time being settled on cost-based prices based on e¢ cient long-
run incremental costs (see Hausman and Sidak (2005). First, we consider the
conceptual basis of FL-LRIC, a cost-based approach. As implied by its title,
FL-LRIC encompasses three tenets: forward-looking - long-run - incremental
costs. Forward-looking denotes costs incurred to e¢ ciently provide a future
service. The long run is a time frame period over which all costs, including
those related to network capacity, are variable. Incremental costs are those
costs that can be attributed directly to a service and are therefore avoidable if
the service in question is not provided. In the context of FL-LRIC an increment
refers to a total service or a whole volume of interconnection or access service
that the access provider produces or is likely to produce. This characterization
distinguishes incremental costs from marginal costs and its essence is that is
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captures the full breath of costs incurred to provide access.
FL-LRIC is also advanced in a considerable body of literature as an e¤ective
instrument for incentive regulation in telecommunication access networks. Pro-
ponents of FL-LRIC, have argued that its tenets including its forward-looking
and long-run approach to estimating costs, use of optimized scorched node net-
work conguration, use of MEAs to project capital costs and use of DCF to
establish a nancial equilibrium based on the weighted average cost of capital,
all taken together provide appropriate incentives for productive and dynamic
e¢ ciency. It is argued that access seekers pay a price, and access providers
receive a price that corresponds to the costs that the latter imposes on access
infrastructure. Consequently, access seekers bear a cost that is equivalent to
the social cost of supply. In this respect, it is argued that FL-LRIC, is not only
equitable to the access provider but induces entry from access seekers who are
either equally or more e¢ cient than the access provider in the intermediate ser-
vices market (Sappington and Weisman, 1996; Vogelsang, 2003). Economides
(1999) observes:
Appropriate pricing of unbundled network elements, transport, and
access termination is crucially important for promoting e¤ective compe-
tition. The extent to and the speed with which competition will develop
depend critically on having prices for unbundled network elements and
services that are close to the economic costs as possible. The more prices
exceed e¢ cient costs, the less entry there will be. The less entry there
is, the less likely it will be that e¤ective competition will develop in the
local exchange markets, and, if e¤ective competition does develop, it will
happen more slowly. There is only one cost measure that fulls. . . ...that
cost measure is the long-run forward looking economic cost, or Total
Element Long-run Incremental Cost.
In addition, it has been argued that access priced at cost provides the correct
signals for e¢ cient consumption by neither articially encouraging nor discour-
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aging consumption. An access price below cost of service encourages consump-
tion above a level that is socially optimal. Conversely, an access price above
cost articially restricts consumption and brings with it the risk of duplicat-
ing access infrastructure. Further, its proponents argue that FL-LRIC ensures
competitive neutrality between competing technologies because the access price
reects the cost that access seekers exert on the respective technological plat-
forms. Therefore, it is argued, that an access platform, would not in any way
be put at a competitive advantage or disadvantage relative to platforms using
alternative technologies, if access was priced using FL-LRIC.
It can be argued that the conceptual basis of FL-LRIC as an approach
to pricing access is open to question. Now under FL-LRIC, it is assumed
that the users of the access infrastructure take a predictable and static path
through a space of possibilities during a regulatory lag. The assumed path is
some trajectory, between the extremes in the possibility space, measured by an
average value. This premise is however questionable. Access seekers are able
to adapt favourably to the stochastic processes generating value in the access
infrastructure. This raises the question of the relative value of the exibility
that gives a third party the leverage to adapt to the stochastic processes that
generate value.
2.6 Access Pricing and Value of Flexibility
2.6.1 Value of Flexibility
A key debate in the literature questions the versatility of FL-LRIC from the
standpoint of option-theoretic considerations. Hausman (1999) is one of the
pioneers of the debate. The subsequent papers by Economides (1999), Hausman
and Myers (2002), Alleman (2002), Alleman and Rappoport (2002, 2005 and
2006), Vogelsang (2003), Pindyck (2005a, 2005b and 2007) and Cave (2006)
add to the debate. An issue at the centre of the debate is the versatility of FL-
LRIC in responding to the stochastic processes that dene downstream value.
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Of particular importance is the question about the value of the exibility to
respond to downstream stochastic processes.
The arguments in the literature see a transition in the characterization of the
anomaly attributed to cost-based prices from the standpoint of option pricing
theory. This transition has three strands of arguments. First, that sunk costs
truncate cash ows and result in an asymmetrical distribution of risk. Second,
regulatory prescriptions give rise to investment inexibility and therefore have
an opportunity cost from a real options perspective. Third, the asymmetri-
cal exibility to adapt to downstream stochastic processes at the level of an
exchange line has value. These three strands of arguments are however not
concisely compartmentalized and in fact at times overlap in the literature.
In the rst strand of arguments, Hausman (1999) frames the issue as one
where the fundamental premise of TSLRIC (US equivalent term for FL-LRIC)
is fundamentally awed because it assumes a perfect contestability standard
under which costless entry and exit exist. Hausman argues that costless entry
and exit presume no sunk costs and this presumption deviates from the reality in
the access market where the bulk of the investments are sunk. Therefore, going
by this argument, TSLRIC does not permit a mark-up over cost to allow for the
risk associated with sunk investments. Hausman observes that while TSLRIC
makes an allowance for the cost of investment and variable costs, it makes no
allowance for sunk costs. Hausman concludes that because TSLRIC ignores the
sunk nature of investment, it confers free options to third parties. Hausman and
Myers (2002) take a similar strait and argue that the non-existence of barriers
to entry truncates the upside because of either entry or the threat of entry.
At the same time there is no downside protection because of the existence of
sunk costs. This gives rise to an asymmetrical distribution of cash ows and
hence lower than expected returns. Therefore, according to this argument, an
upward adjustment of the regulated rates is required to correct this anomaly
and ensure competitive returns.
The premise of the arguments by Hausman (1999), and Hausman and Myers
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(2002) are however vulnerable. Now cost, in the context of TSLRIC/FL-LRIC,
includes a mark-up for a competitive return  in addition to being forward-
looking, equivalent to the costs of a least cost provider, being incremental,
having a long-run orientation, and being exclusive of monopoly prots and
cross-subsidies (see Economides, 1999). The relevant instructive provision, com-
petitive returns, implies a return on capital that is equivalent to what assets
with a similar risk exposure would earn. Such risk must however necessarily
include the risk attributable to sunk investments.
Alleman (2002), Alleman and Rappoport (2002, 2005 and 2006) and Pindyck
(2005), adapt the second strand of arguments. These authors take the premise
that regulatory prescriptions give rise to investment inexibility and therefore
have an opportunity cost from a real options perspective. As real options theory
suggests, the exibility, for example, to delay, abandon or start/stop a project
has value.6 The delay option is considered particularly relevant in telecommu-
nications because once a service provider sinks capital, they in e¤ect exercise
their options. The opportunity cost associated with such exercise is however
not incorporated in cost-based prices. The primary context of these studies
is that the traditional approach to pricing access is static and assumes that
management has no exibility to change direction as the states of nature are
revealed through the passage of time. For example, Pindyck (2005) observes
that in the presence of uncertainty, there is an opportunity cost of investing
rather than waiting for the arrival of new information about the prospects of an
investment. Pindyck adds that when the investment option is exercised there
is an associated loss of value which should be included as part of the invest-
ment cost. Accordingly the traditional approach to pricing does not capture
the value of managerial exibility. Pindyck suggests that a real options ap-
proach to pricing would capture the asymmetrical distribution of risk in the
access infrastructure. The core of the second strand of arguments are perhaps
best encapsulated in Alleman and Rappoport (2002) and run as follows:
6For a broad exposition of real options theory, see Trigeorgis (1996).
36
If the company faces a common carrier obligation to provide broad-
band services and to maintain payphones, the requirement to provide
broadband services eliminates the companys option to delay. Simi-
larly, the inability to exit the payphone business eliminates the rms
ability to exercise its abandonment option. . . . . . .regulation can restrict
the exibility of the rm through the imposition of price constraints
and by imposing costs associated with either delay, abandonment, or
shutdown/restart options. . . . . . . . . the real options analysis provides a
means of capturing the exibility of management to address uncertain-
ties as they are resolved. . . . . . . . . the exibility that management has
includes options to defer, abandon, shutdown/restart, expand, contract,
and switch use.. . . . . . ..the deferral option is the one that is generally
illustrated and is treated as analogous to a call option. . . . . . . . . . . . the
question is: what is the investment worth with and without management
exibility. . . .......in these situations (broadband and payphones), the in-
cumbent carriers are precluded from exercising the option to delay in the
rst case, and the option to abandon in the second case. A related option
is the ability to shutdown and restart operations. . . . . . ... the lack of op-
tions has not been considered in the various cost models that have been
utilized by the regulatory community for a variety of policy purposes.
The arguments by Alleman (2002), Alleman and Rappoport (2002, 2005,
2006) and Pindyck (2005), have their basis in the implications of the oblig-
ation to serve. The thrust of these arguments is that if a service provider is
constrained by regulation and if as a consequence there result limitations on,
for example, when and where to enter a market or when and where to exit,
then there are opportunity costs from a real options perspective, which should
be added to the cost of investment and be borne by the users of the access in-
frastructure. The fundamental question must therefore be whether regulation
imposes such constraints. The case in telecommunications suggests that the
implications of regulation on investment timing, which we refer to here as Tier
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I exibility, may not be as severe as suggested in the literature. If one consid-
ers the case of, for example, broadband roll-out, the facts are that a capacity
access provider has the leverage to determine the technology and the pace of
roll-out. Regulatory encumbrances on the timing of investments are in the main
non-existent. In fact Alleman and Rappoport (2002) observe that at the time
of their study there was no legislation in the US restricting the exibility of
service providers with respect to network roll-out. In the UK, the timing and
location of broadband roll-out has proceeded in accordance with the discretion
of the access providers. Now if the exercise of an investment option by a service
provider is sub-optimal for reasons other than restrictions imposed by regula-
tion, then it is inappropriate that the cost of this should be borne by either
competing access seekers or retail subscribers. Absent regulatory constraints, a
service provider has an obligation to ensure that the timing of their investments
is optimal.7
Turning to the analogue access market, the e¤ect of regulatory intervention
by way of universal service obligations the one area where regulation impacts
investment timing exibility are unlikely to be consequential because these
obligations a¤ect peripheral catchment areas. One would therefore expect that
network roll-out, in the main, proceeds in a manner consistent with the dis-
cretion of an incumbent. In conclusion, while acknowledging the merits of the
second strand of arguments, it is nevertheless noted that the implications of
these may not be as severe as suggested in the literature because of the said
mitigating factors. More generally some researchers, for example, Economides
(1999) suggest that in oligopolistic interactions, rst mover advantages can be
crucial and therefore the value of waiting may be negative.
The third strand of arguments suggest that cost-based access prices, inde-
pendent of investment timing exibility, are distortionary because they do not
respond to the value of the exibility to adapt to the stochastic processes that
7It is instructive to note that Tier I exibility and the value of this is independent of the
obligation to provide mandatory access. The opportunity cost related to Tier I is necessarily
added to the direct costs to establish the aggregate cost of investment.
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dene downstream value at the operational level.8 This cluster of arguments
alludes to asymmetrical operational exibility that arises as a consequence of
the obligation to provide capacity access to third parties who have the exibil-
ity to align entry and exit decisions to the stochastic dynamics at the level of
an exchange line. To give an example of arguments that subscribe to this clus-
ter, Pindyck (2007) observes that local loop unbundling is exible, allowing an
entrant to rent facilities in small increments for short durations with no long-
term commitments. Pindyck argues that the operational exibility conferred
to entrants is of great value and is costly for incumbents to supply. Pindyck
concludes that the traditional approach to pricing access is not e¢ cient and
discourages incumbents, and in the long run undermines the objective of pro-
moting facilities-based competition. Vogelsang (2003) notes that access seekers
do not have a long term commitment to the access infrastructure and are thus
able to protect themselves from downside risks, leaving an incumbent exposed
to the risk of stranded assets if demand vanishes. Cave (2006) suggests that
FL-LRIC is not adequately responsive to the distribution of risk between an
incumbent and an access seeker. He notes that FL-LRIC ignores the fact that
access seekers have the option of continuing to buy access products unlike in-
cumbents - therefore the appropriate access price should include the access price
and the value of the option to buy. Cave concludes that regulatory strategy
should be designed to generate sustainable infrastructure-based competition
where feasible.
The common thread in the third strand of arguments is that access seekers
are not bound by long-term commitments and can walk in and out at the level
of exchange lines. In essence, an incumbent provides access at the option of its
rivals who utilize the infrastructure at their discretion. This gives the access
seeker the advantage of exercising the option when, for example, it can attract
business at the level of an exchange line. Equally the access seeker has the
leverage not to exercise the option when, for example, an exchange line is de-
8This class of exibility is referred to here as Tier II exibility.
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activated. This protects an access seeker from the downside of operational risk
but confers to it the upside potential. On the other hand an incumbent, having
sunk capital, is exposed to the full spectrum of risk. All this gives a signicant
competitive advantage to an access seeker. The asymmetrical distribution of
risk e¤ectively confers an advantage to the access seeker analogous to a free
nancial option at the level of delivery points. Such asymmetrical distribution
of risk has value and therefore a price.9
2.6.2 Situating the Research Questions
This thesis builds more immediately on the third strand of arguments in the
literature. It is recognized that the upside and downside at the level of the
delivery points will migrate within the network and the ability to align entry
and exit to such migration has value because it confers exposure to the upside
and not the downside. The essence of the third strand of arguments is that an
access seeker is conferred a bundle of rights through space and time, at the level
of exchange lines. Now while the access provider provides inputs used by the
access seeker to compete with the former in the downstream market, and while
the latter pays an access price based on the cost of capital, the access seeker is
not fully exposed to the risk captured by the cost of capital. An access seeker
is able to favourably align its market entry and exit to the stochastic processes
that generate value at the level of an exchange line (operational level) and in
essence, for each time interval obtain the substantive equivalent of a call option.
For each such interval, the right conferred to an access seeker is analogous to a
contingent claim dened on the process generating value.
While the debate in the literature generally provides important qualitative
conjectures about the potential shortcomings of cost-based price regulation on
grounds of the asymmetrical distribution of risk in the access market, it falls
9It is instructive to note that Tier II exibility and the related concerns only arise when
third-party access is mandated. The related opportunity cost is a relevant cost in pricing a
unit of access at the level of the exchange line.
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short of providing rigorous quantitative option-theoretic arguments, nor any
empirical evidence founded on the stochastic dynamics that dene downstream
value.10 Hence the literature still lacks a rigorous analytical framework for
analyzing the symmetry of costbased access prices, from the standpoint of
option-theoretic considerations. In particular a framework that maps the sto-
chastic dynamics of value to contingent claim pricing theory. Therefore the
basis for addressing the fundamental question about whether the value of the
exibility to respond to downstream stochastic processes is signicant relative
to the nancial equilibrium of access seekers, and whether therefore any such
value if unpriced adversely inuences market outcomes, is still lacking. This
research is motivated more immediately by these questions and the challenges
that they pose. More broadly, this motivation emanates from a keen inter-
est in the emerging application of nance theory to the regulation of network
industries.
These questions take the centre stage in the regulation of capacity access
in telecommunications for two reasons. First, on one hand, while the case for
less than competitive terms of access has been put forward on grounds that
this stimulates competition, on the other hand, a number of empirical studies
have shown that the price of access to the local loop is positively correlated
to facilities-based deployment (see evidence in Crandall et al. (2004) and Wa-
verman et al., 2007). Somewhat corroborating evidence, based on the trend of
migration from service-based to facilities-based competition, is found in, for ex-
ample, Crandall et al. (2004), Hazlett (2005) and Hausman and Sidak (2005).
Further, Bauer (2005), Cave (2006) and Waverman (2006) observe that the pol-
icy of "easy access" in the US created resellers who did not climb the ladder of
investment and build their own infrastructure. The US experience shows how
regulation impinged social welfare by furthering intra-modal competition at the
10Pertinent considerations include the properties of the evolution of net average down-
stream value of an activated exchange line, including its drift and volatility; intensity of
exchange line activation, including its drift and volatility; the price of access to the Sub-
scriber Network; the price of market risk; and the price of the risk of default.
41
expense of inter-modal competition. Cave (2006) observes that the policy of
"easy access" impedes facilities-based competition and cites evidence from the
US where a product UNE-Platform (UNE-P) was introduced in 1999. This
product allowed competing operators to lease an incumbents entire local ser-
vice at discounts between 50-60% of retail prices. UNE-P resulted in a market
with a high presence of leased lines and a stagnation of facilities-based com-
petition. It is estimated that UNE-P accounted for nearly half of the total
lines that were in service at the time the product was discontinued. The lesson
learned was that competitive investments are unlikely to materialize if access
products are made available on disproportionately favourable terms. Hausman
and Sidak (1999) capture this argument aptly, as follows:
. . . . . . they (TSLRIC prices) also discourage the use of and invest-
ment in competitorsown facilities. The availability of those UNEs at
ine¢ ciently low prices not only attracts rms that could have deployed
their own facilities, but also induces rms that could not have e¢ ciently
entered or expanded in the marketplace to do so. The subsidized prices
shield ine¢ cient entrants from the true economic prices that they would
otherwise be forced to face... . . . . . . . . . . . thus, CLECs can tenably argue
that access to unbundled elements is necessary for all sunk-cost elements
because competitive supply of those elements will not exist. The com-
petitive supply will not arise because the Commission has set an uneco-
nomically low price for the element that does not recognize the sunk-cost
nature of the required investments.
Second, on the matter of the less than competitive terms of access, shifting
the burden of subsidized entry to an incumbent can be argued to be a viola-
tion of the property rights of the incumbent. The conscatory drawbacks of
regulation are perhaps best articulated by Sidak and Spulber (1997). They
argued that an incumbent takes pioneering initiatives and invests in long-lived
and non-salvageable assets with the expectation to penetrate the market and
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make a return on its investments. Subsequently, in the interests of competition
and the benets that this confers to consumers, regulators mandate third-party
entry into the market. Sidak and Spulber argue that regulatory rules should
however not be conscatory nor destructive to the property rights of the in-
cumbent service provider. Sidak and Spulber further argue that any regulatory
intervention that changes the legitimate expectations of a utility should, on
grounds of equity, confer a just compensation which mirrors the outcome of a
voluntary exchange, and should therefore yield the full economic cost of will-
ingly parting with the relevant assets.
2.7 This Thesis
While the case for mandatory vertical separation continues to be debated, and
while the issue about mandating third-party capacity access and the broader
rationale for this is not entirely settled, even more unsettled is the issue about
how to price access. The search for an appropriate approach to pricing has
evolved variously in the literature through rate of return regulation, the Ef-
cient Component Pricing Rule, price-cap regulation (RPI-X) and cost-based
regulation, based on e¢ cient forward-looking costs (FL-LRIC) all in search
of an approach that would send signals for e¢ ciency to the users of the ac-
cess infrastructure and thereby maximize consumer welfare. The stakes in this
search have been high. On one hand, a material overstatement of access prices
reinforces the dominant position of the incumbent, puts upward pressure on the
price of downstream products and distorts the competitive neutrality between
alternative technology platforms. On the other hand a material understatement
of access prices encourages ine¢ cient entry, sties the ability of an incumbent
to sustain and improve its infrastructure and distorts the competitive neutrality
between alternative technology platforms. The overarching objective of regu-
lation should however be to foster outcomes that mimic those in competitive
markets.
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This thesis builds on the debate in the literature by investigating the distor-
tionary e¤ect of FL-LRIC, in the main, from the standpoint of Tier II exibility.
More specically, the purpose of this study is three-fold. First, to develop a
framework for valuing the exibility of adapting to downstream value, and to
test the neutrality of FL-LRIC as an approach for pricing capacity access, based
on evidence from the analogue platforms, using numerical methods. Second,
to develop a framework for valuing the exibility of adapting to downstream
value, and to test the neutrality of FL-LRIC as an approach for pricing capacity
access, based on evidence from the ADSL platform, using numerical methods.
Third, to develop closed-form option-theoretic generalizations of the value of
such exibility, in the two platforms. Maximum Likelihood Estimation is used
to calibrate the stochastic di¤erential equations describing downstream value
and the value of the underlying contingent claims are estimated using risk-
neutral valuation measures. The results from the numerical methods provide
a check on the results from the closed-form analytical solutions and vice-versa.
The theoretical framework underpinning this study is option pricing theory.
The motivation for using this theory arises from its capacity to conceptualize
and quantify the value of exibility. This study distinguishes between the ana-
logue and ADSL platforms because of di¤erences in the dynamics that create
downstream value between the two platforms.
On original contributions, rst, this study provides a rigorous analytical
framework, founded on the stochastic dynamics of downstream value, for eval-
uating the symmetry of FL-LRIC. Second, this study provides empirical evi-
dence on the symmetry or otherwise of FL-LRIC access prices based on evidence
from the analogue platform. Third, it provides similar evidence from the ADSL
platform. These contributions set this study apart from previous studies and
take the debate in the literature beyond the current qualitative conjectures.
The analytical solutions generalize the results and provide an option-theoretic
approach for pricing access where third parties have the leverage of adapting
to downstream stochastic value. In this regard too, this study is signicantly
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di¤erent from previous research in the eld.
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Chapter 3
Option Pricing Theory
3.1 Introduction
The theoretical framework underpinning the analysis in Chapters 5, 6 and 7
is option pricing theory. The theory is implemented in this thesis using mar-
tingale pricing principles.1 Now contingent claim pricing theory has been dis-
cussed in the literature under two main paradigms initially in absolute terms
using rational expectations arguments and subsequently in relative terms using
arbitrage arguments. The earlier paradigm has been shown to be ine¢ cient
because it fails to recognize opportunities to benet from riskless prots from
hedging. The subsequent paradigm dominates economic and nance literature
and provides the foundation for the contemporary approaches to contingent
claim valuation in the two disciplines. The essence of this theory is that it
should not be possible to guarantee a riskless prot through hedging.
The widely acclaimed Black and Scholes (1973) paper provides the founda-
tion for the prevailing approaches to pricing contingent claims using arbitrage
arguments. Black and Scholes derive a closed-form solution, based on a dynamic
portfolio replication strategy, for pricing European options in continuous time.
Merton (1973) extends the Black and Scholes model by relaxing its restrictive
assumptions about dividends and interest rates. Black (1976) derives a closed-
form solution, for pricing options on futures contracts, building on the earlier
work by Black and Scholes, and Merton. The paper by Black (1976) has been
instrumental in providing a framework for pricing commodity derivatives in
circumstances where futures and forward prices are either observable or where
these can be reasonably inferred. Cox et al. (1979) provide a framework for
1The terms martingale pricing and risk-neutral valuation are used inter-changeably in this
thesis.
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valuing contingent claims where the value of the underlying asset is dened by
a discrete-time binomial process.
Harrison and Kreps (1979) and Harrison and Pliska (1981 and 1983) provide
the foundations for contingent claim valuation under martingale pricing prin-
ciples. Martingale pricing draws more immediately on the risk-neutral pricing
insights by Cox et al. (1979). The key argument in martingale pricing is the
link between the absence of arbitrage and the existence of equivalent martingale
measures. Martingale pricing provides a versatile tool for pricing derivatives
and has been successfully applied to price contingent claims where the under-
lying is one of a wide variety of variables, including, for example, nancial
assets or indices. In this chapter, a cross-section of studies that apply martin-
gale pricing, in particular, in circumstances where futures and forward prices
provide an alternative to the spot price as a basis for pricing derivatives, are
discussed. This review covers electricity and weather derivatives. Because of
the non-storable character of electricity, electricity derivatives provide instruc-
tive insights relevant to contingent claim analysis in telecommunication access
capacity markets. Weather derivatives too provide important insights because
the underlying is not a tradable commodity. While the range of applications of
martingale pricing reviewed in this chapter is not necessarily complete because
of the limitations of space, this review nevertheless brings out the salient ele-
ments of martingale pricing deemed necessary in considering contingent claim
analysis in telecommunication capacity markets. The rest of this chapter is
laid out as follows Section 3.2 sets out the broad principles of option pricing
theory. Section 3.3 provides an overview of martingale pricing; Section 3.4 pro-
vides an overview of how martingale pricing has been applied to electricity and
weather derivatives. Section 3.5 provides an overview of key literature on the
pricing of defaultable claims.
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3.2 Hedging by Dynamic Replication
While much of the earlier research on option pricing theory is credited to
Sprenkle (1961), Ayres (1963), Boness (1964), Samuelson (1965), Baumol et al.
(1966) and Chen (1970), the contemporary approach to option pricing in con-
tinuous time is credited to Black and Scholes (1973) who derived a closed-form
solution, for pricing European options, based on a dynamic portfolio replica-
tion strategy. The solution is based on a hedged position consisting of a long
position in a stock and a short position in an option. Their derivation assume
that short-term interest rates are known and are constant; the price of the un-
derlying asset follows a process of the form dS(t)=S(t) = udt + dW (t); the
underlying asset pays no dividends; there are no transaction costs; the option
is European; borrowing any fraction of the price of the underlying security is
permissible; and there are no penalties for short-selling. Under these condi-
tions the value of the option does not depend on the price of the stock but
on time and known constants. Merton (1973) extends the results of Black and
Scholes (1973) by relaxing its restrictive assumptions about dividends and in-
terest rates. He develops closed-form solutions for pricing options where the
underlying asset pays dividends and where interest rates are non-constant but
deterministic.
The framework in the papers by Black and Scholes (1973) andMerton (1973)
have been extended to provide closed form-analytical solutions for pricing con-
tingent claims where the underlying is a commodity spot, futures or a forward
price. To illustrate, Black (1976) derives a closed-form analytical solution to
price an option on a futures contract where the price of the underlying is dened
by a Geometric Brownian Motion, as follows
C(F (t) : t; T ) = e r(T t)[F (t; T )N(d1) KN(d2)] (3.1)
here
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
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d2 = d1   
p
T   t
for T > t: Now F (t; T ) is the price of a futures contact written at time t
for delivery at time T . Eqn.3.1 assumes the arbitrage arguments that it is
possible to build a riskless portfolio by combining a short position in one call
option and a long position n futures contracts. Now from the spot-forward
relationship we have
F (t; T ) = S(t)e(r y)(T t) (3.2)
Using the relationships in Eqn. 3.1 and Eqn. 3.2 we have
C(F (t) : t; T ) = S(t)e y(T t)N(d1) Ke r(T t)N(d2) (3.3)
Eqn. 3.4 shows the closed-form solution for the price of a European call option
on a commodity spot, C(S(t); t; T ), written at time t and maturing at time
T , and where the underlying spot price process is described by a Geometric
Brownian Motion.
C(S(t) : t; T ) = S(t)e y(T t)N(d1) Ke r(T t)N(d2) (3.4)
where
d1 =
ln

S(t)e y(T t)
Ke r(T t)

+ 1
2
2(T   t)

p
T   t
and
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d2 = d1   
p
T   t
Here S(t) is the price of the underlying asset at time t, K is the exercise
price,  is the volatility of the price of the underlying asset and y is the con-
venience yield. Now Eqn. 3.3 and Eqn. 3.4 are identical. The use of futures
and forward prices has been instrumental in providing a framework for pricing
derivatives where the spot price or spot index are either not readily observable
or are not traded. We extensively draw on this fact in the analysis in Chapters
5-7.
Cox et al.(1979) provide a framework for valuing contingent claims where
the value of the underlying asset is dened by a discrete-time binomial process.
The premise underpinning the Cox et al. model is that a portfolio consisting
of shares of the underlying asset and risk-free borrowing can be constructed to
replicate the value of an option on the underlying asset. Since the option and
the replicating portfolio have the same returns, these two assets must necessarily
sell for the same price to avoid arbitrage. In the one period case they show that
the price of an option, written at time t and maturing at time T , is
C(t; T ) =
Cu   Cd
u  d +
uCd   dCu
(u  d)r
=

r   d
u  d

Cu +

u  r
u  d

Cd

=r (3.5)
here Cu is the value of the call in the optimistic scenario and Cd its value
in the pessimistic scenario at time T . Now u is one plus the rate of return on
the risky asset in an optimistic scenario and d is one plus the rate of return on
the risky asset in the pessimistic scenario. Here q = r d
u d ; 1  q = u ru d ; and r is
a wealth relative2 on a risk-free asset. The price of a call option can therefore
be simplied as follows
2One plus the risk-free rate of interest.
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C(t; T ) = [qCu + (1  q)Cd]=r (3.6)
It is instructive to note that the objective probability measure, p, does not
appear in the pricing formula. What matters are the relative values of C; S; u; d
and r. Now since 1 > q > 0, this can be interpreted as a probability measure - in
this case a risk-neutral probability measure. The price of an option is therefore
an expectation under risk-neutral probabilities. In the next section we show
how risk-neutral pricing in discrete time can be extended to a continuous time
framework.
3.3 Martingale Pricing
Harrison and Kreps (1979) and Harrison and Pliska (1981 and 1983) provide
the foundations for contingent claim valuation under martingale pricing. Mar-
tingale pricing draws on the broad framework of the earlier papers by Black and
Scholes (1973) and more immediately on the Cox et al. (1979) paper. Martin-
gale pricing extends the notion of risk-neutral pricing to continuous time. The
key argument in martingale pricing is the link between the absence of arbitrage
and the existence of martingale measures. A martingale measure, Q, is a prob-
ability measure on the space (
;z) such that Q and the objective measure P
are equivalent measures such that Q(X) = 0 if and only if P (X) = 0, for every
X 2 z; the Radon-Nikodym derivative dQ=dP is square integrable with respect
to P ; and the relative discounted prices S(t)=B(t) under Q expectations are
martingales.3 Harrison and Pliska (1983) provide proofs of the tenets of arbi-
trage pricing theory and show that a market is free of arbitrage if there exists a
martingale measure; a market is complete if the martingale measure is unique;
and the price of a contingent claim in an arbitrage free market is equivalent to
3Here S(t) represents the spot price of a risky asset and B(t) a money market account
where B(0) = 1:
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the discounted payo¤s of the claim under risk-neutral probabilities, discounted
at the risk-free rate.
In essence, martingale pricing rests on the premise that in an e¢ cient mar-
ket, a portfolio cannot have a zero value at time t; and a positive value at T
(where T > t) with a corresponding non-zero probability of negative value at
T . In other words the absence of arbitrage implies that the expected future
value of an asset at T under risk-neutral probabilities discounted at the risk-
free rate is equal to its value at t. If we consider an interval [t; T ], the price of
a contingent claim, C(t; T ), under the martingale pricing principle is given by
C(t; T )
B(t)
= [qCu + (1  q)Cd]=B(T ) (3.7)
where Cu, is the value of the contingent claim in the favourable state, Cd is
the corresponding value of the claim in the unfavourable state at time T and
q is a risk-neutral probability. This very much corresponds to the risk-neutral
arguments by Cox et al. (1979). B(t) represents the numeraire at time t which
is customarily taken to be a money market account. The expression in Eqn.
3.7 above can be simplied to
C(t; T )
B(t)
= EQ

C(T )
B(T )

(3.8)
where EQ denotes an expectation under an equivalent martingale measure.
More formally, the price of a contingent claim relative to the money market
account at t and the pay-o¤ of the claim relative to the money market account
at T are martingales or more simply, the relative prices are martingales.
Now if we have a portfolio of a stock and a risk-less asset, a necessary
and su¢ cient condition for the non-existence of arbitrage is that an equivalent
martingale measure exists such that the price of the stock relative to the risk-
free asset is a martingale. If we consider the interval [t; T ], this implies
C(S(t) : t; T )
B(t)
= EQ

S(T ) K
B(T )

(3.9)
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Now turning to martingale valuation in continuous time, the evolution of
the money market account and the price of the risky asset can be represented
as follows
dB(t) = rB(t)dt (3.10)
and
dS(t) = S(t)(udt+ dW (t)) (3.11)
where B(0) = 1. We let D(t) represent the price of the risky asset relative
to the money market account i.e. D(t) = S(t)=B(t). Using, Itos formula we
have
dD(t) = D(t)[(u  r)dt+ dW (t)] (3.12)
If we have that P and Q are equivalent measures, from a martingale pricing
standpoint, the immediate matter is to dene the Q-dynamics of Eqn. 3.12.
For this we use the Randon-Nikodym derivative L(t) = dQ=dP j z(t). By
Girsanovs Theorem, the Randon-Nikodym derivative for the change of measure
of a P -Brownian motion is
L(t) = exp
24  tZ
0
(s)dW (s)  1
2
tZ
0
((s))2ds
35 (3.13)
Using Girsanovs Theorem, the relationship between the P and Q-Weiner
processes are as follows
dW (t) = dfW (t)  (t)dt (3.14)
where fW (t) is a Q-Weiner process. Using Eqn. 3.14 above the Q-dynamics
of the D(t)-process is represented as follows
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dD(t) = D(t)[(u  r   (t))dt+ dfW (t)] (3.15)
Now that D(t) evolves as a martingale, the following must necessarily hold.
u  r   (t) = 0 (3.16)
Therefore
(t) =
u  r

(3.17)
If Eqn. 3.17 holds, then the Q-dynamics of the S(t)-process can be repre-
sented as follows
dS(t) = S(t)[rdt+ dfW (t)] (3.18)
Now (t) in Eqn. 3.17 is commonly referred to as the market price of risk
and is central to the valuation of contingent claims. The market price of risk
can be interpreted as the price of a unit of volatility. It is a handle which
transforms a process dened by a P  measure to a process dened by a Q 
measure. In the case of dS(t)=S(t) = udt+ dW (t), this results in a relocation
of the path of S(t) to that that would prevail in a risk-free world. We make
extensive use of this argument in the analysis in Chapters 5-7.
3.4 Applied Martingale Pricing
The application of risk-neutral pricing where the underlying is either a non-
nancial or non-tradable asset is considered in this section. In doing this elec-
tricity and weather derivatives are discussed. In discussing electricity deriva-
tives, the papers by Vehvilainen (2001), Schwartz and Lucia (2002), Benth et
al. (2003), Audet et al. (2004), Burger et al. (2004) and Cartea and Figueroa
(2005) are considered. The papers by Alaton et al. (2002), Brody et al. (2002)
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and Benth and Benth (2005 and 2007) are considered in reviewing weather
derivatives. The the key arguments in these papers are considered and how
these can inform derivative pricing in telecommunication capacity access mar-
kets. While the range of applications of martingale pricing reviewed in this
chapter is not necessarily complete because of the limitations of space, this re-
view nevertheless brings out the salient elements of martingale pricing deemed
to be relevant in considering contingent claim analysis in telecommunication
capacity markets.
Electricity derivatives emerged following the liberalization of electricity mar-
kets. Now the liberalization led to competitive wholesale markets - and com-
petition in the wholesale markets in turn led to greater volatility of the spot
price and a growth in derivative products both in the physical and nancial
markets. A number of features distinguish electricity derivatives from other
commodity derivatives. First, electricity is largely a non-storable commodity.
Therefore unlike most other commodities, the spot price at time T is not a
function of the spot price at t < T . The traditional arbitrage arguments which
dene the relationship between a spot and a forward price in commodity mar-
kets, i.e. F (t; T ) = S(t)e(r y((T t), does not apply.4 Second, electricity markets
are primarily local because of limitations in transporting electricity over long
distances. Because of the limitations of carrying electricity through space and
time, the spot price is largely dependent on the local conditions of supply and
demand.
In electricity markets the spot price gravitates towards the cost of pro-
duction hence the meanreverting processes that describe the spot. This is
coupled with seasonal variations and spikes in spot prices which reect tem-
porary mismatches between supply and demand. The SDEs describing the
spot price process developed by, for example, Schwartz and Lucia (2002)5 cap-
4Here F (t; T ) is the price of a forward with a time T delivery, for a contract written at
time t, S(t) is the spot price, r is the return on a risk-free asset and y is the convenience
yield.
5And some earlier unpublished papers.
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ture the mean-reversion and seasonality. Clewlow et al.(2001) and Cartea and
Figueroa (2005), for example, supplement the mean-reversion and seasonality
with jumps. A number of studies on pricing electricity derivatives are moti-
vated by Harrison and Kreps (1979). Under this broad framework, the pricing
of electricity contingent claims has been based on one of two processes. First,
the spot price process as in the case in, for example, the studies by Lucia and
Schwartz (2002) and Cartea and Figueroa (2005). Second, the forward price
process as in the case in, for example, the studies by Clewlow and Strickland
(1999) and Audet et al. (2004). The studies that use the forward price process
have their theoretical foundations in Black (1976) and capitalize on the exis-
tence of data on forward curves. Where data of forward curves is lacking, spot
price dynamics have been used to derive forward curves, as for example in Lucia
and Schwartz (2002). Here the forward price is taken to be equivalent to the
price of the spot under risk-neutral measures, that is, F (t; T ) = EQ[S(T ) j zt].
Here the Q dynamics are derived from the P dynamics by change of mea-
sure.6 In essence, the spot price is translated into a forward price through the
intermediary of the market price of risk. Other studies that use this approach
include Vehvilainen (2001), Cartea and Figueroa (2005), Burger et al. (2004)
and Benth et al. (2003). Benth et al. (2003) derive forward prices as a function
of the spot price. The theoretical forward price thus derived is the basis for the
valuation of contingent claims.
The derivation of electricity derivatives based on both spot and forward
prices is considered, starting with the former approach. Now Lucia and Schwartz
(2002) price electricity derivatives based on the spot price process. We discuss
here their key arguments using their one factor model. Now they dene the
process describing the evolution of the spot price, P (t), as follows
P (t) = f(t) +X(t) (3.19)
6Change of measure entails the transformation of a probability space.
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where f(t) is a deterministic process and X(t) is a stochastic process which
takes the following form
dX(t) =  X(t)dt+ dW (t) (3.20)
Combining Eqn. 3.19 and Eqn. 3.20, we have
d(P (t)  f(t)) = (f(t)  P (t))dt+ dW (t) (3.21)
Eqn. 3.21 represents a mean-reverting dynamic and bears similarity to the
Vasicek model. The solution to Eqn. 3.20 is
X(t) = X(0)e t + 
tZ
0
e(s t)dW (u) (3.22)
since the process reverts around a mean of zero. From Eqn. 3.22, since X(t) =
P (t)  f(t), we have
P (t) = f(t) +X(0)e t + 
tZ
0
e(s t)dW (u) (3.23)
Now given that X(0) = P (0)  f(0), we that7
EP (P (t) j z0) = f(t) + (P (0)  f(0))e t (3.24)
and
V ar(P (t) j z0) = 
2
2
(1  e 2t) (3.25)
Now the risk-neutral process for the X(t) process is
dX(t) = (  X(t))dt+ dfW (t) (3.26)
7The third term is dropped because the process reverts around zero.
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where dfW (t) is a Q Brownian motion and where
 =
 

(3.27)
Here  is the market price of risk. The solution to the risk-neutral process
followed by P (t) is
P (t) = f(t) +X(0)e t + (1  e t) + 
tZ
0
e(s t)dfW (u) (3.28)
From Eqn. 3.28, the expectation of P (t) under risk-neutral probabilities is
EQ(P (t) j z0) = f(t) +X(0)e t + (1  e t) (3.29)
The value at time zero on a forward contract maturing at T is
C = e rTEQ[P (T )  F (P (T ) : 0; T ) j z0] (3.30)
Since, C, the value of a forward on the spot must be zero to avoid arbitrage,
using Eqn. 3.29 we have that
F (P (t) : 0; T ) = EQ(P (T ) j z0) =
f(T ) + (P (0)  f(0))e T + (1  e T ) (3.31)
where
 =
 

Using an alternative approach, Clewlow and Strickland (1999) price electric-
ity derivatives based on forward curve dynamics. Now they dene the forward
curve dynamics by the following SDE
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dF (t; T )
F (t; T )
= e (T t)dW (t) (3.32)
where F (t; T ) is the forward price for a time T delivery for a contract written
at time t,  the volatility of the forward process and  is the rate at which the
volatility of the forward process declines. The solution to Eqn. 3.32, obtained
by integration, is
F (t; T ) =
F (0; T ) exp
24 1
2
tZ
0
2e 2(T u)du+
tZ
0
e (T u)dW (u)
35 (3.33)
The spot price process is obtained by setting T = t
S(t) =
F (0; t) exp
24 1
2
tZ
0
2e 2(t u)du+
tZ
0
e (t u)dW (u)
35 (3.34)
The natural logarithm of the spot price is normally distributed with
lnS(T )  N
24lnF (0; T )  1
2
TZ
0
2e 2(T u)du;
TZ
0
2e 2(T u)du
35
= N

lnF (0; T )  
2
4
(1  e 2T ); 
2
2
(1  e 2T )

(3.35)
The price of a call option on the spot price process is
C(t; S(t);K;T ) = EQ[P (t; T )max(S(T ) K; 0) j zt] (3.36)
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where P (t; T ) = exp
0@  TZ
t
r(u)du
1A. The closed-form solution of a call
option on the spot price based on the Black and Scholes (1973) formula is
C(t; S(t);K;T ) = P (t; T )[F (t; T )N(h) KN(h pw)] (3.37)
where
h =
ln

F (t;T )
K

+ 1
2
w
p
w
; w =
2
2
(1  e 2(T t))
Clewlow and Strickland (1999) show that the time t price of a European
call option, with a strike price K, written on a forward contact that matures
at time s is8
C(t; F (t; s);K;T; s) = EQ[P (t; T )max(F (T; s) K; 0) j zt] (3.38)
The closed form analytical solution for Eqn. 3.38 is
C(t; F (t; s);K;T; s) = P (t; T )[F (t; s)N(h) KN(h pw)] (3.39)
where
h =
ln

F (t;s)
K

+ 1
2
w
p
w
On the merits of using forward prices relative to spot prices for the valuation
of contingent claims, the spot dynamics will be inuenced by transient factors
hence the commonly observed higher volatility of the spot. Such volatility
presents considerable challenges from a modelling or a valuation standpoint.
On the other hand the forward dynamics are to a lesser extent susceptible
8For s  T:
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to transient inuences and therefore present a more stable evolution of the
underlying. This stability presents a lower degree of challenges for modelling
and valuation.
The pricing of weather derivatives under martingale pricing is considered
next. Now weather derivatives are contingent claims where the underlying is a
weather variable, for example, temperature, humidity, rain or snowfall. These
derivatives provide exposure to an upside without corresponding exposure to
the downside of specied weather index. As a result weather derivatives can be
used to manage the volatility of cash ows that are sensitive to the weather.
More commonly weather derivatives are written on the temperature. Weather
derivatives have been traded at the Chicago Merchantile Exchange from 1999.
Alaton et al. (2002), Brody et al. (2002) and Benth and Benth (2005, 2007)
are examples of studies on weather derivatives. All these studies use risk-
neutral pricing. The underlying of a temperature derivative is either one of three
indices: heating degree-days (HDD), cooling-degree days (CDD) or Cumulative
Average Temperature (CAT). Here
HDD =
Z
A
max(T   T (t); 0)dt (3.40)
CDD =
Z
A
max(T (t)  T; 0)dt (3.41)
CAT =
Z
A
T (t)dt (3.42)
where T (t) is the average temperature on day t and T is the reference
temperature. Derivatives on temperature include futures, forwards and options
written on indices in specied cities. To illustrate the broad principles we use
the arguments in Benth and Benth (2007). Now they describe the evolution of
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temperature using a mean-reverting process as follows9
dT (t) = dS(t)  (T (t)  S(t))dt+ (t)dW (t) (3.43)
where S(t) captures trend and seasonality. Benth and Benth observe that
the Q dynamics of temperature arrived at by transforming Eqn. 3.43 using
Girsanovs theorem is
dT (t) = dS(t) + ((t)  (T (t)  S(t)))dt+ (t)dfW (t) (3.44)
where dfW (t) is a Q Weiner process and (t) is the market price of risk.
Benth and Benth observe that the solution to Eqn. 3.44, under Q dynamics,
is
T (t) = S(t) + (T (t)  S(t)) e (s t)+
sZ
t
(u)e (s u)du+
sZ
t
ue
 (s u)dW (u)
(3.45)
Now T (t) under risk-neutral expectations is
EQ[T (s) j T (t)] = S(t) + (T (t)  S(t))e (s t) +
sZ
t
(u)e (s u)du (3.46)
and its variance is
V ar[T (s) j T (t)] =
sZ
t
2ue
 2(s u)du (3.47)
The price of a futures contract on an HDD index is
9We assume that this model is correctly specied.
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FHDD(t : t; s) = E
Q
24 sZ
t
max(T   T (u); 0)du j zt
35 (3.48)
And the price of a futures contract on an CDD index is
FCDD(t : t; s) = E
Q
24 sZ
t
max(T (u)  T; 0)du j zt
35 (3.49)
The price of a call option on HDD futures is
CHDD(t : t; s) = e
 r(s t)EQ

FHDD(t : t; s) K; 0]+ j zt

(3.50)
The price of a call option on CDD futures is
CCDD(t : t; s) = e
 r(s t)EQ

FCDD(t : t; s) K; 0]+ j zt

3.5 Contingent Claims on Defaultable Bonds
Jarrow and Turnbull (1995) were among the earlier advocates of the intensity-
based approach to valuing defaultable securities and pricing derivatives on these
instruments. Subsequent work on intensity-based models include that of Du¢ e
and Singleton (1999), Jarrow and Turnbull (1995, 2000), Jarrow et. al. (1997),
Lando (1998), and Madan and Unal (1998). The intensity-based approach nds
application in circumstances where there exists a risk of default which is either
totally or partially independent of the value of underlying assets. This approach
therefore recognizes two main sources of risk i.e. market risk and asset-specic
default risk. The recognition of asset-specic default risk distinguishes the
intensity-based approach from the earlier structural approach to pricing which
was advocated by, among others, Merton (1973, 1977), and Black and Cox
(1976).
The intensity-based approach recognizes that at each instant, there is a
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possibility that a rm can default on its obligations for reasons other than the
value of the underlying asset. This approach takes into account the stochastic
dynamics of the value of the underlying asset, and the dynamics of default and
recovery. Default is allowed to occur before the maturity of the underlying
asset and is triggered by an exogenous process which is either fully or partially
independent of the value of the underlying asset. Default times are modeled as
a counting process with a stopping time, , derived from an intensity process
.10 Under intensity-based modelling, the default event is commonly modelled
as a poisson distribution as follows
P (X(t) = k j zs) = E

e (t s)
((t  s))k
k!

(3.51)
where X(t) denotes the number of defaults in the interval [s; t] and  is a
constant default intensity. Assuming a non-constant default intensity, (u), the
probability that the stopping time,  , exceeds an abitrary time, t, is
P ( > t j zs) = E
24exp
0@  tZ
s
(u)du
1A35 (3.52)
Now the value of a non-defaultable zero-coupon bond written at time, s,
and maturing at time, t, under risk-neutral probabilities is
Bn(s; t) j zs = EQ
24exp
0@  tZ
s
r(u)du
1A35 (3.53)
where r is the instantaneous interest rate. The value of a defaultable bond
under-risk neutral expectations is
10It is however noted that this dynamic contrasts the phenomenon that is subject of this
study where the useful life of the underlying asset can extend beyond rst stopping time, ,
and even oscillate variously between active and inactive states. We discuss this contrast and
an approach for capturing this dynamic in Chapters 5 and 6.
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Bd(s; t) j zs =
EQ
24exp
0@  tZ
s
r(u)du
1A35  EQ
24exp
0@  tZ
s
(u)du
1A35 (3.54)
Therefore allowing for independence between r and (u), the value of the
defaultable bond is11
Bd(s; t) j zs = EQ
24exp
0@  tZ
s
(r(u) + (u))du)
1A35 (3.55)
Jarrow and Turnbull, Akat et. al (2006) and Akat (2007) develop a model
for valuing defaultable securities where the underlying value is dened by a Geo-
metric Brownian Motion. In Akat (2007), the value of the defautable security
is dened as follows
dS(t) = uS(t)dt+ S(t)dW (t) (3.56)
Given a constant exogenous default intensity, , the risk-neutral process
dening the evolution of the underlying assets is
S(t) j zs = S(s) exp((r +    1
2
2)t+ dfW (t) (3.57)
where  is a risk-neutral intensity process and dfW (t) is a Q-Brownian
Motion. The ratio = represents the risk premium associated with the risk
of default (Du¢ e, 2002). The price of a European digital option which pays $1
at maturity if S(T ) > K or otherwise zero is given by
P (t; s) = e (r+
)(T t)(N(d+()  ( s
K
)1 
2(r+)
2 N(d ()) (3.58)
11See Lando (1998) and Elliott et. al (2000)
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where
d + () =
 s
K
+ (r +   1
2
2)

p

(3.59)
3.6 Summary
The review in this chapter has taken an excursion from the Black and Scholes
(1973) model to its enhancements in Merton (1973). We considered Black
(1976) who showed how futures prices can be used to price contingent claims,
based on arbitrage arguments. The contribution by Black is particularly im-
portant in commodity markets where spot prices may be ambiguous but where
futures and forward prices are either observable or can be reasonably inferred.
Cox et al. (1979) not only showed how arbitrage arguments can be structured in
discrete time but also quite importantly introduced the concept of risk-neutral
valuation. Harrison and Kreps (1979), and Harrison and Pliska (1981, 1983)
more rigorously developed the concept of risk-neutral valuation and extended its
application to continuous time. Now concepts introduced by Black (1976) and
the risk-neutral pricing principles constitute some of the fundamental corner-
stones for pricing commodity derivatives. In applying risk-neutral pricing, the
market price of risk has been shown to be a handle which links P -dynamics to
Q-dynamics. We reviewed the application of risk-neutral pricing to the pricing
of derivatives where the underlying is either a non-nancial or a non-tradable
asset these included electricity and weather derivatives. We considered some
of the key arguments in valuing these derivatives and examined how these can
inform derivative pricing in telecommunication capacity access markets.
On the merits of using forward prices relative to spot prices for the valuation
of contingent claims, it has been argued that the spot dynamics will be gen-
erally inuenced by transient factors hence the commonly observed volatility
of the spot. Such volatility presents considerable challenges from a modelling
or a valuation standpoint. On the other hand the forward dynamics are to a
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lesser extent susceptible to transient inuences and therefore present a more
stable evolution of the underlying. This stability presents lesser challenges for
modelling and valuation.
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Chapter 4
Research Design and Analytical Framework
4.1 Introduction
At a rst level of enquiry, case study research is used to identify the dynam-
ics that describe downstream value in telecommunication capacity platforms.
This background is used to develop a framework for testing the symmetry of
cost-based access prices from the standpoint of option pricing theory. The data
used in this study is based on UK evidence from the analogue and ASDL capac-
ity access platforms. On the analytical methods, this study uses a two-prong
approach a numerical method, Monte Carlo simulation and closed-form ana-
lytical solutions. Monte-Carlo simulation is used because of its versatility in
computing high-dimensional integrals and valuing complex derivatives dened
by multi-dimensional stochastic processes. The closed-form analytical solu-
tions rst, provide a basis for checking the results from the numerical methods.
Second, these solutions generalize the results and provide an option-theoretic
framework for pricing access where third parties have the leverage of adapt-
ing to downstream stochastic value. In both cases the analysis is founded on
the dynamics of the evolution of the average downstream value of an activated
exchange line, including its drift and volatility; the intensity of exchange line
activation, including its drift and volatility; the price of access to the Subscriber
Network; and the price of market risk, and that of the risk of default.
Section 4.2 of this chapter covers the philosophical foundations of this study
and includes a discussion of positivism and the hypothetico-deductive method.
Section 4.3 discusses the research design, including the structure of the study
and the sources of data. Section 4.4 discusses the rst analytical method used
in this study, Monte Carlo simulation. Section 4.5 covers a discussion of e¢ -
ciency enhancing techniques, with respect to Monte Carlo simulation, including
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antithethic variates, control variates, moment matching, stratied sampling,
importance sampling and low discrepancy sequences. Section 4.6 provides an
overview of the second method used in this study, closed-form analytical solu-
tions.
4.2 Philosophical Foundations
4.2.1 Positivism
The broad philosophical foundation of this study is positivism. Within this
broad framework, this research draws on the hypothetico-deductive principle.
Under positivism, the phenomenon under study is conceptualized as being
quantiable. While its proponents have argued that positivism brings with it
the virtue of objectivity, there are questions which challenge this view. These
questions include whether the predispositions of researchers a¤ect their syn-
thesis of the external reality. Or whether the construction of knowledge is
pursued around existing paradigms and whether therefore the ensuing knowl-
edge is neutral and free from the social conventions of the day. Other concerns
centre around whether the linguistic apparatus used in research is proactive in
generating the reality that is represented. This section considers these ques-
tions in discussing the strengths and weaknesses of positivism as a philosophical
foundation in the context of this study.
Positivism nds its roots in the rationalist and empiricist traditions of the
pre-Enlightenment period. The rationalists, for example, Rene Descartes em-
phasized the sceptical contemplation of the external reality as a basis for con-
structing knowledge. Perhaps the most important inuence of the rationalists
traditions on positivism was the presumption of Cartesian dualism which con-
jectures that the external reality exists independently of the human mind. The
primary epistemic stance of empiricists including, for example, John Locke and
Francis Bacon, was that warranted knowledge owed from test experience. In
other words observation of instances of a phenomenon was the only basis for
69
generating knowledge. Positivism took its highest expression in the work of the
logical positivists a group associated with the social intellectuals in the 1920s
and 1930s.
Positivism conjectures that the techniques of observation, measurement and
quantication are the basis for the construction of warranted knowledge. Pos-
itivism emphasizes that observation and empirical testing, free from precon-
ceptions, are the means through which the external reality can be explained.
Positivists argue that science must concern itself with the generation of fac-
tual knowledge and that which cannot be derived from empirical facts cannot
constitute the basis for constructing knowledge. As a result claims which are
non-veriable are necessarily excluded from the domain of warranted knowl-
edge.
The vulnerabilities of positivism lie in its absolutist foundations. A compet-
ing philosophy, which is commonly referred to as relativism, in the main, argues
that science cannot discover absolute truths. Relativistsepistemology counters
the deterministic foundations of positivism and holds that knowledge claims are
context-dependent. More specically relativists argue that: there does not ex-
ist a neutral language for projecting science; truth can only be relative to, for
example, culture, language and paradigms. Therefore empirical observations
are only intelligible within the context of the underlying circumstances. The
next section takes a closer look at these arguments.
4.2.2 Challenging Positivism
Relativists including, among others, Immanuel Kant, Thomas Kuhn, Max We-
ber, Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucalt and Jurgen Habermas challenge the abso-
lutist traditions of positivism. For example, Kant argued against the positivists
stance that suggests that there exists an external reality which is separate from
the human mind and which can be accessed directly through human cognitive
structures. Kant (1965), in his Critique of Pure Reason, observes that the hu-
man mind is not a passive receptor of the world outside it. Rather constructs
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of the mind are inuenced by cognitive predispositions. These constructs are
therefore shaped by what Kant refers to as a priori contents of the human
mind which include, for example, beliefs, culture and knowledge. Therefore,
according to Kant, the human mind is not a passive receptor of information or
data from the world outside it but is active in constructing the perceived world.
Kant distinguishes between noumena and phenomena and suggests that the
former represents the external world which is independent of human cognition.
This external world cannot however be accessed directly by human cognition
and is therefore unknowable to the human mind. On the other hand phenomena
represents the pseudo-reality created by the human mind. Any such creation
of the mind is prone to noise from cognitive structures. Therefore while phe-
nomena is accessible to the human person, noumena is not. This observation
has two important implications. First, scientic knowledge is limited to knowl-
edge of phenomena. Second, because scientic knowledge must necessarily be
relative to the predispositions of its proponents, there cannot be absolutes in
knowledge claims.
Kuhn also counters the absolutist traditions of positivism. He argues that
what is considered as the truth or warranted knowledge is always relative to
a paradigm. Paradigms are however transitory and see shifts through time.
Kuhn (1970), in his book, The Structure of Scientic Revolutions, observes
that scientic knowledge is driven by paradigms of the day and reect social
conventions. These conventions dene the boundaries of what is acceptable
within a scientic community. In other words, paradigms reect the inclinations
of such a community, their way of looking at issues and their views of what is
deemed as contemporary. This is however conning as researchers work around
and within what is deemed acceptable within their community.
Kuhn observes further that the development of knowledge is subject to
paradigm shifts. Through the passage of time the process of knowledge cre-
ation is characterized by competing paradigms from which emerges a dominant
paradigm, and which provides the basis for research at the time. Over time
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however dominant paradigms lose their versatility and new competing para-
digms emerge. Then, here too emerges a dominant paradigm. Kuhn postulates
that because knowledge is constructed around paradigms which are transitory
by their nature, knowledge claims cannot be absolute. Knowledge constructed
around paradigms cannot be absolute because researchers do not have a neu-
tral standpoint from which to observe the reality around them. As it were
concepts and knowledge claims are driven by paradigms of the day. Therefore
a paradigm-neutral observational standpoint does not exist. Without such neu-
tral observational standpoint, what holds is the consensus theory of truth. The
proponents of this theory suggest that truth claims cannot be anything more
than the product of the views of those who subscribe to a particular paradigm
or a frame of reference. Truth claims are therefore pronouncements that are
accepted in particular social contexts, and such claims can only be relative.
Post-structuralistsepistemology further counters the positivistsclaims on
absolute truths. One of the key arguments of the post-structuralists, for exam-
ple Derrida, following the "linguistic turn", is that language is value-laden.
However knowledge is constructed through language. Because language is
not neutral, scientic observations cannot be objective. Accordingly post-
structuralists reject the positivist conjecture that there exists an objective basis
for capturing reality through the application of a neutral observational lan-
guage. According to the post-structuralistsepistemology, concepts (signiers)
are used to communicate mental concepts (signied) the relationship between
the two is however deemed to be arbitrary. A mental concept can be repre-
sented by a tier of words. Such tier can however be represented by alternative
sets of words. This gives rise to a profusion of meanings. Therefore the linguist
apparatus is proactive in generating the reality that is represented. As a result,
according to post-structuralistsepistemology, unmediated access to reality is
a myth because language cannot denitively represent reality.
Despite the criticisms levelled against it, positivism brings the credibility of
scientic methods to social sciences. The construction of knowledge in social
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sciences is nevertheless impacted by inuences including, among others, the
predisposition of the researcher, the socialization of science and the uncontrol-
lability of language. The gravity of these inuences will vary depending on
the object of study. At one extreme, the use of positivistic methods may well
achieve Keat and Urrys (1982) conception of science as an objective and ra-
tional enquiry which aims at true explanatory knowledge of an external world,
based on empirical evidence. At the other extreme the impact of the said three
inuences may take a rmer hold and give meaning to Rortys (1982) obser-
vation that truth is a changeable artefact or Alvesson and Willmots (1996)
observation that knowledge remains the product of particular values that give
it meaning. Ultimately while the ideal scientic method may not exist in social
sciences, a researcher must carefully consider how the nature of the research
sits with the vulnerabilities of the positivistic methods. Whatever the case re-
searchers must humble themselves from lofty truth claims and see their ndings
from positivistic methods as truths that are relative to the inuences on their
studies.
4.2.3 Hypothetico-Deductive Method
Popper (1959), in his work, The Logic of Scientic Discovery, counters the
broad premise of positivisms inductive and vericationist principles arguing
that these principles do not recognize the place of refutations of existing theories
as legitimate contributions to the construction of knowledge. Poppers views
here are based on the premise that there is nothing absolute about knowledge
and that the results of scientic activity can never be certain since science can-
not produce denitive accounts of the truth but only approximations of it. At
any time a theory only reects the distance travelled in a particular discipline.
New evidence drives out weak theories and new theories emerge. Knowledge
creation is therefore a sequence of conjectures and refutations. Through this
sequence of conjectures and refutations knowledge evolves as more versatile ap-
proximations of the truth. Theories should therefore be held as tentative con-
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jectures until falsied. But such falsication must be underpinned by empirical
evidence. A theory is refuted if it does not hold to the evidence. Bertrand Rus-
sel (1948), in his work, Human Knowledge, Its Scope and Limits, encapsulates
this in a most compelling way:
One day a chicken was hatched. By chance it stumbled upon corn and
water. It was a happy chick. The next day it happened again and again
the next day. Being an intelligent chicken, it considered the possibility
that supplies might stop and wondered whether it was necessary to take
precautions. It decided to investigate the world to see whether, given
a large number of cases and a variety of conditions, there were grounds
to suppose that the pattern of events so far witnessed would continue
in future. The benet would be that the no precaution against the
non-supply of corn and water need be taken. After months of careful
observations and noting that di¤erences in the weather, conguration of
the stars, beings encountered, mood and many other things did not stop
supplies, the chicken concluded that the world was truly a wonderful
place. The very next day, everything changed. It was December 24.
Turning to the background of this study, FL-LRIC is advanced in a con-
siderable body of literature as an e¤ective instrument for incentive regulation
in telecommunication capacity access networks. Proponents of FL-LRIC ar-
gue that its tenets provide appropriate incentives for productive and dynamic
e¢ ciency. It is argued that access seekers pay a price, and access providers
receive a price that correspond to the costs that the latter imposes on access
infrastructure. Consequently, access seekers bear a cost that is equivalent to
the social cost of supply. In this respect, it is argued that FL-LRIC, is not only
equitable to the access provider but induces entry from access seekers who are
either equally or more e¢ cient than the access provider in the intermediate ser-
vices market (Sappington and Weisman, 1996; Vogelsang, 2003). In this study
we test whether the hypothesized neutrality of FL-LRIC can stand up to the
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evidence.
4.3 Research Design
4.3.1 Case Study Research
Given the complexity of the phenomenon being studied, at a rst level of en-
quiry, we use case study research to dene the dynamics that describe down-
stream value in the telecommunication capacity platforms. This understanding
is used to develop models that describe the evolution of such value and also
develop models that value the di¤erent dimensions of the exibility to adapt
to downstream stochastic processes. These models are subsequently used to
test the symmetry of cost-based access prices. Based on the plausibility of the
logic of the analysis, the ndings are generalized as theoretical propositions.
Their extrapolation from case to case is based on logical inference. Now case
studies have been widely used in research for explanatory purposes, in respect
of both theory building and theory testing (Thomas, 2004). Thomas observes
that case studies can generate theoretical insights that are closely grounded in
real experience, in contrast to speculative theorizing.
Yin (2003) denes a case study as an empirical inquiry into a contemporary
phenomenon within its reallife context. Mitchell (1983) characterizes a case
study as an examination of an event (or a series of events) which exhibits the op-
eration of some identied theoretical principal. Collis and Hussey (2003) dene
a case study as an extensive examination of a single instance of a phenomenon
of interest. Eisehardt (1989) argues that case studies utilize concepts that are
validated by their close contact with empirical reality and are therefore capable
of yielding theories that are versatile. Yin (2003) observes that case studies can
be used to explain the presumed casual links in real-life interventions that are
too complex for the survey methodology. Case studies have been an important
research methodology in business (Ghauri and Gronhaug, 2002). In economics
case studies have been used to investigate the structure of industries or the
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economies of cities and regions (Yin, 2003). In such cases, the choice of case
studies as a research tool is driven by the need to understand complex phenom-
enon and provide in-depth understanding of the holistic nature and complexity
of real-life events.
Citing Kaplan (1964), Ryan et al.(1992) illustrate the relevance of case
studies with reference to the pattern model of explanation. In such a model,
the system and its context form the basis of explanation. The relationship
between the various parts the system and the systems relationship with the
larger system of which it is a part (its context) serve to explain the system.
Ryan et al. observe that whereas the inductive model of explanation provide
predictions of occurrences at the empirical level, based on more abstract general
laws or theories, it does not provide an explanation of these occurrences. These
statistical generalizations indicate statistical regularities which may or may
not apply in specic circumstances. The explanations from the pattern model
aid a fuller understanding of the world that we live in. Ryan et al. further
observe that it is inappropriate to study individual parts of social systems
taken out of context because these systems develop a characteristic wholeness
or integrity. Accordingly, a holistic research methodology seeks to explain this
holistic quality and locate particular social systems in their practical context.
A key criticism of case study research is that it provides little basis for sci-
entic generalizations (Thomas, 2004). Arguing to the contrary, Yin (2003)
observes that while case studies, like experiments, cannot be generalized to
populations or universes, they can however be generalized to theoretical propo-
sitions. Therefore a case study, like an experiment, does not represent a sample
but rather provides a basis for analytical generalizations but not statistical
generalizations. Arguing for case study research, Smith (1991) citing Worsley
et al. (1970) writes, "the general validity of the analysis does not depend on
whether the case being analysed is representative of other cases of its kind, but
rather upon the plausibility of the logic of the analysis." On the same subject
Ryan et al. citing Mitchell (1983), observe that "logical inference is epistemo-
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logically quite independent of statistical inference." Mitchell (1983) argues that
"the process of inference from case studies is only logical or causal and cannot
be statistical and extrapolability from any one case study to similar situations
in general is based only on logical inference. We infer that the features present
in the case study will be related to a wider population not because the case is
representative but because the logic of the analysis is unassailable."
Case study research gains more acceptance as a method of research given
the view of some researchers that a considerable body of management research
deviates from the complexity of reality and therefore leans towards being irrel-
evant. Starkey and Madan (2001) examine the relevance gap in management
research and argue that knowledge should inform action; and action becomes
knowable if we better understand the underlying principles linking cause and
e¤ect. The authors add that researchers should engage more with the com-
plexities of practice and argue that the dening characteristic of management
research should be its applied nature.
John and Duberly (2000) observe that the focus of management research
has become narrower and narrower in search for causal relationships to the
extent that the propositions being tested do not reect the complexity of the
real world. They conclude that the result can be propositions which apply
in such narrow circumstances that they bear little relationship to reality and
therefore have remote e¤ectiveness as a basis for understanding or controlling
social phenomenon. Di Maggio (1995) decries management research whose
thrust is the search for covering laws and which relies on a view of scientic
progress as being a kind of a "R2 sweepstake."
4.3.2 Structure of the Study and Data Sources
The data required for this study is that which describes the downstream sto-
chastic value in telecommunications access markets. This primarily includes
data on the evolution of tari¤s, and the price of access and conveyance. To the
best of the knowledge of the researcher, the UK is the only market where a
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substantial part of this data is in the public domain. This factor underpinned
the decision to base the study on UK evidence. Now the capacity access mar-
ket in the UK comprises the following platforms  analogue, ISDN2, ASDL
(Symmetric) and ASDL (Asymmetric). These platforms are di¤erentiated, in
the main, by capacity (bandwidth), hence their di¤erences in service capabil-
ities. Analogue lines provide capacities of up to 56 kbit/s, ISDN2 64 kbit/s
over single-digital channels and 128 kbit/s over double-bonded digital chan-
nels. ADSL Symmetric and Asymmetric platforms provide capacities higher
than 128 kbit/s. Symmetric access provides equal upstream and downstream
bandwidth while asymmetric access provides maximum downloading capacity
but a lower uploading capacity. This research covers the residential analogue
and ADSL (asymmetric) platforms. This coverage constitutes about 62% by
value of the analogue access market and 43% by value of the ADSL access
market at the time of the study.1
With respect to the analogue platform, this study is based on data from the
period September 1999 to June 2007. We use September 1999 as the starting
point because it is the earliest period in respect of which the required data
is available in the public domain. The data is sourced from Oftels2 Market
Information Fixed Update in respect of the period July 1999 to June 2003 and
Ofcoms Market Data Tables for the period July 2003 to June 2007. The price
of access to the Subscriber Access Network can be obtained from either BTs
regulatory accounts or Ofcom (2005), Wholesale Line Rental: Reviewing and
Setting Charge Ceilings for WLR Services. The price of conveyance, including
unit costs and usage factors, is obtained from BTs regulatory accounts. With
respect to the ADSL platform, this study is based on data from the period July
2000 to December 2008. Here July 2000 is used as the starting point because
it is the earliest period in respect of which the required data is available in the
public domain. The tari¤ data is obtained from databases managed by Point
1A more expansive coverage has not been opted for because of the limitations on the
length of this thesis.
2Ofcoms predecessor
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Topic and Pure Pricing,3 and from individual service providers. The price of
conveyance in the core network is obtained from BTs Wholesale Broadband
Services Price List. As with the analogue platform, the price of access to the
Subscriber Access Network can be obtained from either BTs regulatory ac-
counts or Ofcom (2005),Wholesale Line Rental: Reviewing and Setting Charge
Ceilings for WLR Services.
We use data points from the period September 1999 in the case of the ana-
logue platform, and from July 2000 in the case of the ADSL platform, to cali-
brate the SDEs dening downstream value and use these as a basis for valuing
the underlying contingent claims. The contingent claims are dened as bundles
of rights through time and space. We restrict the valuation of the contingent
claims to a 12-month period, a conservative estimate of a regulatory lag. A
regulatory lag is the period during which the regulated access price remains
xed. In essence therefore this is the period within which the equivalent of the
strike price, from a contingent claim perspective, remains xed. In practice, a
regulatory lag will however usually be between 1 and 5 years. In this study we
take the conservative limit of one year. In both the analogue and ADSL plat-
forms, the sources referred to above only contain quarterly data. Faced with
this constraint, monthly data points are obtained through interpolation. Whilst
this adds noise to the data set, this approach has been used by researchers, for
example, Henisz and Zelner (2001), when faced with similar constraints.
4.4 Monte Carlo Simulation
4.4.1 Basis as a Numerical Method
A contingent claim in the telecommunications access market is driven by a
complex set stochastic processes. Based on this consideration, this study uses
the Monte Carlo Method as part of a two-prong analytical approach. The
Monte Carlo method was particularly appealing in the earlier days of the study
3Both rms maintain databases on broadband retail tari¤s.
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when the feasibility of using closed-form analytical solutions seemed unlikely
because of the complexity of the dynamics studied. From the standpoint of
option pricing theory, the value of a contingent claim is equivalent to the dis-
counted risk-neutral expectation of the cash ows from the derivative security.
Computing the value of a contingent claim is therefore equivalent to computing
an integral over the space dened by the underlying value generating process.
The computational complexity of evaluating such integral is exponential to the
dimensions of the space dening value (Barraquand, 1995). The Monte Carlo
method is the only tractable approach for computing high dimensional inte-
grals (Barraquand and Martineau, 1995). The Monte Carlo method presents a
tool for valuing complex derivatives dened by, for example, multi-dimensional
stochastic processes, path dependence and early exercise, where closed-form
analytical solutions may not be feasible
Boyle (1977) was among the rst proponents of the Monte Carlo method as
a numerical method for the valuation of derivative securities. Boyle shows how
Monte Carlo simulation, when reinforced with appropriate variance reduction
techniques, provides solutions which approximate those arrived at by closed-
form analytical solutions. The basis of the Monte Carlo method as a tool for
numerical integration is as follows - take a function h(u) where the realizations
u(i) are independent, identically distributed and dened by some pdf f(u): The
Monte Carlo method provides a basis for evaluating the following integral
E[h(u)] =
Z
A
h(u)f(u)du (4.1)
The Monte Carlo method in e¤ect computes an integral over the space
dening value and thereby provides a basis for deriving the value of a contingent
claim described as an expectation (see Boyle, 1977; Trigeorgis, 1996; Boyle et
al., 1997; Galanti and Jung, 1997). The Monte Carlo method can be extended
to compute multi-dimensional integrals.
The Monte Carlo method has been used as a numerical method for the
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valuation of contingent claims by a large number of researchers. For example,
Hull and White (1987) use the Monte Carlo method to value contingent claims
where the volatility of the underlying asset is stochastic. Kemna and Vorst
(1990) use the Monte Carlo method to value path-dependant contingent claims
where the value of each claim depends on the average value of the underlying
asset in a dened period preceding the derivatives maturity. Here the holder of
the security is entitled to the higher of such average value and a straight bond
value with the exercise price being the nominal value of the bond. Barraquand
(1995) apply the Monte Carlo method to value European contingent claims
dened by multiple sources of uncertainty with the algorithm proposed being
capable of valuing claims where the value of the underlying asset is driven by
up to 100 sources of risk. Barraquand uses quadratic re-sampling, also referred
to in the literature as Moment Matching (see Boyle et al, 1997), to improve the
e¢ ciency of their method.
Barraquand andMartineau (1995) develop an approach for valuing an Amer-
ican contingent claim whose value depends on multiple sources of uncertainty.
They apply the Monte Carlo method to a state space partioning technique
that circumvents the curse of dimensionality. Using one underlying asset, Bar-
raquand and Martineau, show that their results correspond to the Black and
Scholes closed-form analytical solution for both call and put options. Bar-
raquand and Martineau, extend their work to 3 and 10 underlying assets and
show that their method generates results which correspond to classical integra-
tion methods. Barraquand and Martineau successfully apply their method to
the valuation of contingent claims with over 400 dimensions of uncertainty.
Broadie and Glasserman (1997) propose an algorithm based on the Monte
Carlo method for valuing contingent claims with early exercise features. Their
algorithm, which combines the use of two estimators (with high and low bi-
ases), is capable of valuing contingent claims with multiple state variables,
path dependencies and early exercise. Grant et al. (1997) use the Monte Carlo
method to price contingent claims based on the average price of the underly-
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ing assets and where early exercise is feasible. They combine forward-looking
simulation with backward-moving recursive dynamic programming. Longsta¤
and Schwartz (2001) develop a method for valuing options, by simulation, using
a Simple Least-Squares Approach. This method is capable of valuing options
dened by multiple factors. Ibanez (2004) applies the Monte Carlo method to
value multiple exercise contingent claims. These claims in essence represent a
portfolio of buying and selling rights where a specied number of rights can
be exercised in a dened window, and where one right can be exercised per
period for a nite number of exercise dates. Under these contracts the value
of contingent claims are a function of the stochastic processes that drive value
but also necessarily a function of the number of exercise rights conferred to the
purchaser.
4.4.2 Simulating the SDEs Dening Value
The SDEs describing the evolution of downstream value are based on the ob-
servations discussed in Section 4.3.2. Maximum Likelihood Estimation is used
to calibrate the SDEs and the value of the underlying contingent claims are
estimated using risk-neutral valuation principles. An intensity-based approach
is used to account for the e¤ect of the stochastic dynamics of exchange line
activation. The price of market risk and the price of the risk of default are used
as handles that dene the martingale equivalents of the process that generates
value. To illustrate, taking the example of the analogue platform, the evolution
of downstream value of an activated line is dened as follows4
dSa(t)
 = as(as(t)  Sa(t))dt+ asdW (t)as (4.2)
where Sa(t) represents the log of the average downstream value of an ac-
tivated exchange line. The postscript/subscript a distinguishes the analogue
platform from the ADSL platform and the postscript/subscript s distinguishes
4The arguments in Eqn. 4.2 - Eqn. 4.9 are developed more fully in Chapter 5.
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the parameters of Sa(t) from those of other processes in the analogue platform.
Now here as(t) is the level around which the process uctuates, as the speed
of reversion to the mean, as the volatility of the noise term and W (t)as is a
Wiener process. The seasonal variation exhibited by Sa(t) is described as an
ordinary trigonometric function, as follows
as(t) = s + s(t) + s sin(!st+ s) (4.3)
where s, s, s, !s and s are constants. Here s(t) captures the drift of
Sa(t)
 through time. Now s, s, !s and s capture the other usual parameters
of a trigonometric function. The process describing the evolution of Sa(t)
under risk-neutral expectations is given by
dSa(t)
 = as

as(t)  Sa(t)   1as
as

dt+ asdfW (t) (4.4)
where 1 is the market price of risk and dfW (t) is a Q Weiner process. The
expectation with respect to Eqn. 4.4 is
EQ[Sa(t)
 j zs] = (Sa(s)   as(s))e as(t s) + as(t) (4.5)
where
as(t) = s + s(t) + s sin(!st+ s) 
1as
as
Or
as(t) = as(t) 
1as
as
(4.6)
The variance of Sa(t) is
V ar[Sa(t)
 j zs] = 
2
as
2as
(1  e 2as(t s)) (4.7)
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Now the risk-neutral dynamics of Sa(t) can be simulated based on knowl-
edge of Eqn. 4.5 and Eqn. 4.7 where the noise associated with the process, in
the interval [s; t], is represented as follows
es(t) j zs = as
s
(1  e 2as(t s))
2as
"(t) (4.8)
where "(t) is a random variable described by N(0; 1): Similarly the process
F (Sa(t); t; t) can be simulated based on knowledge of its mean and variance.
Turning to model calibration, to illustrate, the parameters of Sa(t) are
calibrated using a two-step procedure.5 The parameters of the trigonometric
function s, s, s, !s and s are rst determined through least squares esti-
mation using Matlab. These parameters are estimated such that the sum of
squares i.e.
nX
t=1
k (Sa(t)   as(t))2 k (4.9)
is minimized.6 Letting a(t) = Sa(t)
   as(t), we observe data a =
fa(t0); a(t1):::::::a(tn)g drawn from a population where a(ti) are indepen-
dent and identically distributed. Next the parameters that dene mean re-
version i.e. a and a are estimated using Maximum Likelihood Estimation
(MLE). We use MLE to solve for a = fa; ag such that the likelihood of
observing the sample data is maximized. This is achieved by maximizing the
following likelihood function. The log-likeliwood function, the development of
which is explained more fully in Chapter 5, is as follows
5This has been done to avoid over-tting given the relatively low number observations,
thereby giving emphasis to the overall trend. The one-step alternative approach is subse-
quently discussed in Chapter 5.
6For t = 1::::n
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L(a(t0); a(ti):::::::a(tn);a ; a ; a) =
 a
2
log

2
a
2
a

  1
2
Pn
i=0 log(1  e 2a(t s) 

a
2
a
Pn
i=0

(a(ti) a (a(ti 1) a )e (ti ti 1))2
(1 e 2a (ti ti 1))
 (4.10)
With respect to the analogue platform, based on evidence from the period
September 1999 to June 2007, we describe the evolution of exchange line acti-
vation as an Ito process, as follows
da(t)
a(t)
= adt+ adW (t)
a (4.11)
where a is the drift of the process, a its volatility and dW (t)
a, is a
Wiener process. The expectation with respect to Eqn. 4.11 above is as follows
E[a(t)] j zs] = a(s) exp

(a  
1
2
2
a
)(t  s)

(4.12)
and the variance of the process is
V ar[a(t)) j zs] = 2a(t  s) (4.13)
Now Eqn. 4.12 and Eqn. 4.13 form the basis of simulating a(t): From Eqn.
4.13 the noise term of the process, in the interval [s; t], is
e(t) j zs = a
p
(t  s)"(t) (4.14)
where " is a random variable from a standard normal distribution. Turning
to the calibration of a(t)
, we observe data a = fa(t0); a(t1)::::: ::a(tn)g
drawn from a population where a(ti)
 are independent and identically distrib-
uted. We use the Maximum Likelihood Estimation to solve for a = fa ; ag
such that the likelihood of observing the sample data is maximized. The rele-
vant log-likeliwood function, the development of which is explained more fully
in Chapter 5, is as follows
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log p(a(t0)
; a(t1)

::::::::::a(tn)

; ap; 
2
a) =
 1
2
Pn
n=1
24log[22a(ti   ti 1)] +
 
a(ti)
 a(ti 1) 
(
a 
2a
2
)
(ti ti 1)
!2
2a(ti ti 1)
35
+ log p(a(t0);a; 
2
a) 
Pn
i=0 log a(ti)
(4.15)
Under the assumption that the risk associated with pa(t) is incorporated in
Sa(t), knowing that a rational access seeker will align entry and exit such that
for any time interval F (Sa(t); t; t) > Ka, the value of a contingent claim on the
Sa(t) process incorporating the stochastic intensity of line activation, is
C(s; F (s; t);Ka; t) =
EQ[(Sa(t); t; t) Ka; 0]+  E[a(t)]
  e r(t s) (4.16)
where E[a(t)] is the intensity of exchange line inactivation under objective
measures. With respect to the ADSL platform, the SDEs describing the evo-
lution of downstream value are based on observations from January 2000 to
December 2008. Here too Maximum Likelihood Estimation is used to calibrate
the SDEs, and the value of the underlying contingent claims are estimated us-
ing risk-neutral valuation principles. And an intensity-based approach is used
to value contingent claims on the process generating value. The price of market
risk and the price of the risk of default are used as the handles that dene the
martingale equivalents of the process that generates value.
4.5 Variance Reduction Techniques
4.5.1 General
A Variance Reduction Technique (VRT), Antithetic Variates, was employed
during the earlier stages of this study to improve the e¢ ciency of estimates
from the numerical methods. This however resulted in modest improvement
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of the results because of the low volatility of downstream exhibited by the
quarterly data used in this study. As discussed more fully in Section 8.2, the
use of quarterly data, while providing a basis for rst-order approximations,
conceivably understates actual volatilities, hence perhaps therefore improperly
marginalizing the usefulness of VRTs in this study. Enhanced levels of volatility
of downstream value may well require VRTs to improve the e¢ ciency of the
estimates from numerical methods. Given this, VRTs are discussed in this
section to provide an appreciation of their potential relevance in the face of
more disaggregated data.
4.5.2 Antithetic Variates
Antithetic and Control Variates are the more traditional techniques for im-
proving the e¢ ciency of the Monte Carlo method. Other techniques have more
recently found application in the literature - these include moment matching,
importance sampling and conditional Monte Carlo (Boyle et al. 1997). We
rst consider Antithetic Variates. Using Antithetic Variates, Boyle (1976), de-
creases the 95% condence limits for a 20-period contingent claim from 0:958
to 0:574 .
Antithetic Variates induce narrower condence intervals and therefore higher
e¢ ciency and precision without disturbing the expectation i.e. the rst mo-
ment. Antithetic Variates achieve this by using complimentary pairs of random
variates. More precisely Antithetic Variates induce negative correlation be-
tween the pairs of random variates. The mathematical basis of Antithetic Vari-
ates is as follows. Consider a sequence of random variables underlying, for exam-
ple, the es(t) process in Eqn. 4.8, where we have (es1(t1); es2(t1)); (es1(t2); es2(t2)
:::::::(es1(tn); es2(tn)); and where esk(ti) is the ith pair of observations and kth
occurrence - for i = 1:::n and k = 1 to 2. We can generate the rst observation
in a pair, es1(t1), by using a random variate "1(t1) and generate the second
observation in the pair, es2(t1), by using a random variate "2(t1) which is sim-
ply equal to  "1(t1) and where "1(ti) approximates N(0; 1). Now because "1(ti)
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approximates N(0; 1), "2(ti) necessarily also approximates N(0; 1) and provides
a basis for generating es2(ti): We therefore have it that if E("1(ti)) =  then
E("2(ti)) =  for i = 1:::n. Each pair of observations is however indepen-
dent such that ("1(ti); "2(ti)) 6= ("1(ti+1); "2(ti+1)): We however use the mid-
point of each pairs of observations such that "(ti) = ("1(ti) + "2(ti))=2: Here
E("(ti)) = "(ti): Now
V ar("(ti) =
V ar("1(ti)) + V ar("2(ti)) + 2Cov("1(ti); "2(ti))
4n
(4.17)
for i::::n. The pair replication generates for a small "1(ti) a large "2(ti),
and a large "1(ti) generates a small "2(ti). As a result Cov("1(ti); "2(ti)) is
necessarily less than zero. This negative correlation reduces V ar("(ti)) and
thereby improves the e¢ ciency of the estimates. See Barraquand (1995), Boyle
et al. (1997) and Averill (2007) for expositions of Antithetic Variates.
Antithetic variates can also be applied where a sample is drawn from U(0; 1).
To illustrate consider a sequence of random variables (es1(t1); es2(t1)); (es1(t2); es2(t2))
:::::::(es1(tn); es2(tn)) where esk(ti) is the ith pair of observations and kth occur-
rence - for i = 1:::n and k = 1 to 2. We can generate the rst observation
in a pair, es1(t1), by using a random variate U1(t1) and generate the second
observation in the pair, es2(t1); by using a random variate U2(t1) = (1 U1(t1))
where U1(ti) approximates U(0; 1). Now because U1(ti) approximates U(0; 1),
U2(ti) also necessarily approximates U(0; 1) and provides a basis for generat-
ing es2(t1): We therefore have it that if E(U1(ti)) =  then E(U2(ti)) =  for
i = 1:::n. Each pair of observations is however independent such that (U1(ti);
U2(ti)) 6= (U1(ti+1); U2(ti+1)):We use the mid-point of each pairs of observations
such that U(ti) = (U1(ti) + U2(ti))=2: Here E(U(ti)) = U(ti): Now
V ar(U(ti)) =
V ar(U1(ti)) + V ar(U2(ti)) + 2Cov(U1(ti); U2(ti))
4n
(4.18)
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for i::::n. The pair replication generates for a small U1(ti), a large U2(ti) and
vice versa.. As a result Cov(U1(ti); U2(ti)) is necessarily less than zero. This
negative correlation reduces V ar(U(ti)) and thereby improves the e¢ ciency of
the estimates.
4.5.3 Control Variates
Control Variates are a further technique for improving the e¢ ciency of Monte
Carlo simulation. Using control variates, Boyle (1977), decreases the 95% con-
dence limits of estimates of option values from 0:958 to 0:026 for a 20-period
contingent claim. The Control Variate method uses knowledge about the cor-
relation between random variables in a simulation to modulate realizations of
runs and thereby improve the condence limits of the estimates. To illustrate,
consider the random variable Sa(t) introduced in Section 4.4.2. We introduce a
second random variable R(t) which is correlated to Sa(t), and has a theoretical
average bR(t). A simulated run of n observations will have an average,
R(t) =
1
n
nX
t=1
R(t): (4.19)
Now the Control Variate Method uses knowledge of the correlation between
Sa(t)
 and R(t), and also knowledge of the deviation of R(t) from bR(t) to
provide adjusted estimates as follows
fSa(t) = Sa(t)   (R(t)  bR(t)) (4.20)
where fSa(t) is the adjusted estimator, Sa(t) is the unadjusted estimator
and  is a constant. The variance of the adjusted estimator is7
7The variance of the two processes are in the interval [s; t] and can be more concisely
expressed as V ar(Sa(t)) j zs and V ar(R(t)) j zs. However for clarity of exposition we use
the abbreviated terms V ar(Sa(t)) and V ar(R(t)):
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V ar(fSa(t)) = V ar(Sa(t)) + 2V ar(R(t))  2Cov(Sa(t); R(t))
= V ar(Sa(t)
) + 2V ar(R(t))  2(Sa(t); R(t))
q
V ar(Sa(t))V ar(R(t))
(4.21)
The value of  is found by determining a value that minimizes the volatility
offSa(t). This is found by di¤erentiating the right-hand side of Eqn. 4.21 with
respect to  and setting this to zero this gives8
 =
Cov(Sa(t)
; R(t))
V ar(R(t))
= (Sa(t)
; R(t))
p
V ar(Sa(t))q
V ar(R(t))
(4.22)
We can see that the variance of fSa(t) is smaller than the variance of Sa(t)
if for a positive value of  the following holds
 < 2(Sa(t)
; R(t))
p
V ar(Sa(t))q
V ar(R(t))
(4.23)
Similarly the variance of fSa(t) is smaller than the variance of Sa(t) if for
a negative value of  the following holds
 > 2(Sa(t)
; R(t))
p
V ar(Sa(t))q
V ar(R(t))
(4.24)
Therefore if Sa(t) and R(t) are positively correlated a variance reduction
will be realized if Eqn. 4.23 above holds. Here  takes a positive value. If Sa(t)
8Note that Corr(Sa(t); R(t)) =
Cov(Sa(t)
;R(t))p
V ar(Sa(t))V ar(R(t))
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is above its expectation, the positive quantity (R(t)  bR(t)) reduces Sa(t). If
on the other hand Sa(t) and R(t) are negatively correlated a variance reduction
is realized if Eqn. 4.24 above holds. Here  takes a negative value. If Sa(t) is
above its expectation, the negative (R(t)  bR(t)) increases Sa(t). See Boyle et
al. 1997, Hull and White 1988 and Kemna and Vorst (1990) for applications of
Control Variates. While presenting a useful method for improving the e¢ ciency
of the Monte Carlo method, this study does not use control variates because
there does not exist a variable that is known to be correlated to the Sa(t)
process, and whose theoretical value can be determined.
4.5.4 Other Variance Reduction Techniques
The other VRTs discussed in the literature in the context of pricing of derivative
securities include moment matching, stratied sampling and importance sam-
pling. This section provides a broad overview of these techniques and discusses
the reasons why these have not been used in this study. Moment matching
is discussed in the literature as a method for improving the e¢ ciency of MC
simulation. See for example Boyle et al. (1997). To illustrate this method,
consider Eqn. 4.8. Now the sample moments of "(t) for (t = 1; :::; n) may not
necessarily exactly match the moments of a standard normal distribution. In
such circumstances, moment matching can be used to correct undesired devia-
tions of the moments of "(t):With respect to the rst moment of "(t), moment
matching is applied as follows
e"(t) = "(t)  "(t) (4.25)
where
"(t) =
nX
t=1
"(t)
n
(4.26)
where e"(t) is the adjusted estimate and "(t) is the unadjusted estimate for
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t = 1; :::; n:Moment matching can be extended to correct the rst two moments
of "(t). For example, where the mean and variance of "(t) are di¤erent from
those of the underlying distribution, moment matching can be used as follows
e"(t) = ("(t)  "(t))a
b
+ a (4.27)
where a and a is the rst moment and the standard deviation of the under-
lying population, respectively and b is the standard deviation of the "(t): See
Boyle et al. 1997. Using the method of moments, Eqn. 4.8 takes the following
form
es(t) = as
s
(1  e 2as(t s))
2as
e"(t) (4.28)
Similarly, using the method of moments, the noise assosicated with Eqn.
4.14 can be restated as follows
e(t) j zs = a
p
(t  s)e"(t) (4.29)
The SDE in Eqn. 4.8 and Eqn. 4.14 assume a random process underlined
by a standard normal distribution. This study is based on a large sample size
a sample size of 10,000 is used. This mitigates the risk, inherent in small
samples, of the moments of the random variates being biased. For this reason
moment matching is not used.
Stratied sampling is also discussed in the literature as a method for increas-
ing the e¢ ciency of stochastic simulation as a numerical method. To illustrate
this example consider again Eqn. 4.8. Now if we consider a run of say 100
intervals, the distribution of the U(t) (for say, t = 1; :::; 100) may not exactly
reect a uniform distribution as some segments of the area of integration will be
under-represented. Stratied sampling overcomes this drawback be spreading
the sample evenly throughout the area of integration. See Boyle et al. (1997).
Taking a sample run with 100 intervals, the simulation inputs would be as
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follows
X(t) = F 1((t+ U(t)  1)=100) (4.30)
Here t = 1; :::; 100 and where F 1 is the inverse of the cumulative normal
distribution, U(t) is a random variate from U(0; 1): This method therefore
spreads the observations fairly uniformly throughout the domain of integration.
In essence one observation lies in between the (t   1)th and tthpercentile. See
Boyle et al. (1997). We do not use stratied sampling because this study uses
a large sample.
Importance sampling is a further approach to increasing the e¢ ciency of
stochastic simulation. Importance sampling improves e¢ ciency by narrowing
the domain of integration to the specic area of interest. To illustrate consider
Eqn. 4.1 where we have that the function h(u) is integrated over the domain
A (see George and Casella (2004), pp 92). If we have, for example, that the
extremes of this domain are not of interest but rather another domain B 2 A,
then the following equality can be used as a basis of estimation
y =
Z
B
h(u)f(u)g(u)
g(u)
d(u) (4.31)
where g(u) represents the pdf of U in B:
4.5.5 Low Discrepancy Sequences
The U(0; 1) distribution will commonly be used as a basis for generating,
through appropriate transformations, the distributions that are used in sto-
chastic simulation, for example N(0; 1). In the discussion so far the U(0; 1) is
represented by pseudo-random numbers generated in the interval [0; 1]. Pseudo-
random numbers may however cluster and therefore not uniformly cover the
domain of integration. Low-discrepancy sequences also referred to as quasi-
random numbers address this shortcoming. In doing so these sequences en-
hance convergence. Four low-discrepancy sequences are commonly used in the
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literature - these include Halton (1960), Sobol (1967), Faure (1982) and Nieder-
reiter(1988) sequences. Galanti and Jung (1997), among others, discuss the
mechanics for generating these sequences.
Galanti and Jung (1997) study the e¢ ciency of low discrepancy sequences
in the context of pricing European call options. The study separately considers
1, 10 and 250 time periods. For each time period the number of simulations is
gradually varied from 1,000 to 200,000. The study nds that with one time in-
terval the low-discrepancy sequences outperform the pseudo-random numbers.
The study further nds that with 10 time periods, the low discrepancy sequences
decidedly outperform pseudo-random numbers after 10,000 simulations. For
250 time intervals, the study nds that only the Sobol sequences outperforms
pseudo-random numbers after 10,000 simulations. For this time interval and
at 15,000 simulations, the respective errors of the pseudo-random numbers,
Halton, Faure and Sobol sequences are 0.90%, 13.68%, 3.25% and 0.34%, re-
spectively. The study concludes that for high-dimensional integrals, the Sobol
sequence exhibits better results than either Faure or Halton sequences. More
generally, for large sample sizes, there is little distinction between the e¢ ciency
of pseudorandom numbers combined with antithetic variates and either Sobol
or Faure sequences. Overall, Galanti and Jung conclude that the e¢ ciency of
low discrepancy sequences relative to pseudo-random numbers very much de-
pends on the dimensions of a simulation and the complexity of the underlying
integrals.
Pastov and Traub (1995) evaluate the relative e¢ ciency of pseudo-random
and quasi-random numbers. The study is based on mortgage backed securities
and evaluates integrals with more than 360 dimensions. They nd that Sobols
sequences are more e¢ cient than Haltons sequences. They also nd that low-
discrepancy sequences outperform pseudo-random numbers. In contrast Brat-
ley et al. (1992) nd that pseudo-random numbers outperform low-discrepancy
sequences for dimensions greater than 12. Boyle et al. (1997) evaluate the rela-
tive e¢ ciency of pseudo-random numbers and low discrepancy sequences. Using
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50,000 dimensions they nd that low-discrepancy sequences outperform pseudo-
random numbers, and that Sobols sequence outperform Faures sequence. For
higher dimensions pseudo-random numbers outperform Faure sequences but
Sobols sequences remain superior to pseudo-random numbers. Boyle et al.
(1997) nd that while Faure and Sobol sequences outperform pseudo-random
numbers for dimensions up to 200,000, between the two low discrepancy se-
quences, Sobols sequences were generally outperformed for dimensions in the
middle two quartiles.
Taken together the above results suggest that Sobol sequences are generally
more e¢ cient than either Haltons or Faures sequences. However the evidence
is mixed on the relative superiority of low discrepancy sequences over pseudo-
random numbers for computations with high dimensions. On one hand Brately
et al. (1992) nd the pseudo-random numbers outperform low discrepancy
sequences for computations with high dimensions, on the other, the studies
by Pastor and Traub (1995) and Boyle et al. (1997) have results that nd
otherwise. What is however instructive is the nding by Galanti and Jung
(1997) that combining pseudo-random numbers with Antithetic Variates result
in around about the same e¢ ciency as low discrepancy sequences. Based on
these ndings, low discrepancy sequences are not used in this study.
4.6 Closed-Form Analytical Solutions
Closed-form analytical solutions can be used to value contingent claims where
the value of the underlying asset is driven by a small set of sources of un-
certainty, dened by Gaussian processes. Black and Scholes (1973) present
a closed-form analytical solution to value a contingent claim where the value
of the underlying security is dened by a Geometric Brownian Motion. Stulz
(1982) presents a closed-form analytical solution for pricing an option whose
underlying value depends on a maximum of two sources of uncertainty. In
this study, the development of closed-form analytical solutions draws on the
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Gaussian distributions that underpin the processes that dene the evolution of
the downstream value of exchange lines. In the case of the analogue platform
we know, as is subsequently shown in Eqn. 5.58, that downstream value of an
activated line, under risk-neutral expectations, can be represented as follows
EQ[Sa(t)
 j zs] = (Sa(s)   as(s))e as(t s) + as(t) (4.32)
where
as(t) = s + s(t) + s sin(!st+ s) 
1as
as
(4.33)
Here Sa(t) represents the evolution of the log of net average downstream
value of an exchange line, as the volatility of the SDE describing the evolu-
tion of Sa(t), as(t) the risk-neutral level around which Sa(t)
 oscillates. The
parameters of the trigonometric function, s, s, s, !s and s, are constants.
Here 1 is the price of market risk. Now the variance associated with Eqn. 4.32
is dened as follows
V arQ[Sa(t)
 j zs] = 
2
as
2as
(1  e 2as(t s)) (4.34)
As will be subsequently shown in Eqn. 5.35, the evolution of exchange line
activation for the analogue platform can be represented as follows
E[a(t)) j zs] = a(s) exp

(a  
1
2
2
a
)(t  s)

(4.35)
here a(t) represents the intensity of exchange line activation and a the
drift of activation. For ease of exposition letting as(t) = E
Q[Sa(t)
 j zs],
af = V ar
Q[Sa(t)
 j zs] and u = lnF (Sa(t); t; t; ), we have that downstream
value on the risk-neutral process, in an activated state, is
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V (Sa(t); s; t) =
+1Z
 1
(F (Sa(t); t; t) Ka) 1
af
p
2
exp
(
 1
2

u  as(t)
af
2)
du
(4.36)
where Ka the price of access to the Subscriber Network. Knowing that a
rational access seeker will align entry and exit and negotiate contractual terms
such that F (Sa(t); t; t) > Ka, the risk-neutral value accruing to an access seeker
is therefore
E[(F (Sa(t); t; t) Ka); 0]+ =
+1Z
lnKa
(F (Sa(t); t; t) Ka) 1afp2 exp

 1
2
h
u as(t)
af
i2
du
=
+1Z
lnKa
F (Sa(t); t; t)
1
af
p
2
exp

 1
2
h
u as(t)
af
i2
du 
1Z
lnKa
Ka
1
af
p
2
exp

 1
2
h
u as(t)
af
i2
du
(4.37)
The relationships in Eqn. 4.35 and Eqn. 4.37 can be used as the basis
of a closed-form analytical solution. The closed-form solutions present a basis
for generalizing the results. Similar arguments can be furthered for the ADSL
platform.
4.7 Summary
At a rst level of enquiry, case study research is used to dene the dynam-
ics that describe downstream value in telecommunications capacity platforms.
This understanding is used to develop models that describe the evolution of
such value and subsequently test the symmetry of cost-based access prices from
the standpoint of option pricing theory. The data used in this study is based
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on UK evidence from the analogue and ASDL capacity access platforms. On
the analytical methods, this study uses a two-prong approach a numerical
method, Monte Carlo simulation and closed-form analytical solutions. Monte-
Carlo simulation is used because of its versatility in computing high-dimensional
integrals and valuing complex derivatives dened by multi-dimensional stochas-
tic processes. The closed-form analytical solutions rst, provide a basis for
checking the results from the numerical methods. Second, these solutions gen-
eralize the results and provide an option-theoretic framework for pricing access
where third parties have the leverage of adapting to downstream stochastic
value.
98
Chapter 5
Analogue Capacity Access: Contingent
Claim Analysis
5.1 Introduction
This chapter develops a framework for valuing the exibility of adapting to
downstream value, and tests the neutrality of FL-LRIC1 as an approach for
pricing capacity access, based on evidence from the analogue platform. This
evidence is from the residential analogue capacity market in the UK and covers
the period September 1999 to July 2007. Option pricing theory is used as a
theoretical framework. This pricing theory is used because of its capacity to
conceptualize and quantify the value of exibility. A numerical method, Monte
Carlo simulation, is used because of its capacity to value complex derivatives
dened by multi-dimensional stochastic processes. In using a numerical method,
an intensity-based approach is used to value contingent claims on the process
generating value. The price of market risk and the price of the risk of default
are used as the handles that dene the martingale equivalents of the process
that generates value. Maximum Likelihood Estimation is used to calibrate
the stochastic di¤erential equations describing downstream value and the value
of the underlying contingent claims are estimated using risk-neutral valuation
principles.
The analysis in this chapter assumes the typical model in a liberalized net-
work where third parties (access seekers) have wholesale rights to the Subcriber
Access Network and therefore downstream rights to provide retail services to
end users. Under this model, third parties also have wholesale access rights to
the Conveyance Network. A third party is therefore able to provide end-to-end
1Forward-looking, long-run incremental costs.
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connectivity to its subscribers by renting an incumbents infrastructure. Fur-
ther, under this model the price of third-party access to the Access Network is
regulated being that this part of the infrastructure is considered as a bottleneck
facility. A descriptive overview of the analogue access network is presented in
Section 5.2. The model describing downstream value and its constituent parts
are discussed in Sections 5.3 to 5.5. Section 5.6 presents a framework for cali-
brating the model. Section 5.7 provides a framework for valuing a contingent
claim on the process dening downstream value. Closed-form analytical solu-
tions are developed in Chapter 7. The results and discussion are covered in
Chapter 8.
5.2 Network Topology
5.2.1 Subscriber Access Network
The analogue access infrastructure comprises two layers2 the Subscriber Ac-
cess Network3 (hereinafter referred to as the Access Network) and the Con-
veyance Network.4 The Access Network extends from a subscribers premise to
a telephone exchange. The rst layer of the analogue access network, the Ac-
cess Network, extends from a subscribers premises to the MDF of an exchange.
Each subscriber exchange line is a dedicated twisted copper wire pair extending
from the Network Termination Equipment (NTE) at subscribers premises to
the MDF of a telephone exchange. Each NTE will have one or more exchange
lines and each line runs from the NTE to the exchange in a hierarchical struc-
ture. A nal drop cable, which may either be overhead or underground, joins
2The source of data for this descriptive overview includes Ofcom (1997) - Network Charges
from 1997; Ofcom (2005a) - Local Loop Unbundling: Setting the Fully Unbundled Rental
Charge Ceiling and Minor Amendment to SMP Conditions FA6 and FB6; Ofcom (2005b) -
Review of BTs Network Charge Control; Ofcom (2005c) - Valuing Copper Access; Ofcom
(2005d) - Wholesale Line Rental: Reviewing and Setting Charge Ceilings for WLR Services;
BTs Regulatory Accounts (various); and Analysys (2005) - Cost of the BT UK Local Loop
Network.
3Also commonly referred to as the Local Loop Access Network.
4The Conveyance Network is the upstream infrastructure connecting exchanges.
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the NTE to the rst concentration point, a Distribution Point (DP). Typically
there will be two concentration points between the NTE and the exchange.
The rst of these are DPs which concentrate between 20-30 active wire pairs.
The second class of concentration points are the Primary Concentration Points
(PCPs) which concentrate between 500-600 active wire pairs.
The DPs and PCPs, and the PCPs and MDF are linked by cables buried in
ducts. The PCPs lead to the MDF at the exchange. An MDF together with
its associated PCPs, DPs and NTEs represent an access area. The part of the
access layer that extends from the MDF in an exchange to and including the
PCP is referred to as the E-side and the part of the layer that is immediately
after the PCP up to and including the DP is referred to as the D-Side. The
MDF, PCP, DP and NTE will typically be above ground structures and the
D-side and E-side cabling will usually be underground structures. The drop
wire could either be above or below ground-level - see Figure 5.1.
Source: Ofcom (2005)
Figure 5.1: Analogue - Network Topology
The regulated wholesale price of access to Access Network is a geographically
averaged unit cost of an exchange line. The unit costs in the access layer
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are mainly driven by demographics, in particular, population density. This
density drives the dimensions of the network. These dimensions aim to optimize
network e¢ ciency and dene, for a service area, the number of NTEs per DP,
number of DPs per PCP and PCPs per route. Further the unit costs will depend
on the network structure, for example, the type of soil, type of duct, type of
cable and type of cabinets. Capacity bu¤ers, through over-provisioning, also
impacts unit costs. The Access Network is usually over-provisioned to provide
for the spare capacity required to guarantee network availability and cater for
demand growth. The unit cost of a node (MDF, PCP and DP) is primarily
a function of capacity, and the cost of the link between the nodes (cables and
ducts) is a function of capacity and length.
5.2.2 Conveyance Network: Switching Layer
The conveyance network consists of switching and transport layers.5 Typically
a local-exchange will serve an area referred to as a local exchange area where
each subscriber will have a dedicated line to the exchange. More than one
exchange may be required to serve a local area where there are a large number
of subscribers and where one exchange is not e¢ cient. In such a multi-exchange
area, subscribers are assigned to a specic exchange but connectivity between
the exchanges is made possible through junctions which join the exchanges.
This allows any-to-any connectivity - see Figure 5.2.
In addition to being linked to one another, the local exchanges will be
connected to a tandem switch. A tandem switch, commonly referred to as a
trunk or transit exchange, generally serves a local area. A tandem switch will
be connected to a tandem switch in other exchange areas to provide any-to-any
connectivity between local exchange areas. In addition to being connected to
other tandem switches, a tandem switch will be connected to an international
switch, an international gateway, which connects the network in one country
with the networks in other countries, thereby providing any-to-any connectivity
5The MDF is the demarcation between the Access and Conveyance Networks.
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between countries. In some cases however the switching nodes lowest in the
hierarchy will be a Remote Concentrator Unit (RCU) which is a small digital
exchange. The RCU will be located away from the local exchange, have the
capacity to carry out a number of switching functions and is driven by the
processors in the parent local exchange. The switching layer is therefore made
up of the nodes in the network i.e. RCUs, local exchanges, tandem switches
and national switches. The components of a remote concentrator will be similar
to those of a local exchange the key components being the Subscriber Line
Termination Unit, switchboard, processor and Digital Line Termination Units.
Except for the SLTU, the tandem switch will have similar components to the
RCU or local exchange.
Source: Ofcom (2005)
Figure 5.2: Conveyance Infrastructure
The capacity of the various components of the switching nodes are dimen-
sioned to cater for busy hour tra¢ c and are either functions of busy hour call
attempts or busy hour call durations. For example, the capacity and cost of
a processor is driven by the number of busy hour call attempts. The proces-
sor runs programmes controlling the switch and also maintains the network
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database, which has subscriber and switching information. The switch block
switches calls and its capacity and cost is driven by tra¢ c intensity i.e. busy
hour call attempts and their duration. Other costs attributable to switch-
ing elements are site costs (land and buildings) and Signalling Transfer Points
which facilitate communication between the processors of di¤erent exchanges.
The DLTU provides the interface to the switch and their cost is driven by the
number of lines to other exchanges.
While the capacity of the di¤erent elements of the switching apparatus will
be dimensioned primarily with reference to either the number of busy hour
call attempts and/or busy hour call durations, this capacity is usually over-
provisioned to provide for the spare capacity required to guarantee network
availability and cater for growth in demand growth. The access price for a
switching element is the geographical averaged unit cost per unit of time. This
is therefore based on aggregate costs of an element during a regulatory lag
divided by the expected demand in minutes.
5.2.3 Conveyance Network: Transport Layer
The transport layer comprises the physical links connecting the nodes in the
Conveyance Network. The transport layer therefore includes the links between:
a RCU and a local switch; two adjacent local switches; a local switch and a
tandem switch; and two tandem switches. These links include transmission
infrastructure and electronics the infrastructure comprising ducts and cables
and the electronics comprising multiplexing, line termination equipment and
digital cross-connects.
The RCUs in a local area are connected to each other in a ringstructure
by an SDH ring referred to as the RCU ring. The RCU rings will have both
way capabilities with the size of each ring corresponding to the dimensioned
capacity. Each RCU is connected to an RCU ring by an add drop multiplexers
(ADM) and each ring is connected to the local exchange (gateway node) by a
multiplexer. The multiplexing equipment at the gateway node corresponds to
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the capacity of the RCU ring.
The number of RCUs per ring and the capacity of each ring is primarily a
function of subscriber density. Transmission equipment will have regenerators
after threshold intervals to boost signal transmission. The local switches are
connected by SDH rings, referred to as LS rings. The number and capacity
of LS rings will depend on subscriber density and tra¢ c intensity. As with
the RCU rings, each local switch is connected to the LS ring by an ADM
and each LS ring is connected to a gateway tandem by a multiplexer. As
with RCU rings, transmission along the LS rings is boosted by regenerators.
Unlike the connections between RCUs and between local switches, connections
between tandem switches take the form of a partial mesh allowing point-to-point
connectivity. Such connectivity is made possible by digital cross-connects. In
cases where there may not be a direct path between two tandem switches, such
point-to-point connectivity is made through digital cross-connects.
The RCU and LS rings will usually run underground as part of underground
plant. The plant, also referred to as infrastructure, comprises primarily of ducts
and cables. A duct will usually be made of a trench and a duct route. The cost
of the underground plant will not only be driven by capacity and length of the
plant but also di¤erences in geo-types, for example, terrain types. The cost of
a duct will vary depending on whether it is a metropolitan area, urban or rural
area as these di¤erences a¤ect the cost of digging and reconstructing surfaces.
The dimensions of the transport layers are based on busy-hour billed minutes.
This is adjusted for holding times, allowance for growth, leased lines and an
allowance to provide for network resilience. The regulated access price for a
transport element is the geographical averaged unit cost. This is therefore
based on the aggregate costs of an element during a regulatory lag divided by
the expected demand in minutes.
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5.3 Model Specication
5.3.1 Downstream Value
We focus on the typical model in a liberalized network where third parties (ac-
cess seekers) have wholesale rights to the Access Network and therefore down-
stream rights to provide retail services to end users. Under this model, third
parties also have wholesale access rights to the Conveyance Network. A third-
party is therefore able to provide end-to-end connectivity to its subscribers by
renting an incumbents infrastructure.6 Further, under this model the price
of third-party access to the Access Network is regulated being that this part
of the infrastructure is considered as a bottleneck facility. Now downstream
value to an access seeker depends on the regulated price of access to the Access
Network, revenue from an exchange line (which has a xed and variable compo-
nent), cost of conveyance through the meshed core network and the stochastic
state of a line. In the ideal situation, the key statistic required for contingent
claim analysis is that which captures the evolution of average downstream value
of an exchange line. This is however not available as a single statistic from the
data in the public domain. What is however available is data that captures the
constituent parts of downstream value (average tra¢ c per exchange line across
customers, revenue per unit of tra¢ c, conveyance charges per unit of tra¢ c etc).
The analysis in this chapter is built on this secondary evidence. Based on this
evidence, if we consider a representative portfolio of analogue exchange lines,
downstream value through time, based on the premise of average throughput,
in the constrained case,7 is represented as follows
6While this is study is based on the model where a third-party purchases end-to-end
connectivity, it is recognized that an access seeker may opt to purchase only a subset of the
network elements required to provide end-to-end connectivity, and supplement these with its
own elements.
7Where an access seeker does not have the exibility to adapt to downstream stochastic
processes.
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Zai(t) =(
Xa(t) (Ya(t)  Ua(t)) + Va(t) Ma(t) Ka(t) if Lai(t) = 1
 Ma(t) Ka(t) if Lai(t) = 0
(5.1)
The subscript a distinguishes the analogue platform from the ADSL plat-
form studied in Chapter 6. Here Zai(t) represents the downstream value of the
ith exchange line in a representative portfolio.8 Xa(t) represents the variable,
average tra¢ c per exchange line per unit time;9 Ya(t) represents average tari¤s
per unit of tra¢ c; Ua(t), the average price of conveyance per unit of tra¢ c;
Va(t), the regulated retail rental per unit of time; Ma(t) other costs; and Lai(t)
the state of an exchange line.10 Here  represents the proportion of value that
cannot be re-assigned. Now Xa(t) and Lai(t) are stochastic while Ya(t), Ua(t),
Va(t),Ma(t) andKa(t) are relatively deterministic during a regulatory lag. Now
the dynamics through space, for a given point in time, can be represented as
follows
Zat(i) =(
Xa(t) (Ya(t)  Ua(t)) + Va(t) Ma(t) Ka(t) if Pat(i) = 1
 Ma(t) Ka(t) if Pat(i) = 0
(5.2)
for i = 1::::::n, where Pat(i) denes the state of the ith of element of a
representative portfolio of exchange lines at time t in the analogue platform.
Now Pat(i) = 1 with a probability a(t) or 0 with a probability 1   a(t). An
access seeker has the right to the downstream value described by Sai(t) subject
8For i = 1:::::n
9This represents an average across customers at each time interval and is therefore the
expected throughput per individual exchange line in a representative portfolio at time t. This
study focuses on the mainstream market segment where tra¢ c comprises of local, national
and international calls, and calls to mobiles.
10For i = 1:::::n
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to a price,11 Ka(t), the regulated price of access to the Access Network. We
discuss the algorithms that capture the Lai(t) and a(t) processes in Section
5.5.
In a liberalized capacity access framework, the regulated price of access
to the Access Network constitutes the substantive equivalent of a strike price,
from the standpoint of contingent claim analysis, for four main reasons. First,
the price allows an access seeker to participate in the downstream market.
Second, the access price is xed for a specied period (regulatory lag). Third,
the downstream market is characterized by uncertainty with both a potential
upside and downside. Fourth, the right to participate in the downstreammarket
does not have a corresponding obligation. Now conveyance charges have a
substantive form that is di¤erent from the charges to the Access Network,12
from the standpoint of contingent claim analysis because these charges are
only incurred by an access seeker if there is downstream activation. The Xa(t)
and Ya(t) processes are considered in greater detail in the next section.
5.3.2 Tra¢ c and Tari¤s
Xa(t)
 is dened based on observations from September 1999 to July 2007.13
It is observed that the evolution of this process exhibits mean-reversion with
seasonal variation - see data in Table E.1 in Appendix E.14 Accordingly we
describe the evolution of Xa(t) as a trigonometric function. An expression
representing this evolution is as follows
dXa(t)
 = ax(ax(t) Xa(t))dt+ axdW (t)ax (5.3)
Here Xa(t) is dened on a probability space (
;A;P). The information
set is captured by F=fzt : t  0g. Now Xa(t) is zt measureable and is
11Sai(t) =

Xa(t) (Ya(t)  Ua(t)) + Va(t) Ma(t) if Lai(t) = 1
 Ma(t) if Lai(t) = 0
12Where end-to-end connectivity is purchased.
13Here Xa(t) = lnXa(t):
14The database used for this study contains the tra¢ c history from only September 1999.
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adapted to the same lteration. The postscript/subscript a distinguishes the
analogue platform from the ADSL platform studied in Chapter 6 and the post-
script/subscript x distinguishes the parameters of Xa(t) from those of other
processes that will be subsequently discussed in this chapter. Now here ax(t)
is the level around which the process uctuates, ax the speed of reversion to
the mean and ax the volatility of the noise term. The process has a posi-
tive drift at a rate of ax when ax(t) > Xa(t)
 and a negative drift of the
same rate when ax(t) < X(t). Now ax and ax are constants and W (t)
ax is
Wiener process.15 The seasonal variation exhibited by Xa(t) is described as
an ordinary trigonometric function, as follows
ax(t) = x + x(t) + x sin(!xt+ x) (5.4)
where x, x, x, !x and x are constants. Here x(t) captures the drift of
Xa(t)
 through time. Now x, x, !x and x capture the other usual parameters
of a trigonometric function. The expectation with respect to Eqn. 5.3, for t > s,
is
E[Xa(t)
 j zs] = (Xa(s)   ax(s))e ax(t s) + ax(t) (5.5)
And its variance is
V ar[Xa(t)
 j zs] = 
2
ax
2ax
(1  e 2ax(t s)) (5.6)
From Eqn. 5.5 and Eqn. 5.6, we have that the solution to Eqn. 5.3 is
Xa(t)
 = (Xa(s)   ax(s))e ax(t s) + ax(t)+
ax
q
(1 e 2ax(t s))
2ax
"
(5.7)
15The model above assumes that ax and ax are constants. Evidence from data points
obtained from more frequent intervals and from a longer time series may suggest otherwise.
The model above should therefore be seen as a rst-order model which could be developed
further to accommodate any stochastic behaviour of axand ax.
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where " is a random variable from a standard normal distribution. The
basis of Eqn. 5.5 and Eqn. 5.6 are developed more fully in Appendix A.
The Y (t) process is dened based on observations from September 1999 to
December 2007. In the initial period to the third quarter of 2004, the evolution
shows a transitory trend. A steady-state is observed in the ensuing period where
average prices approximate a constant. The analysis in this section assumes the
values in the steady state.
5.4 Access Layer and Conveyance
The FL-LRIC charge for the right of access to the Access Layer comprises two
parts. The rst part is charged per unit time and the second is an event-based
(activation) charge. The former charge is the sum of the geographical average
element cost of each of the six elements comprising the Access Layer - these
include E-Side copper, D-Side copper, local exchange general frames, line test
equipment, drop wire capital and PSTN NTE, and PSTN Line Card. The rst
part is therefore a charge for wholesale access from the NTE to the MDF. Each
of these elements has a regulated access price chargeable per unit time. The
second charge arises each time a wholesale connection is made. This charge is
therefore driven by the intensity with which exchange lines transition from a
non-activated to an activated state.16 The strike price for the right of access in
an interval per exchange line per unit time can be represented as follows
Ka(t) =
6X
i=1
Aai(t) (5.8)
Now Aai(t) is dened as the regulated price of access for the ith access
component in the analogue access platform. We let i = 1 represent E-Side
copper (capital and current) geographical average unit costs; i = 2 represent
16If we dene h(t) as the intensity of transitions from State 0 to State 1 and  as the
connection charge in the ith access platform, then the cost of activation is simply h(t)  .
Because of its relative insignicance, this is lumped with other costs i:e: Ma(t).
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D-Side copper (capital and current) geographical average of unit costs; i =
3 represent local exchange general frames (capital and current) geographical
average unit costs; i = 4 represent line test equipment (capital and current)
geographical average of unit costs; i = 5 represent drop wire capital and PSTN
NTE geographical average unit costs; and i = 6 represent PSTN Line Card
geographical average unit costs.17
The price of conveyance is usagedriven and charged per unit of time. This
charge is the sum of the geographical average cost of each of the elements re-
quired to provide a service. The elements comprising the Conveyance Layer
include the local exchange processor, local-tandem link, local-tandem trans-
mission, inter-tandem transmission link and inter-tandem transmission length.
The various voice services, local, national, international and calls to mobiles use
varying degrees of conveyance elements. The intensity with which an element
is used is measured by its usage factor.
Now dene Caij as the usage factor of the ith access service with respect
to the jth access element. Dene Daj(t) as the unit cost of component j and
Eai(t) as the proportion of tra¢ c attributable to service i. The average cost of
conveyance per unit of tra¢ c, is18
Ua(t) =
X
i=1
X
j=1
Caij(t) Daj(t)  Eai(t) (5.9)
for i = 1 to 4 and j = 1 to 6, where i = 1 represents local calls, i = 2
represents national calls, i = 3 represents calls to mobiles, and i = 4 repre-
17The regulated access charges are published in BTs audited regulatory accounts which
provide the FL-LRIC access price for the various elements of the Access Network for residen-
tial and business analogue wholesale products. This includes the unit costs of E-Side Copper,
D-side Copper, local exchanges general frames, PSTN Line Test Equipment, drop wire costs
and PSTN NTE and PSTN Line Cards. The data also includes of unit cost of conveyance.
The data in BTs regulatory accounts is based on BTs Line Costing Study. The audited unit
cost forms the basis of the regulated access charges in the UK. See Ofcom (2005d),Wholesale
Line Rental: Reviewing and Setting Charge Ceilings for WLR services, for an aggregation of
these prices.
18We obtain data on usage and unit prices from BTs regulatory accounts.
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sents international calls. And j = 1 represents local exchange processor, j = 2
represents main exchange switching, j = 3 represents local-tandem link, j = 4
represents local-tandem transmission, j = 5 represents inter-tandem transmis-
sion link, and j = 6 represents inter-tandem transmission length.
We assume the usage (equipment utilisation per unit of a call) in BTs
audited nancial statements, for each of the four classes of calls. For lo-
cal calls these are: local exchange processor (1:860), main exchange switch-
ing (0:170), local-tandem transmission link (1:787), local-tandem transmission
length (24:850); inter-tandem transmission link (0:151) and inter-tandem trans-
mission length (7:299). For national calls these are: local exchange proces-
sor (1:949), main exchange switching (1:584), local-tandem transmission link
(1:768), local-tandem transmission length (27:803); inter-tandem transmission
link (1:501) and inter-tandem transmission length (164:896). For calls to mo-
biles these are: local exchange processor (1:016), main exchange switching
(1:441), local-tandem transmission link (1:272), local-tandem transmission length
(16:731); inter-tandem transmission link (0:410) and inter-tandem transmis-
sion length (25:172). For international call these are: local exchange proces-
sor (1:026), main exchange switching (0:917), local-tandem transmission link
(1:034), local-tandem transmission length (10:880); inter-tandem transmission
link (0:345) and inter-tandem transmission length (24:034). The raw data used
for the computation of Ua(t) is in Table E.12 in Appendix E.
5.5 Intensity of Line Activation
5.5.1 Intensity in Equilibrium
With respect to the dynamics of activation, it is recognized that at each instant
through time, there is a possibility that an activated line may be de-activated, or
vice versa, for reasons which may or may not be dependent on tari¤s. Activation
or de-activation can therefore occur at any time during the useful life of an
exchange line, and either is conceived as being triggered by an exogenous process
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that is fully or partially independent of Ya(t). In the analysis that follows, we
adapt an intensity-based approach to capture these dynamics. This approach
nds application in circumstances where there exists a risk of default which
is either partially or fully independent of the primary value of the underlying
asset.
The dynamics of activation and de-activation can be explored, in equilib-
rium, through space/time,19as an on-o¤ or a renewal process. Alternatively
these dynamics, through time/space,20can be explored as a Bernoulli process.
While, in equilibrium, both approaches can be readily reconciled, the former
approach has a strong intuitive appeal in developing the core arguments in con-
tingent claim valuation in telecommunication networks because this approach
can be reconciled more directly to the cyclical life of retail service contracts.
However as will be demonstrated later in this chapter, the latter approach pro-
vides a basis for more robust analysis. Further, the data required for empirical
analysis that is in the public domain only corresponds only to the second ap-
proach. Because of the aforesaid, the analysis in this chapter is initially built
on the rst approach to capture the essence of retail service contracts but this is
subsequently transitioned to exploring the dynamics using the second approach,
thereby providing a basis for empirical and more rigorous analysis.
Starting with the rst approach, the dynamics of exchange line activation
in a representative portfolio through time is driven by the pdfs of the two
alternative states. We start with a consideration of the dynamics in equilibrium.
Now dene fa0(t) as the pdf and Fa0(t) the cdf of the random variable,21 La(k),
time expended in State 0 by elements of a representative portfolio of residential
analogue exchange lines.22 It is assumed that the realizations of La(k) are
independent and identically distributed. Now therefore fa0(t)  0 where 0 
19With space in the rst dimension and time in the second.
20With time in the rst dimension and space in the second.
21The subscript/postscript a distinguishes the analogue platform from the ADSL platform
studied in Chapter 6.
22For k = 1::::::n. Here k represents an interval.
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t  1 and
1Z
0
fa0(t)dt = 1 (5.10)
Further
Fa0(t) =
tZ
0
fa0(t)dt (5.11)
It follows that Fa0(0) = 0, Fa0(1) = 1 and fa0(t) = dFa0(t)=dt. The average
length of time a representative portfolio of exchange lines expend in State 0 is
a0 =
1Z
0
tfa0(t)dt (5.12)
Dene fa1(t) as the pdf and Fa1(t) the cdf of the random variable, L
0
a(k),
time expended in State 1 by elements of a representative portfolio of exchange
lines.23 It is assumed that the realizations of L
0
a(k) are independent and iden-
tically distributed. Now therefore fa1(t)  0 where 0  t  1 and
1Z
0
fa1(t)dt = 1 (5.13)
Further
Fa1(t) =
tZ
0
fa1(t)dt (5.14)
It follows that Fa1(0) = 0, Fa1(1) = 1 and fa1(t) = dFa1(t)=dt. The average
length of time an exchange line expends in State 1 is
23For k = 1::::::n:
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a1 =
1Z
0
tfa1(t)dt (5.15)
Dene F ca0(t) as the complement of Fa0(t). F
c
a0(t) is a non-decreasing func-
tion of t and F ca0(t) = 1 Fa0(t) and F ca0(0) = 1. Dene F ca1(t) as the complement
of Fa1(t). F ca1(t) is a non-decreasing function of t and F
c
a1(t) = 1   Fa1(t) and
F ca1(0) = 1. Given an alternating process dened by fa0(t) and fa1(t), we draw
on renewal theory to make inferences about the evolution of the stochastic state
of exchange lines.24 If we have that g(t) is a convolution of fa0(t) and fa1(t),
now knowing that Gc(t)=uc, has a Laplace transform,25 1   g(s)=ucs, we can
substitute this in the formulation of the renewal function for a modied renewal
process (see Eqn. B.5 in Appendix B) to derive the renewal function26 of the
equilibrium renewal process, as follows
H
e
a(s) =
1  g(s)
sf1  g(s)g 
1
cs
=
1
cs
2
(5.16)
An inversion of the above gives27
Hea(t) =
t
c
(5.17)
where 
c
is the average length of a cycle.28 The probability that a new cycle
begins at t is derived by substituting 1   g(s)=cs for g1(s) in (Eqn. B.11 in
Appendix B), to give
24For a detailed exposition of renewal theory see Pham-Gia and Turkkan (1999).
25where Gc(t)=uc is the pdf of the rst cycle of a modied process. See Pham-Gia and
Turkkan (1999), and Cox (1967).
26Captures average number of complete cycles in the interval [0; t].
27The inverse of 1=s2 is t. The inverse of 1=s is 1 - see Bolton (1994).
28Here c = a0 + a1:
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h
e
a(s) =
1
cs
(5.18)
Therefore by inversion
hea(t) =
1
c
(5.19)
Now in an equilibrium renewal process, the probability that a process will
be in State 1 at time t given that it was in the same state at the origin is made
up of two components. First, that a State 1 interval prevailing at t = 0 persists
until time t. The pdf of this interval is F ca(t)=a1. Second, there occurs a Type
0 event, at some time u, where u < t, followed by a Type 1 interval which
persists for a period at least equal to t  u. Therefore we have that29
ea11(t) =
1Z
t
F ca1(u)
a1
du+
tZ
0
hea10(u)F
c
a1(t  u)du (5.20)
here hea10 is the renewal density of a Type 0 failure, given that the process
starts at the origin in State 1. Taking the Laplace transform of Eqn. 5.20
above, we have that30
ea11(s) =
(ua1s  1 + fa1(s))
ua1s2
+ hea10
(1  fa1(s))
s
(5.21)
Drawing on Eqn. B.11 in Appendix B and recognizing that for an equilib-
rium renewal process the Laplace transform of the pdf for L0(0) is 1 fa1(s)=u1s,
where we start with a Type 1 interval and end with a Type 0 interval, we have
that
h
e
a10(s) =
fa0(s)(1  fa1(s))
ua1s(1  fa0(s)fa1(s))
(5.22)
Substituting Eqn. 5.22 in Eqn. 5.21 we have that
29See Pham-Gia and Turkkan (1999), and Cox and Miller (1965).
30Using B.14 and B.16 in Appendix B.
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ea11(s) =
1
s
  (1  fa0(s))(1  fa1(s))
ua1s2(1  fa0(s)fa1(s))
(5.23)
From Eqn. 5.23, the following holds31
lim
t !1
ea11(t) =
ua1
ua0 + ua1
(5.24)
Similarly, the following holds
lim
t !1
ea01(t) =
ua1
ua0 + ua1
(5.25)
Therefore
lim
t !1
ea1(t) =
ua1
ua0 + ua1
(5.26)
And
ea0(t) =
ua0
ua0 + ua1
(5.27)
For clarity of exposition, we let ea1(t) = a(t). Now the state of delivery
points through space is dened on a probability space (
; ) where 
 = f1; 0g
- the realizations Pat(i) is 1 with a probability of a(t) and 0 with a probability
of 1   a(t): We can therefore dene the process describing the state of lines
through space, at any time t, as a Bernoulli process.32
So far we have assumed that the moments of fa0(t) and fa1(t) are constant.
However these parameters will change through time with corresponding changes
in a(t). One would expect that a(t) increases if the utilization of an access
platform is increased and the converse is true if the utilization of an access
platform is decreased. The evolution of a(t) can be inferred from the data in
the public domain and this evidence is used as a basis for the analysis in this
31See Pham-Gia and Turkkan (1999), and Cox and Miller (1965).
32Similarly, through time we have it that the realizations Lai(t) is 1 with a probability of
a(t) and 0 with a probability of 1  a(t):
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chapter. We discuss the evolution of a(t) in more detail in the next section.
5.5.2 Dynamic Intensity
The process a(t) is dened based on observations from the period July 1999
to July 2007 - see data in Tables E.2 and E.3 in Appendix E. Based on this
evidence we describe the intensity of exchange line activation as an Ito process,
as follows
da(t)
a(t)
= adt+ adW (t)
a (5.28)
Here a(t) is dened on a probability space (
;A;P). The information set is
captured by F=fzt : t  0g. Further, a(t) is zt measureable and is adapted
to the same lteration. Now a is the drift of the process, a its volatility and
dW (t)a, a Weiner term. Now 0  a(t)  1: The solution to Eqn. 5.28 is33
a(t) j zs = a(s) exp

(a  
1
2
2a)(t  s) + aW (t)a

(5.29)
for t > s. The basis of this solution is as follows - we log transform the
process in Eqn. 5.28 such that a(t)
 = ln a(t). Using Itos lemma, the process
followed by a(t)
 is as follows34
da(t)
 =

@a(t)

@a(t)
aa(t) +
@a(t)

@t
+ 1
2
@2a(t)

@a(t)
2 
2
aa(t)
2

dt+
@a(t)

@a(t)
aa(t)dW (t)

(5.30)
33The constraint 0  a(t)  1 is important. Eqn. 5.29 by itself does not however impose
this constraint. For our purposes given a(0), the volatility of the process ap and the window
under consideration [t(0); t(12)], the constraint is unlikely to be violated. If it was likely that
the constraint would be violated then a modication of Eqn. 5.29 would be called for.
34The model above assumes that ap is a constant. Evidence from data points at more fre-
quent intervals and from a longer time series may suggest otherwise. The model above should
therefore be seen as a rst order model which could be developed further to accommodate
any stochastic behaviour of ap.
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From Eqn. 5.30 above we have that35
d(t) = (a  
1
2
2a)dt+ adW (t)
 (5.31)
Integrating Eqn. 5.31 above we have
a(t)
 j zs = a(s) +
tZ
s
(a  
1
2
2a)du+
tZ
s
adW (u)

= a(s)
 +
tZ
s
(a  
1
2
2a)du+ aW (u)
 (5.32)
We convert Eqn. 5.32 above into the original a(t) term to obtain
a(t) j zs = a(s) exp

(a  
1
2
2a)(t  s) + aW (t)

(5.33)
Using the result in Eqn. 5.33, for a given set of sample data we have
a(t)
   a(s) = (a  
1
2
2a)(t  s) + a(W (t)  W (s)) (5.34)
From Eqn. 5.34 above it follows that
E[a(t)
) j zs] = a(s) + (a  
1
2
2
a
)(t  s) (5.35)
and the variance of the process is
V ar[a(t)
) j zs] = 2a(t  s) (5.36)
Now while the primary premise of this thesis is that the risk associated with
a(t) is incorporated in Sa(t), if the alternative argument is adopted then the
valuation of a contingent claim on downstream value must be based on the
35Knowing that @a(t)

@a(t)
= 1a(t)
; @a(t)

@t = 0 ; and
@2a(t)

@a(t)
2 =   1a(t)2
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Q-dynamics of a(t). The rationale and approach to dening the Q-dynamics
of a counting process are perhaps best articulated by El Karoui and Martellini
(2001) who provide an explicit expression for the martingale equivalent of the
probability of non-default, in the case of defaultable securities. Unlike the
case in El Karoui and Martellini (2001), where the rst stopping time, dened
by an underlying Poisson distribution of arrival times is relevant, in the case
here the instantaneous probability of default takes the form of Eqn. 5.28. In
both cases however the Q-dynamics of default or non-default can be derived
using Girsanovs theorem. If we have that 2 is the market price of the risk of
default, the Randon-Nikodym derivative, La(t) = dQ=dP j zt, can be used to
derive the Q-dynamics of the process.36 By Girsanovs Theorem, the Randon-
Nikodym derivative for the change of measure of the P -Brownian motion is
La(t) = exp
24  tZ
0
2(s)dW (s)  1
2
tZ
0
(2(s))
2ds
35 (5.37)
where 2 is the price of the risk of default. Using Girsanovs Theorem, the
relationship between the P and Q-Wiener processes is as follows
dW (t)a = dfW (t)a   2dt (5.38)
where dfW (t)a is a Q-Wiener process. Using Eqn. 5.38 the Q-dynamics of
a(t) is represented as follows
37
36The market price of the risk of default can be interpreted as the price of a unit of volatility.
It is a handle which transforms a process dened by a P  measure to a process dened by
a Q measure. This results in a relocation of the path of a(t) to that that would prevail in
a risk-neutral world.
37We consider some corroborating evidence for the formulation in Eqn. 5.39. Du¢ e (2002)
observes that 
Q
P
reects the risk premium associated with the risk of default, in the context
of the valuation of defaultable securities, and from the standpoint of a risk-neutral intensity
process. Here P and Q and are the instantaneous probabilities of default under P and
Q dynamics, respectively. Based on similar arguments, we know from Bluhm et al. (2003)
that Qd (t) > Pd (t) where d(t) is the probability of default on a defaultable bond
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da(t)
a(t)
= adt+ a(dfW (t)a   2dt)
= (a   a2)dt+ adfW (t)a (5.39)
The Matlab Code for simulating a(t) is in Appendix C (see M-File II).
5.6 Model Calibration
The parameters of Sa(t) are calibrated using a two-step procedure.38 Starting
with Specication I, if we consider the trigonometric function in Eqn. 5.52, the
parameters of as(t), i.e. s, s, s, !s and s, are determined by least squares
estimation using the cftool function in Matlab. These parameters are estimated
such that the sum of squares
nX
t=1
k (Sa(t)   as(t))2 k (5.40)
is minimised. Next the parameters of the mean-reverting process i.e. a
and a are estimated using Maximum Likelihood Estimation. Now letting
a(t) = Sa(t)
 as(t), we observe data a = fa(t0); a(t1):::::::a(tn)g drawn
from a population where a(ti) are independent and identically distributed. We
use the Maximum Likelihood Estimation to solve for a = fa; ag such that
the likelihood of observing the sample data is maximized. This is achieved by
maximizing the following likelihood function.
^(a) =
nY
i=0
f(a(ti); a) (5.41)
38This has been done to avoid over-tting given the relatively low number observations,
thereby giving emphasis to the overall trend. The one-step alternative approach is subse-
quently discussed.
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To ease the computation, we convert Eqn. 5.41 above into a log-likelihood
function ln [^(a)] = L(a). Now L(a) can be written as follows
ln [^(a)] = L(a) = ln
"
nY
i=0
f(a(ti); a)
#
=
nX
i=0
ln[f(a(ti); a)] (5.42)
Given n+ 1 observations a = fa(t0); a(t1):::::::a(tn)g, knowing that its
mean and variance are as represented in Eqn. A.9 and Eqn. A.10 in Appendix
A, respectively, the transitional density of a(ti) j ti 1 is39
f(a(ti); a; a ; a) = (2)
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2a
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Using the result in Eqn. 5.43, the log-likelihood function can be written as
follows
L(a(t0); a(ti):::::::a(tn);a ; a ; a) =
 n
2
log

2a
2
a

  1
2
Pn
i=1 log(1  e 2a(ti ti 1) 

a
2a
Pn
i=1

(a(ti) a (a(ti 1) a )e a(ti ti 1))2
(1 e 2a (ti ti 1))
 (5.44)
It is recognized that as an alternative to the aforesaid approach, all the
unknowns can be estimated simultaneously. To illustrate, we observe sam-
ple data Sa = fSa(t0); Sa(t1):::::::Sa(tn)g. We can use MLE to solve for
as = (s; s; s; !s; s; bs; bs and bs) such that the likelihood of observing
the sample data is maximized. This is achieved by maximizing the following
likelihood function
39Note : f(xt;u; 2) = 1p22 exp

 (xt u)2
22

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^(as) =
nY
i=0
f(Sa(t)
; as) (5.45)
Now
L(as) =
nX
i=0
ln[f(Sa(t)
); as)] (5.46)
Here given n + 1 observations Sa(t0); Sa(t1):::::::Sa(tn), the conditional
density can be computed knowing that the mean and variance are as represented
below40. The essential di¤erence between this and the previous approach is a
shift from a 2-factor to a 8-factor maximization problem.
Turning to the caliberation of a(t)
, we observe data a = fa(t0); a(t1):::::
::a(tn)
g drawn from a population where a(ti) are independent and identi-
cally distributed. We use the Maximum Likelihood Estimation to solve for
a = fa ; ag such that the likelihood of observing the sample data is max-
imized. Now the conditional probability of the occurence of a(ti)
 j zi 1 can
be expressed as
f(a(ti)
;a; a) =
1p
22a(ti ti 1)

exp

 1
2
(a(ti) (ti 1) (a  122a)(ti ti 1))
2
2a(ti ti 1)
 (5.47)
The corresponding log-likelihood function is
40The expectation with respect to Sa(t)
EQ[Sa(t)
 j zs] = (Sa(s)   as(s))e as(t s) + as(t)
where
as(t) = s + s(t) + s sin(!st+ s)
We also have that
V arQ[Sa(t)
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2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(5.48)
The Matlab Code for the MLE based on Eqn. 5.44 is in Appendix C (see
M-File IV) and that based on Eqn. 5.48 is in Appendix C (see M-File V).
5.7 Valuation
A framework for valuing the exibility to adapt to the stochastic processes
that create downstream value is presented in this section. The case where such
exibility can be exercised at the level of an exchange line is considered. Here
an access seeker has separate rights to the trajectories dened by Sai(t), for
each time interval. The study assumes the prevalent practice where capac-
ity access to the local loop can be initiated or terminated within prescribed
notice periods. Further, the study assumes the practice where access seekers
mirror the lead times and other relevant conditions associated with wholesale
service agreements onto retail service agreements, thereby accruing the value
from being able to favourably align entry and exit. Since the Sai(t) trajectories
pervade time and space, the access privileges can be depicted as a bundle of
rights through the two dimensions.41 Therefore, through these dimensions, an
access seeker has the leverage to exercise the right of access if a downstream
41An access seeker has the right to contract any consenting individual customer. Further,
the average throughput represents the expected throughput per exchange line in a represen-
tative portfolio at a dened time interval. The analysis in this thesis assumes a large repre-
sentative portfolio of delivery points, with connections and disconnections from the portfolio
also being representative. Since the singleton lines entering and leaving the portfolio are
representative, the expected throughput through each these is reected by the average. This
scenario di¤ers from that where investment is made in a random standalone singleton line in
isolation. The volatility of individual lines becomes relevant in such standalone investments.
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market at the level of an exchange line exists. The access seeker does not how-
ever have the obligation to seek access when the downstream market dissipates.
These rights are akin to nancial call options because they confer rights, with-
out corresponding obligations, to invest in Sai(t), for any time interval, at a
pre-determined price during a regulatory lag. Such exibility allows an access
seeker to take advantage of the resolution of uncertainties and only seek access
when these are resolved and when market circumstances justify such access.
The access seeker is therefore able to favourably align market entry and
exit to the stochastic processes that generate value and in essence, for each
time interval [s; t], obtain the substantive equivalent of a contingent claim or
derivative instrument dened on the underlying process, Sai(t). At each time
interval, at the level of each delivery point, State 1 occurs with a probability
of a(t) and State 0 occurs with a probability of 1  a(t). We implement the
valuation using martingale pricing.42 The key argument in martingale pricing
is the link between the absence of arbitrage and the existence of martingale
measures. Harrison and Pliska (1983) provide proofs of the tenets of arbitrage
pricing theory and show that a market is free of arbitrage if there exists a
martingale measure; a market is complete if the martingale measure is unique;
and the price of a contingent claim in an arbitrage free market is equivalent
to the pay-o¤s of the claim under risk-neutral probabilities, discounted at the
risk-free rate.
We have drawn on the intensity-based approach to contingent claim valu-
ation. This approach nds application in circumstances where there exists a
risk of default which is either totally or partially independent of the value of
underlying assets. This approach therefore recognizes two main sources of risk
i.e. market risk and asset-specic default risk. The intensity-based approach
recognizes that at each instant, default can arise for reasons other than the
value of the underlying asset. This approach takes into account the stochas-
tic dynamics of the value of the underlying asset and the dynamics of default.
42Martingale and risk-neutral pricing are used inter-changeably in this thesis.
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Default is allowed to occur before the maturity of the underlying asset and is
triggered by an exogenous process which is either fully or partially independent
of the value of the underlying asset. The price of market risk and the price of
the risk of default are used as the handles that dene the martingale equivalents
of the process that generates value.
With regard to the telecommunications capacity market, we argue that while
constructing a hedging strategy on the spot process may not be feasible because
the underlying asset cannot be carried forward through time, building such a
strategy on the forward process is however feasible. We further argue that a
forward price process can be reasonably inferred from the spot process given the
relative stability of the constituent drivers of value. On inferring the forward
price from the spot, because the underlying commodity cannot be carried for-
ward through time, the traditional no-arbitrage relationship between the spot
and a forward i.e. F (s; t) = E[S(s)e(r y)(t s) j zs] does not hold (here t > s).
We know however that the price of a forward is equivalent to the price of the
spot under risk-neutral expectations i.e. F (s; t) = EQ[S(t)]. Now from Section
5.3.1, downstream value given an activated state is
Sa(t) = Xa(t) (Ya(t)  Ua(t)) + Va(t) Ma(t) (5.49)
Knowing that Ya(t), Ua(t), Va(t) and Ma(t) are relatively deterministic and
letting  = Y (t)  U(t) and 2 = Va(t) Ma(t), we have
Sa(t) = Xa(t)+ 2 (5.50)
Letting Sa(t) = lnSa(t), the evolution of downstream value can be repre-
sented as
dSa(t)
 = as(as(t)  Sa(t))dt+ asdW (t)as (5.51)
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The seasonal variation exhibited by Sa(t) is described as an ordinary trigono-
metric function, as follows
as(t) = s + s(t) + s sin(!st+ s) (5.52)
where s, s, s, !s and s are constants. Here s(t) captures the drift
of Sa(t) through time. Now s, s, !s and s capture the other usual pa-
rameters of an ordinary trignometric function. Now by Girsanovs Theorem,
the Randon-Nikodym derivative for the change of measure of the P -Brownian
motion is
Las(t) = exp
24  tZ
0
1(s)dW (s)  1
2
tZ
0
(1(s))
2ds
35 (5.53)
where 1 is the market price of risk. Using Girsanovs Theorem, the rela-
tionship between the P and Q-Weiner processes are as follows
dW (t)as = dfW (t)as   1dt (5.54)
where dfW (t) is a Q Weiner process. The process describing the evolution of
Sa(t)
 under risk-neutral expectations is
dSa(t)
 = as

as(t)  Sa(t)   1as
as

dt+ asdfW (t) (5.55)
The expectation with respect to Eqn. 5.55 is
EQ[Sa(t)
 j zs] = (Sa(s)   as(s))e as(t s) + as(t) (5.56)
where
as(t) = s + s(t) + s sin(!st+ s) 
1as
as
Or more simply
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as(t) = as(t) 
1as
as
(5.57)
Drawing on Eqn. 5.6 we have that
V arQ[Sa(t)
 j zs] = 
2
as
2as
(1  e 2as(t s)) (5.58)
For simplicity of exposition letting as(t) = E
Q[Sa(t)
 j zs] and af =
V arQ[Sa(t)
 j zs], for the Q dynamics, knowing from the lognormal properties
of Sa(t) that Sa(t) = e
as(t)+
1
2
2af , we have that
EQ[Sa(t) j zs] =
exp
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(Sa(s)
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as(t s) + as(t) + 
2
as
4as
(1  e 2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i (5.59)
If we take Sa(t) and pa(t) to be seperate and independent processes in the
short-run, and therefore the risk associated with the latter is incorporated in
former, i.e. Scenario I, knowing that a rational access seeker will align entry and
exit such that for any time interval F (Sa(t); t; t) > K, the value of a contingent
claim on Sa(t) incorporating the stochastic intensity of line activation, is43
C(s; F (s; t);Ka; t) =
E[F (Sa(t); t; t) Ka; 0]+  E[a(t)]  e r(t s)
(5.60)
where E[a(t)] is the intensity of exchange line activation under objective
measures. If on the other hand it is assumed that the risk associated with a(t)
is not incorporated in Sa(t), i.e. Scenario II, then the value of a contingent
claim on Sa(t) incorporating the stochastic intensity of line activation, is
43From the evidence in Chapter 8, the correlation between Ya(t) and a(t) is spurious, at
least in the short run. Based on this evidence any correlation between the noise terms of the
two processes, if any, is not investigated further.
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C(s; F (s; t);Ka; t) =
E[F (Sa(t); t; t) Ka; 0]+  EQ[a(t)]  e r(t s)
(5.61)
where EQ[a(t)] is the risk-neutral intensity of exchange line activation. The
alternative assumptions underlying Scenarios I and II are deemed to be the two
most plausible ways of investigating the questions that are the subject of this
thesis. A third contender is not obvious. The Matlab code for simulating Sa(t)
under risk-neutral expectations is in Appendix C (see M-File I). The Matlab
codes corresponding to Eqn. 5.60 and Eqn. 5.61 are in Appendix C (see M-
File III). Analytical solutions corresponding to Eqn. 5.60 and Eqn. 5.61 are
developed in Chapter 7. The results and discussion are in Chapter 8.
5.8 Summary
Mandatory capacity access in telecommunication capacity networks raises the
question of the value of the di¤erentiated abilities of the access provider and
access seekers to adapt to the stochastic dynamics of downstream value at the
level of delivery points - more specically, their di¤erentiated abilities to adapt
to the migration of the upside and the downside between delivery points in a
network. This chapter has developed a framework for valuing the exibility
of adapting to downstream value, and tested the neutrality of FL-LRIC as
an approach for pricing capacity access, based on evidence from the analogue
platform. Contingent claim pricing theory is used as a theoretical framework.
This pricing theory has been used because of its capacity to conceptualize and
quantify the value of exibility. A numerical method, Monte Carlo simulation,
is used because of its capacity to value complex derivatives dened by multi-
dimensional stochastic processes. Maximum Likelihood Estimation is used to
calibrate the stochastic di¤erential equations describing downstream value and
the value of the underlying contingent claims are estimated using martingale
pricing.
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We draw on intensity-based approaches to contingent claim valuation. This
approach takes into account the stochastic dynamics of the value of the under-
lying asset and the dynamics of default. Default is triggered by an exogenous
process which is either fully or partially independent of the value of the under-
lying asset. The market price of risk and the market price of the risk of default
are used as the handles that dene the martingale equivalents of the process
that generates value.
In summary, this chapter has developed an approach for valuing contingent
claims in the analogue platform. This is approach together with the evidence
from the residential analogue market in the UK form the basis of the numeri-
cal analysis that test the symmetry or otherwise of FL-LRIC. The results are
discussed in Chapter 8.
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Chapter 6
ADSL Capacity Access: Contingent Claim
Analysis
6.1 Introduction
This chapter develops a framework for valuing the exibility of adapting to
downstream value, and tests the neutrality of FL-LRIC as an approach for
pricing capacity access, based on evidence from the ADSL platform. This ev-
idence is from the 8 mbit/s subscriber access capacity in the UK and covers
the period January 2000 to December 2008.1 As with the analysis of the ana-
logue voice capacity access market in Chapter 5, option pricing theory is used
as a theoretical framework.2 This pricing theory is used because of its capac-
ity to conceptualize and quantify the value of exibility. A numerical method,
Monte Carlo simulation, is used as an analytical tool because of its capacity
to value complex derivatives dened by multi-dimensional stochastic processes.
Maximum Likelihood Estimation is used to calibrate the stochastic di¤eren-
tial equations describing downstream value and the value of the underlying
contingent claims are estimated using martingale pricing principles.
Being a di¤erent technology platform, the ADSL data capacity access net-
work necessarily presents important di¤erences to the analogue network from
a contingent claim perspective. For example, downstream value to an access
seeker in the ADSL network, for a provisioned capacity, in the main, is indepen-
dent of tra¢ c. Further, conveyance in the ADSL network is e¤ected through
a system of virtual paths. This contrasts the meshed connectivity in the ana-
logue voice platform. Despite these di¤erences there are important similarities
1The rationale for this coverage is discussed in Chapter 4.
2Option pricing theory and contingent claim pricing theory and are used inter-changeably
in this thesis.
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between the two platforms for example, capacity access to the local loop con-
fers downstream rights in both platforms. Because of these similarities, there is
an inevitable overlap between the analysis in this chapter and that in Chapter
5 on, for example, the substantive nature of access to the local loop and the
stochastic dynamics dening exchange line activation. A descriptive overview
of the ADSL access network is presented in Section 6.2. The model describing
downstream value and its constituent parts are discussed in Sections 6.3 to 6.5.
Section 6.6 presents a framework for calibrating the model. Section 6.7 provides
a framework for valuing a contingent claim on the process dening downstream
value. Closed-form analytical solutions are developed in Chapter 7. The results
and discussion are covered in Chapter 8.
6.2 Network Topology
6.2.1 Downstream and Upstream Markets
The downstream data market comprises three products - narrowband, and sym-
metric and asymmetric broadband.3 These three products are di¤erentiated, in
the main, by capacity (bandwidth), and hence quality and service range distinc-
tions. Narrowband provides capacities of up to 56 kbit/s over analogue lines, 64
kbit/s over ISDN 2 digital channels and 128 kbit/s over double-bonded ISDN
2 digital channels. Symmetric and asymmetric broadband provide capacities
greater than 128 kbit/s. At the rst level in the hierarchy, narrowband is dif-
ferentiated from asymmetric broadband by its lesser capabilities which create
demand-side distinctions and separate economic markets. At the next level in
the hierarchy, asymmetric broadband is di¤erentiated from symmetric broad-
band by its lesser capabilities which also create demand-side distinctions and
3The source of data for this descriptive overview includes Ofcom (2004a) - Direction
Setting the Margin between IPStream and ATM interconnection Prices; Ofcom (2004b) -
Review of Wholesale Broadband Markets Access Markets; Ofcom. (2005c) - Valuing Copper
Access; Ofcom (2006) - Review of Wholesale Broadband Markets 2006/7; Ofcom (2007) -
The UK Communications Market; Oftel (2002) - Direction to Resolve a Dispute between
BT, Energis and Thus Concerning Xdsl Interconnection at the ATM Switch.
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separate economic markets. Asymmetric access provides maximum download-
ing capacity but a lower uploading capacity while symmetric access provides
equal bandwidth for downloading and uploading.
ADSL-enabled xed-wire and cable are currently the dominant access plat-
forms for asymmetric broadband access and account for over 99% of the data
market in the UK (Ofcom, 2004a). Cable accounts for 40% of the market
and currently exerts appreciable competitive pressure on ADSL-enabled ac-
cess. Alternative access platforms include Wireless Fidelity (WiFi), Broadband
Fixed Wireless Access (BFWA), Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Ac-
cess (WiMax), Mesh Networks, satellite, power line technology and free space
optics. These alternative platforms do not at present exert appreciable com-
petitive pressure on either ADSL and cable platforms because of their lesser
service capabilities. This research focuses on the 8 mbit/s downstream market
which constitutes 43% of the data market in the UK (see Ofcom, 2007).
The UK market can be stratied into three segments based on the homo-
geneity of the competitive conditions (Ofcom, 2006). These segments include:
(i) Market 1 - exchanges where BT is the only operator; (ii) Market 2 - ex-
changes where there are 2 or 3 operators and exchanges where there are 4 or
more operators and where there are less than 10,000 delivery points4; (iii) Mar-
ket 3 - exchanges where there are 4 or more operators and where there are more
than 10,000 delivery points. BT, cable operators and LLUs account for 98%,
2% and 0% of Market 1, respectively; 73%, 26% and 1% of Market 2; and 56%,
34% and 10% of Market 3. Markets 1, 2 and 3 have an average of 1,600, 8,000
and 19,000 delivery points per exchange, respectively.
Based on considerations of the incumbents current and prospective mar-
ket shares, barriers to entry and expansion, economies of scale and scope, and
countervailing market power, it is concluded from a regulatory standpoint, that
the incumbent has signicant market power in Markets 1 and 2, hence the basis
for regulating capacity access (Ofcom, 2006). These conditions are weaker in
4Exchange lines
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Market 3 but not su¢ ciently so in the current conditions to conclude, from a
regulatory standpoint, that the incumbent does not wield signicant market
power. It has been argued that regulation is necessary to promote competi-
tion. It is further argued that without such intervention competition in the
downstream and upstream markets would be constrained (Ofcom, 2006).
At the time of this study the UK access market had 5,587 local exchanges
with 972 of these having between 10,000 to 66,000 delivery points; 1,268 between
2,500 and 10,000 delivery points; 1,073 between 1,000 and 2,500; 1,031 between
500 and 1,000; and 1,243 up to 500 delivery points (see Figure F.1 in Appendix
F). At the same time cable had 95%+ presence in the service areas covered
by 48 local exchanges; 65-95% presence in the service areas covered by 816
exchanges; 30-65% presence in 293; 5%-30% in 164; and up to 5% in 4,266.
Overall 857 exchanges included in the rst two clusters serve 45% of the delivery
points in the UK (see Figure F.2 in Appendix F). This suggests that retail
consumers have a choice of more than one access platform in about one half of
the downstream market and the risk of stranded assets is therefore real. This
puts into perspective the question of the value of the exibility to adapt to the
downstream stochastic processes that generate value.
6.2.2 Network Structure
Like the analogue network, the data network comprises twisted copper pairs
connected to a core network of exchanges. Unlike the analogue network, the
capacity of the cooper wire in the data network is enhanced through the Asyn-
chronous Digital Subscriber Line (ADSL) technology which enables digital data
transmission over the twisted copper wire. While the traditional copper pair
has frequencies between 0 Hz and 3.4 Hz with speeds up to 56 kbit/s, ADSL
achieves speeds above 256 kbit/s. ADSL enhances the capacity of the copper
wire by enabling broadband transmission while still supporting voice transmis-
sion. In the ADSL network, the splitter at either end of the subscriber access
network divides the frequency band into low and high frequency portions (see
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Figure 6.1). This allows the twisted copper wire to provide normal telephony
services in the 0 to 3.4 kHz range, data upload in the 30 kHz to 138 kHz range
and data download at speeds upto 1,104 kHz.
M
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D Data
Voice
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TAEM DSL-modem S Splitter M DSL-access multiplexer Customer Socket
Source : WIK (2005)
Figure 6.1: DSL - Subscriber Line
The ADSL network is structurally divided into four main layers - Sub-
scriber Access Network, Backhaul Link and ATM Network and the ISP Link.
The corresponding capacity services include End User Access (EUA), ATM
Backhaul, ATM Conveyance and the ISP Link Conveyance. The Subscriber
Access Network comprises the infrastructure connecting a subscribers premise
to the Digital Subscriber Line Access Multiplexer (DSLAM) at the exchange.
The Subscriber Access Network therefore includes the NTE, PCP and MDF
(see Figure 6.2). The EUA costs are driven by the number of end users and
comprise connection, rental and port reservation costs.
The DSLAM connects the subscriber lines to the core network. The DSLAM,
commonly situated at the exchange, combines signals from subscriber lines
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Figure 6.2: Subscriber Access Network
through multiplexing, and channels these to the core network. In addition the
DSLAM acts as a switch. The ATM Backhaul (Backhaul Link) comprises the
infrastructure that links the DSLAM to the rst point of interconnection in
the core network (parent node). The core network comprises the nodes in the
ATM network. ATM Conveyance comprises the conveyance of tra¢ c between
the nodes in the core network. The cost of backhaul, ATM conveyance and
the ISP Link conveyance is driven by the dimensioned capacity (bandwidth),
which is in turn a function of projected tra¢ c.
An access seeker may interconnect with an incumbents network at one of
four possible points the DSLAM at the local exchange, parent node, distant
node or at the Customer Service Link (see Figure 6.3). Local Loop Unbundling
refers to the rst o¤er where the incumbent provides only EUA. To provide end-
to-end connectivity from the Subscriber Access Network, Virtual Paths (VP)
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are created. In the ADSL network, while each EUA is dedicated to an end user
and is therefore not contented, the VPs are usually contended in a ratio of 50:1
for residential connections and a ratio of 20:1 for business connections. In the
UK, ATM Backhaul is provided in capacities of 0.25, 0.5, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8,
9 and 10 mbit/s. And ATM Conveyance is available in the following capacities
of 0.25, 0.5, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 mbit/s. It should however be noted
that the range of these o¤erings vary from time to time. The cost of the VPs
depends on length and there exists three price categories handover, local (less
than 10 km), regional (between 10 and 150 km) and national (over 150 km) -
see Ofcom (2004a).5
Service Provider
DSLAM
Local Exchange
ATM Network
EUA ATM Backhaul ATM Conveyance ISP Link
Interconnection at Parent Switch
Interconnection at Distant Switch
LLU
Interconnection at ISP Link
Source: Ofcom (2006)
Figure 6.3: Capacity Access
5See Tables E.7 - E.9 in Appendix E.
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6.3 Model Specication
6.3.1 General
The are four key distinctions between the ADSL platform studied in this chap-
ter and the analogue platform chapter studied in Chapter 5. First, in the
ADSL platform, for a provisioned capacity, downstream value to an access
seeker per exchange line is independent of tra¢ c.6 This is unlike the analogue
platform where downstream value to an access seeker is primarily driven by
tra¢ c. Second, downstream value in the analogue platform, unlike the ADSL
platform, exhibits seasonal variation. Third, unlike the analogue voice service,
conveyance of data in the ADSL platform is e¤ected through a system of ded-
icated virtual paths (VPs). This contrasts the any-to-any connectivity in the
analogue voice platform. A VP comprises the connection between the DSLAM
and the point of connection with an internet service provider (ISP). The VP
includes the backhaul link between the DSLAM and the parent node, and if
required, conveyance between the ATM nodes. The VP also includes the ISP
Link, which is the connection between the last ATM terminal node and the
service provider. In the ADSL network, while each EUA is dedicated to an end
user and is therefore not contented, the VPs are usually contended.
Fourth, while downstream value is in part impacted by the risk of de-
activation, as in the case of the analogue platform, the dynamics of exchange
line activation and de-activation in a representative portfolio of ADSL exchange
lines through time will be driven by the pdfs of the two alternative states which
may be fundamentally di¤erent from the corresponding functions for the ana-
logue platform. Because of this, the exposition in this chapter runs parallel to
that in Chapter 5, to emphasize these di¤erences and remove any ambiguity
but at the expense of some duplication of exposition.
Despite these di¤erences there are important similarities between the two
6It is noted that there exist some downstream products where downstream value depends
on tra¢ c. This study focuses on the former market.
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platforms for example, capacity access to the local loop confers downstream
rights in both platforms. Because of these similarities, there is minor overlap
between the analysis in this chapter and that in Chapter 5 on, for example, the
substantive nature of access to the local loop.
6.3.2 Downstream Value
Where mandatory capacity access is provided for, third-party access to the
Subscriber Access Network confers downstream rights to an access seeker. As
with the analogue capacity access market, the price of access to the Subscriber
Access Network constitutes the substantive equivalent of a strike price, from a
contingent claim standpoint, for four main reasons. First, this price allows an
access seeker to participate in the downstream market. Second, the access price
is xed for a specied period (regulatory lag). Third, the downstream market
is characterized by uncertainty with both a potential upside and a downside.
Fourth, the right to participate in the downstream market does not have a
corresponding obligation.
Given a portfolio of delivery points, the rights conferred to an access seeker
can be depicted as a two-dimensional bundle of discrete rights - with rights
through space in the rst dimension and rights through time in the second.
The states of the delivery points are however stochastic through space and
time. The alternative states of a delivery point are either a non-activated state
which we refer to as State 0 or an activated state which we refer to as State 1.
An ADSL line may remain in either state or oscillate variously between the two
states during a regulatory lag. The state of an exchange line and the related
dynamics are important from the standpoint of contingent claim analysis, for
two reasons. First, the exibility of an access seeker in the ADSL market can
exercised at the level of an exchange line. Second, the state of a line is a primary
driver of downstream value.
We study the predominant case where a third-party uses capacity access
in the broadband access market to provide only data services and where such
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a party purchases end-to-end connectivity. In the ideal situation, the single
key statistic required for contingent claim analysis is that which captures the
evolution of average downstream value of exchange lines in the ADSL platform.
This is however not available as a single statistic from the data in the public
domain. What is however available is data that captures the constituent parts
of such value (tari¤s per unit of time, conveyance charges per unit of time
etc). This study is based on such secondary evidence. Now if we consider
a representative portfolio of ADSL delivery points, in the 8 mbit/s end-user
capacity market, the downstream value of the ith line to an access seeker, for
i = 1::::::n, in the constrained case,7 is
Zbi(t) =
(
Yb(t)  Ub(t) Mb(t) Kb(t) if Lbi(t) = 1
 Ub(t)  Mb(t) Kb(t) if Lbi(t) = 0
(6.1)
The subscript b distinguishes the ADSL platform from the analogue platform
studied in Chapter 5. Now Yb(t) represents the evolution of average tari¤s per
exchange line per unit time, Ub(t) the average price of a virtual path per unit
time, Mb(t) other costs and Kb(t) the regulated price of access to the Access
Network. Lbi(t) represents the state of an exchange line. The processes Yb(t)
and Lbi(t) are stochastic while Ub(t) and Mb(t) are relatively deterministic.8
Now  represents the proportion of capacity that cannot be re-assigned. An
access seeker has the right to the downstream value described by Sbi(t) subject
to a payment, Kb(t).9 Kb(t) is therefore the substantive equivalent of a strike
price, from a contingent claim standpoint. Now the dynamics across lines, for
a given point in time, can be represented as follows
Zbt(i) =
(
Yb(t)  Ub(t) Mb(t) Kb(t) if Pbt(i) = 1
 Ub(t)  Mb(t) Kb(t) if Pbt(i) = 0
(6.2)
7If we ignore for the time being the exibility to adapt to downstream stochastic processes.
8See BT Broadband Wholesale - http://www.btwholesale.com
9Sbt(i) =

Yb(t)  Ub(t) Mb(t) if Pbt(i) = 1
 Ub(t)  Mb(t) if Pbt(i) = 0
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for t = 1::::::n and i = 1::::::n, where Pbt(i) denes the state of the ith of
element of a representative portfolio of exchange lines at time t in the analogue
platform. Now Pbt(i) = 1 with a probability b(t) or 0 with a probability
1   b(t). We discuss the algorithms that capture Lbi(t) and b(t) in Section
6.4. Before then, we examine the Sb(t) process more closely in the next section.
6.3.3 Tari¤s and Downstream Value
Broadband was rst delivered through BTs infrastructure from about 2000.
Intra-platform competition for broadband services in BTs infrastructure was
introduced around 2004 before subsequently taking a fairly strong hold in
2005/6. Now Yb(t) is dened based on observations from January 2000 to
December 2008 using two sets of data. The rst set shows the evolution of
BTs retail tari¤s for the 8 mbit/s product (BT Option 1).10 The second set
shows the evolution of tari¤s of comparable competing retail products o¤ered
by BTs competitors.11 Read together the data from the two sources shows,
customary with new product launches, a drift towards a mean-reverting steady
state. The noise around the mean is explained by changing tari¤ di¤erentials
between the competing service providers, shifting market shares, changing lev-
els of promotional discounts from the various service providers and changing
churn patterns. The observed mean-reverting process in the steady state is sim-
ilar to the process observed in the electricity sector where the spot price process
oscillates around a mean which reects the medium to long-run cost of produc-
tion (see for example Lucia and Schwartz, 2002). The observed mean-reverting
state is the basis of the analysis in this chapter. Accordingly Yb(t) is dened as
a mean-reverting process. Now knowing that Yb(t) is a mean-reverting process
in the steady state and that Ub(t) andMb(t) are relatively deterministic during
10Source: Point Topic (http://point-topic.com/). See Table E.4 in Appendix E. The cov-
erage from this source covers the period January 2000 to December 2008.
11Source: Pure Pricing (http://www.purepricing.co.uk/). See Table E.5 in Appendix E.
The coverage from this source is limited to the period December 2006 to December 2008.
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a regulatory lag, the process Sb(t) given Lbi(t) = 1, is also necessarily mean-
reverting.12 Letting Sb(t) = lnSb(t), we have that the process followed by the
logarithm of the spot price, given Lbi(t) = 1, is
dSb(t)
 = bs(bs   Sb(t))dt+ bsdW (t)bs (6.3)
Here Sb(t) is dened on a probability space (
;A;P). The information
set is captured by F=fzt : t  0g. Further, Sb(t) is zt measureable and is
adapted to the same lteration. Now bs is the level around which the process
uctuates, bs the speed of reversion to the mean and bs the volatility of the
noise term.13 The process has a positive drift at a rate of bs when bs > Sb(t)

and a negative drift of the same rate when bs < Sb(t). Now bs is a constant
and W (t)bs is Wiener process.14 The expectation with respect to Eqn. 6.3
under objective measures, for t > s, is
EP [Sb(t)
 j zs] = Sb(s)e bs(t s) + bs(1  e bs(t s)) (6.4)
Drawing on the proof in Appendix A, and based on the corollary in Section
5.3.2, we have
V ar[Sb(t)
 j zs)] = 
2
bs
2bs
(1  e 2bs(t s)) (6.5)
Drawing on Eqn. 6.4 and Eqn. 6.5, the solution to Eqn. 6.3 is
12The subscript/postscript b distinguishes the ADSL platform from the analogue platform
studied in Chapter 5 and the subscript/postscript s denotes the process dening the evolution
of tari¤s.
13As will be discussed more exhaustively in Chapter 8, the data shows that the correlation
between Yb(t) and b(t) is spurious, at least in the short run.
14The model above assumes that bs, bs and bs are constant. Evidence from data points
obtained from more frequent intervals and from a longer time series may suggest otherwise.
The model above should therefore be seen as a rst order model which could be developed
further to accommodate alternative stochastic behaviour of bs, bs and bs.
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Sb(t)
 = Sb(s)e bs(t s) + bs(1  e bs(t s))+
bs
q
1 e 2bs(t s)
2bs
"
(6.6)
where " is a random number drawn from a standard normal distribution.
The risk-neutral process corresponding to Eqn. 6.3, for t > s, can be repre-
sented as follows
dSb(t)
 = bs(

b   Sb(t))dt+ bsdfW (t)bs (6.7)
Here bs = bs 1bs=bs, where 1 is the price of market risk and dfW (t)bs
is a Q Wiener process. The basis of this formulation is as follows - by Gir-
sanovs Theorem, the Randon-Nikodym derivative for the change of measure
is
Lbs(t) = exp
24  tZ
0
1(s)dW (s)  1
2
tZ
0
(1(s))
2ds
35 (6.8)
Using Girsanovs Theorem, the relationship between the P and Q-Wiener
processes are as follows
dW (t)bs = dfW (t)bs   1dt (6.9)
where dfW (t)bs is a Q-Wiener process. From Eqn. 6.3 and Eqn. 6.9 we have
that
dSb(t)
 = bs(bs   S(t))dt+ bs(dfW (t)bs   1dt)
= bs((bs  
1bs
bs
)  Sb(t))dt+ bsdfW (t)bs (6.10)
Therefore15
15See arguments similar to those above in Lucia and Shwartz (2002).
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bs = bs  
1bs
bs
(6.11)
And, following from Eqn. 6.4, the expected value of Sb(t)under risk-neutral
assumptions is
EQ[Sb(t)
 j zs] = Sb(s)e bs(t s) + bs(1  e bs(t s)) (6.12)
And
V arQ[Sb(t)
 j zs)] = 
2
bs
2bs
(1  e 2bs(t s)) (6.13)
The Matlab code for simulating the Sb(t) process under risk-neutral expec-
tations is in Appendix D (see M-File I).
6.4 Intensity of Exchange Line Activation
6.4.1 Intensity in Equilibrium
As with the analogue network, it is recognized that at each instant through
time, there is a possibility that an ADSL activated line may be de-activated,
or vice versa, for reasons which may or may not be dependent on tari¤s. Ac-
tivation or de-activation can therefore occur at any time during the useful
life of an ADSL exchange line, and either is conceived as being triggered by
an exogenous process that is fully or partially independent of Yb(t). As with
the analysis in Chapter 5, the dynamics of activation and de-activation are
explored, through space/time,16as an on-o¤ or a renewal process and second
through time/space,17 as a Bernoulli process. This enables the analysis in this
chapter to mirror the essence of retail service contracts, and then transition to
empirical and more rigorous analysis. While the dynamics of exchange line ac-
16With space in the rst dimension and time in the second.
17With time in the rst dimension and space in the second.
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tivation and de-activation in a representative portfolio of ADSL exchange lines
through time will be driven by the pdfs of the two alternative states, fb0(t) and
fb1(t), it is recognised that these two functions may be fundamentally di¤erent
from the corresponding functions for the analogue platform fa0(t) and fa1(t):
It therefore necessarily follows that Laplace functions, fa0(s) and fa1(s) may
well be di¤erent from f b0(s) and f b1(s). Because of this, the exposition in this
chapter runs parallel to that in Chapter 5, to emphasize these di¤erences and
remove any ambiguity, at the expense of some duplication of exposition.
Now dene fb0(t) as the pdf and Fb0(t) the cdf of the random variable,18
Lb(k), time expended in State 0 by elements of a representative portfolio of
ADSL exchange lines.19 It is assumed that the realizations of Lb(k) are inde-
pendent and identically distributed. It follows that Fb0(0) = 0, Fb0(1) = 1
and fb0(t) = dFb0(t)=dt. Dene fb1(t) as the pdf and Fb1(t) the cdf of the ran-
dom variable, L
0
b(k), time expended in State 1 by elements of representative
portfolio of exchange lines.20 It is assumed that the realizations of L
0
b(k) are
independent and identically distributed. It follows that Fb1(0) = 0, Fb1(1) = 1
and fb1(t) = dFb1(t)=dt. Dene F cb0(t) as the complement of Fb0(t). F
c
b0(t) is
a non-decreasing function of t and F cb0(t) = 1   Fb0(t) and F cb0(0) = 1. Dene
F cb1(t) as the complement of Fb1(t). F
c
b1(t) is a non-decreasing function of t and
F cb1(t) = 1  Fb1(t) and F cb1(0) = 1.
Drawing on renewal theory, for an equilibrium renewal process, the proba-
bility that a process will be in State 1 at time t given that it was in the same
state at the origin is made up of two components. First, that a State 1 interval
prevailing at t = 0 persists until time t. The pdf of this interval is F cb (t)=b1.
Second, there occurs a Type 0 event, at some time u, where u < t, followed by
a Type 1 interval which persists for a period at least equal to t  u. Therefore
18The subscript/postscript b distinguishes the ADSL platform from the analogue platform
studied in Chapter 5.
19For k = 1::::::n: Here k represents a state interval.
20For k = 1::::::n:
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we have that21
eb11(t) =
1Z
t
F cb1(u)
b1
du+
tZ
0
heb10(u)F
c
b1(t  u)du (6.14)
here heb10 is the renewal density of a Type 0 failure, given that the process
starts at the origin in State 1. Taking the Laplace transform of Eqn. 6.14
above, we have that22
eb11(s) =
(ub1   1 + f b1(s))
ub1s2
+ heb10
(1  f b1(s))
s
(6.15)
Drawing on B.11 in Appendix B and recognizing that for an equilibrium
renewal process the Laplace transform of the pdf of L0(0) is 1   f b1(s)=u1s,
where we start with a Type 1 interval and end with a Type 0 interval, we have
that
h
e
b10(s) =
f b0(s)(1  f b1(s))
ub1s(1  f b0(s)f b1(s))
(6.16)
Substituting Eqn. 6.16 in Eqn. 6.15 we have that
eb11(s) =
1
s
  (1  f b0(s))(1  f b1(s))
ub1s2(1  f b0(s)f b1(s))
(6.17)
From Eqn. 6.17 the following holds
lim
t !1
eb11(t) =
ub1
ub0 + ub1
(6.18)
Similarly, the following holds
lim
t !1
eb01(t) =
ub1
ub0 + ub1
(6.19)
21Here b0 is the average length of time a representative portfolio of ADSL exchange lines
expend in State 0: And b1 is the average length of time a representative portfolio of ADSL
exchange lines expend in State 1: See Pham-Gia and Turkkan(1999).
22Using B.14 and B.16 in Appendix B.
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Therefore
lim
t !1
eb1(t) =
ub1
ub0 + ub1
(6.20)
And
lim
t !1
eb0(t) =
ub0
ub0 + ub1
(6.21)
For clarity of exposition, we let eb1(t) = b(t). Now the state of delivery
points through space is dened on a probability space (
; ) where 
 = f1; 0g
- the realizations Pbt(i) is 1 with a probability of b(t) and 0 with a probability
of 1   b(t): We can therefore dene the process describing the state of lines
through space, at any time t, as a Bernoulli process.23
So far we have assumed that the moments of fb0(t) and fb1(t) are constant.
However these parameters will change through time with corresponding changes
in b(t). One would expect that b(t) increases if the utilization of an access
platform is increased and the converse holds if the utilization of an access
platform is decreased. The parameters of fb0(t) and fb1(t) cannot however be
observed from the data in the public domain. The evolution of b(t) can however
be inferred from the data in the public domain and this evidence is used as a
basis for the analysis in this chapter. We discuss the evolution of b(t) in more
detail in the next section.
6.4.2 Dynamic Intensity
Unlike the analogue platform where the data in the public domain provides
evidence of the evolution of activation of delivery points, evidence from the
ADSL platform in the public domain only provides a point estimate, where the
level of inactivated lines is estimated at 14% - see Ofcom (2005a). Based this
evidence and that in Section 5.4.2, the dynamics of activation in the ADSL
23Similarly, through time we have it that the realizations Lbi(t) is 1 with a probability of
b(t) and 0 with a probability of 1  b(t):
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platform, as with the dynamics of the analogue platform, can be assumed to
take a noisy path. Therefore the evolution of b(t) is described as an Ito process
as follows24
db(t)
b(t)
= bdt+ bdW (t)
b (6.22)
where b is the drift of the process, bp its volatility and dW (t)
b, a Wiener
term. Now 0  b(t)  1. The expectation with respect to Eqn. 6.22, for t > s,
is25
E[b(t) j zs] = b(s) exp

b  
1
2
2
b
)(t  s)

(6.23)
and the corresponding variance is
V ar[b(t) j zs] = 2b(t  s) (6.24)
If it is assumed that the risk associated with b(t) is not incorporated in
Sb(t), by Girsanovs Theorem, the Randon-Nikodym derivative for the change
of measure of the P -Brownian motion is
Lb(t) = exp
24  tZ
0
2(s)dW (s)  1
2
tZ
0
(2(s))
2ds
35 (6.25)
where 2 is the price of the risk of default. Using Girsanovs Theorem, the
relationship between the P and Q-Wiener processes is as follows
dW (t)b = dfW (t)b   2dt (6.26)
24The subscript/postscript b distinguishes the ADSL platform from the analogue platform
studied in Chapter 5 and the subscript/postscript  represents the process dening line
activation.
25The constraint 0  b(t)  1 is important. Eqn. 6.24 by itself does not however impose
this constraint. For our purposes given b(0), the volatility of the process bp and the window
under consideration [t = 0; t = 12], the constraint is unlikely to be violated. If it was likely
that the constraint would be violated then a modication of Eqn. 6.24 would be called for.
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where dfW (t)b is a Q-Weiner process. Using Eqn. 6.26 the Q-dynamics of
the b(t)-process is represented as follows
db(t)
b(t)
= bdt+ b(dfW (t)b   2dt)
= (b   b2)dt+ bdfW (t)b (6.27)
Now that b(t) evolves as a martingale, the following must necessarily hold
26
b(t)  b2 = 0 (6.28)
The Matlab Code for simulating b(t) under both objective and risk-neutral
measures is in Appendix D (see M-File II).
6.5 Access Layer and Conveyance
As with the analogue network, the FL-LRIC rental charge for the right of
access to the Subscriber Access Network is charged per unit time. This charge
is the sum of the geographical average element cost of each of the elements
comprising the Access Network. This is therefore a charge for wholesale access
from the NTE to the DSLAM. Each of these elements has a regulated access
price chargeable per unit time and these remain xed for a regulatory lag.
The strike price for the right of access per exchange line per unit time can be
represented as follows
Kb(t) =
nX
j=1
Bbi(t) (6.29)
26The model above assumes that bp is a constant. Evidence from data points at more fre-
quent intervals and from a longer time series may suggest otherwise. The model above should
therefore be seen as a rst order model which could be developed further to accommodate
any stochastic behaviour of bp.
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where Bbi is dened as the regulated price of access of the ith access com-
ponent in the the Subscriber Access Network. The FL-LRIC access price for
the various elements of the Access Network are published in BTs regulatory
accounts. The aggregate regulated access charges are published in Section 44
of BTsWholesale Broadband Services Price List. With respect to conveyance,
we consider Customer Sited Handover27 where a third-party access seeker rents
end-to-end connectivity. The average price of such connectivity for singleton
lines is
Ub(t) =
nX
i=1
Dbi(t)  Ebi(t) +Rb(t) (6.30)
where Dbi(t)  Ebi(t), for i = 1 to 4, represents the average unit cost of a
virtual path for backhaul and conveyance in the core network, and Rb(t) the
average unit price of a virtual path in the Customer Access Link. Here Db1
represents price of a handover VP; Db2, local VP; Db3, regional VP; and Db4,
national VP. We obtain these costs from BTs Wholesale Broadband Services
Price List. Now Ebi represents the respective proportion of handover, local,
regional and national VPs in a representative portfolio of exchange lines. We
nd that these are 10%, 70%, 10% and 10%, respectively.28 A contention ratio
of 50:1 is assumed - see Ofcom (2004a) for the basis of this assumption. The
data used for the computation of conveyance charges is in Tables E.7, E.8, E.9.
E.11 and E.12 in Appendix E.
6.6 Model Calibration
We observe sample data Sb = fSb(t0); Sb(t1):::::::Sb(tn)g. We use the Max-
imum Likelihood Estimation to solve for bs = (bs; bs and bs) such that
27Customer Sited Handover is di¤erentiated from In Span Handover in that the former
corresponds to end-to-end connectivity and handover in respect of the latter service is at a
distant switch.
28See Ofcom (2004a)
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the likelihood of observing the sample data is maximized. This is achieved by
maximizing the following likelihood function
^(bs) =
nY
i=0
f(Sb(t)
; bs) (6.31)
Here f(Sb(t)) is a density function. To ease the computation, we convert
Eqn. 6.31 above into a log-likelihood function ln [^(bs)] = L(bs). Now L(bs)
can be written as follows
ln [^(bs)] = L(bs) = ln
"
nY
i=0
f(Sb(t)
); bs)
#
=
nX
i=0
ln[f(Sb(t)
); bs)] (6.32)
Given n+1 observations Sb(t0); Sb(t1):::::::Sb(tn), knowing that its mean
and variance are as represented in Eqn. 6.4 and Eqn. 6.5 , the conditional
probability of the occurrence of Sb(ti) given Sb(ti 1); is
f(Sb(ti)
; bs; bs; bs) = (2)
  1
2

2bs
2bs
 
1  e 2bs(ti ti 1)  12 
exp
 
 (Sb(ti) bs (Sb(ti 1) bs)e bs(ti ti 1))
2
2
2
bs
2bs
(1 e 2bs(ti ti 1))
!
(6.33)
Using the result in Eqn. 6.33, we can write the log-likeliwood function as
L(Sb(t)
; bs; bs; bs) =  n2 log

2bs
2bs

 
1
2
Pn
i=1 log(1  e 2bs(ti ti 1))  bs2bsPn
i=1

(Sb(ti)
 bs (Sb(ti 1) bs)e bs(ti ti 1))2
(1 e 2bs(ti ti 1))
 (6.34)
The Matlab Code for the Maximum Likelihood Estimates based on Eqn.
6.34 is in Appendix D (see M-File IV).
151
6.7 Valuation
The theoretical framework for valuing a contingent claim on Sb(t) follows from
the theory set out in Section 5.7. Now we know that the price of a forward is
equivalent to the price of the spot under risk-neutral expectations i.e. EQ[Sb(t) j
zs] = F (Sb(t); s; t). Following from Eqn. 6.12 and Eqn. 6.13, given the
properties of a lognormal distribution, the expected value of the spot under
risk-neutral assumptions is29
EQ[Sb(t) j zs] = F (Sb(t); s; t) =
exp

E[Sb(t)
 j zs] + 12V ar[Sb(t) j zs]
 (6.35)
Therefore30
EQ[Sb(t) j zs] =
exp
h
Sb(s)
e bs(t s) + bs(1  e bs(t s)) + 
2
bs
4bs
(1  e bs(t s))
i (6.36)
Knowing that F (Sb(t); s; t) = EQ[Sb(t) j zs], Eqn. 6.36 can alternatively
be written as
lnF (Sb(t); s; t) =
Sb(s)
e bs(t s) + bs(1  e bs(t s)) + 
2
4bs
(1  e bs(t s)) (6.37)
If we take Sb(t) and b(t) to be seperate and independent processes in the
short-run,31 then knowing that a rational access seeker will align entry and exit,
and negotiate contracts such that for any time interval F (Sb(t); t; t) > Kb, the
29From the properties of a lognormal distribution F (s; t) = EQ[S(t) j Fs] = e1+ 122 where
1 is the mean of the log of the spot price and 2 is the variance of the log of the spot price.
30From the evidence in Chapter 8, the correlation between Yb(t)] and b(t) is spurious, at
least in the short run. Based on this evidence any correlation between the noise terms of the
two processes, if any, is not investigated further.
31Where the risk associated with b(t) is incorporated in Sb(t):
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value of a contingent claim on the Sb(t) process incorporating the stochastic
intensity of line activation, is
C(s; F (Sb(t)); t;Kb) =
[E[F (Sb(t); t; t) Kb; 0]+  E[b(t)] e r(t s)
(6.38)
where E[b(t)] is the intensity of exchange line activation under objective
measures. Eqn. 6.38 assumes that the risk associated with b(t) is incorporated
in Sb(t), i.e. Scenario I. If we assume that in fact the risk associated with
inactivation is not incorporated in Sb(t), i.e. Scenario II, then the value of a
contingent claim on Sb(t) is
C(s; F (Sb(t)); t;Kb) =
E[F (Sb(t); t; t) Kb; 0]+  EQ[b(t)

e r(t s)
(6.39)
where EQ[b(t)] is the intensity of exchange line inactivation under risk-
neutral expectations. The alternative assumptions underlying Scenarios I and
II are deemed to be the two most plausible ways of investigating the questions
that are the subject of this thesis. A third contender is not obvious. The
Matlab code corresponding to Eqn. 6.38 is in Appendix D (see M-File III).
Analytical solutions corresponding to Eqn. 6.38 and Eqn. 6.39 are developed
in Chapter 7. The results and discussion are in Chapter 8.
6.8 Summary
Mandatory capacity access raises the question of the value of the di¤erentiated
abilities of the access provider and access seekers to adapt to the stochastic
dynamics of downstream value at the level of the delivery points - more specif-
ically, their di¤erentiated abilities to adapt to the migration of the upside and
the downside between the delivery points in a ADSL network. This chapter
developed a framework for valuing the exibility of adapting to downstream
value, and tested the neutrality of FL-LRIC as an approach for pricing capac-
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ity access, based on evidence from the ADSL platform. This included evidence
from the 8 mbit/s subscriber access market covering the period January 2000
to December 2008 in the UK. As with the analysis of the analogue voice ca-
pacity access market, contingent claim pricing theory is used as a theoretical
framework. This pricing theory has been used because of its capacity to concep-
tualize and quantify the value of exibility. A numerical method, Monte Carlo
simulation, is used because its capacity to value complex derivatives dened
by multi-dimensional stochastic processes. Maximum Likelihood Estimation is
used to calibrate the stochastic di¤erential equations describing downstream
value and the value of the underlying contingent claims are estimated using
martingale pricing.
We have drawn on the intensity-based approach to contingent claim valua-
tion. This approach takes into account the stochastic dynamics of the value of
the underlying asset and the dynamics of default. Default is conceived as being
triggered by an exogenous process which is either fully or partially independent
of the value of the underlying asset. The price of market risk and the price of
the risk of default are used as the handles that dene the martingale equivalents
of the process that generates value.
In summary, this chapter provides an approach for valuing contingent claims
in the ADSL capacity access platform. This is approach together with the
evidence from the residential analogue market in the UK form the basis of the
numerical analysis that test the symmetry or otherwise of FL-LRIC. Chapter 7
develops closed-form analytical solutions based on the evidence in this chapter
and Chapter 8 presents the results.
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Chapter 7
Access Pricing: Option-Theoretic
Analytical Generalizations
7.1 Introduction
Chapters 5 and 6 of this thesis investigate whether FL-LRIC, as a method of
pricing access in telecommunication capacity access markets is distortionary,
based on UK evidence from the analogue and ADSL capacity platforms. A
numerical method, Monte-Carlo simulation, is used for the analysis in the two
chapters because of its versatility in computing high-dimensional integrals and
valuing complex derivatives dened by multi-dimensional stochastic processes.
This chapter develops closed-form analytical solutions to price the value of
third-party exibility to adapt to downstream stochastic processes in the ana-
logue and ADSL capacity markets. These solutions are founded on the proper-
ties of the evolution of net average downstream value of an activated exchange
line, including its drift and volatility; intensity of activation, including its drift
and volatility; the price of access to the Subscriber Network; the price of mar-
ket risk; and the price of the risk of default. More generally, these solutions,
rst, provide a basis for checking the results from the numerical methods in
Chapters 5 and 6. Second, these solutions generalize the results and provide
an option-theoretic framework for pricing access where third parties have the
leverage of adapting to downstream stochastic value.
Martingale pricing principles are the basis of the analysis in this chapter
wherein the value of a contingent claim, given arbitrage arguments, is equiva-
lent to the pay-o¤s of the claim under risk-neutral probabilities, discounted at
the risk-free rate. We use an intensity-based approach to develop the analytical
solutions. Here, the intensity parameter captures the e¤ect of the stochastic
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intensity of exchange line activation. This approach therefore takes into ac-
count the stochastic dynamics of the primary value of the underlying asset and
the dynamics of activation. Activation is conceived as being triggered by an
exogenous process which is either fully or partially independent of the value
of the underlying asset. The price of market risk and the price of the risk of
default are used as the handles that dene the martingale equivalents of the
process that generates value. The case of contingent claim analysis in telecom-
munication capacity access markets presents a special case where the risk of
inactivation is driven by a two-state on-o¤ process. Section 7.2 focuses on the
analogue platform and Section 7.3, the ADSL platform.
7.2 Analogue : Closed-form Analytical Generalizations
The proposition in Eqn. 7.1 depicts the value of a call on downstream value.
Now Eqn. 7.2 and Eqn. 7.3 provide the underlying lemmas and Eqn. 7.4
to Eqn. 7.22, prove the proposition. Intuitively, the closed-form analytical
solution captures the value of exposure to the upside and not the downside of
downstream value, from an option-theoretic standpoint. Here such downstream
value is described by the evolution of the net average downstream value of
an activated exchange line, including its drift and volatility; intensity of line
activation, including its drift and volatility; and the price of access to the
Subscriber Network. The generalization in Eqn. 7.1 provides a basis to price
the protection from the downside arising from market and default risk, and is
based on the market price of risk and the price of default risk. The proposition
is stated as follows:
C(F (Sa(t); Ka; s; t) =(
F (Sa(t); s; t)N
(
ln(F (Sa(t);s;t)Ka )+
2af
2
af
)
 KaN
(
ln(F (Sa(t);s;t)Ka ) 
2af
2
af
))

E[a(t)]  e r(t s))
(7.1)
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where
F (Sa(t); s; t) =
exp
h
(Sa(s)
   as(s))e as(t s) + as(t) + 
2
as
4as
(1  e as(t s))
i
and where
as(t) = s + s(t) + s sin(!st+ s) 
1as
as
In the foregoing Sa(t) represents the evolution of the net average down-
stream value of an activated exchange line1, as the volatility of the SDE de-
scribing the evolution of Sa(t), as(t) the risk-neutral level around which Sa(t)

oscillates, af the standard deviation of Sa(t), a(t) the intensity of exchange
line activation, a the volatility of activation, a the drift of activation, Ka
the price of access to the Subscriber Network2, 1 the price of market risk and
2 the price of the risk of default. Here the parameters of the trigonometric
function, s, s, s, !s and s, are constants. We know from Section 5.7 that,
under risk-neutral expectations, Sa(t)  N(as(t); 2af ) where
as(t) = (Sa(s)
   as(s))e as(t s) + as(t) (7.2)
And where
2af =
2as
2as
(1  e 2as(t s)) (7.3)
The proofs of the lemmas in Eqn. 7.2 and Eqn. 7.3 can be inferred from
Appendix A. Letting u = lnF (Sa(t); t; t; ); we have that downstream value on
the risk-neutral process, given an activated state, is
1Here Sa(t) = lnSa(t):
2The index t is dropped for clarity of exposition.
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V (Sa(t); s; t) =
+1Z
 1
(F (Sa(t); t; t) Ka) 1afp2 exp

 1
2
h
u as(t)
af
i2
du
(7.4)
Knowing that a rational access seeker will align entry and exit and negotiate
contractual terms such that F (Sa(t); t; t) > Ka, the risk-neutral value accruing
to an access seeker is therefore
E[(F (Sa(t); t; t) Ka); 0]+ =
+1Z
lnKa
(F (Sa(t); t; t) Ka) 1afp2 exp

 1
2
h
u as(t)
af
i2
du
=
+1Z
lnKa
F (Sa(t); t; t)
1
af
p
2
exp

 1
2
h
u as(t)
af
i2
du 
1Z
lnKa
Ka
1
af
p
2
exp

 1
2
h
u as(t)
af
i2
du
(7.5)
From the rst part of Eqn. 7.5 we have that
+1Z
lnKa
F (Sa(t); t; t)
1
af
p
2
exp

 1
2
h
u as(t)
af
i2
du
=
+1Z
lnKa
1
af
p
2
exp

lnF (Sa(t); t; t)  12
h
u as(t)
af
i2
du
(7.6)
Or
+1Z
lnKa
1
af
p
2
exp
(
u  1
2

u  as(t)
af
2)
du (7.7)
From Eqn. 7.7, the term in the rst pair of brackets can be written as
follows
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u  (u
2   2as(t)u+ as(t)2)
22af
=
22afu  u2 + 2as(t)u  as(t)2
22af
=
1
22af
 
22afu  u2 + 2as(t)u
  as(t)2
22af
=   1
22af
 
u2   22afu  2as(t)u
  as(t)2
22af
=   1
22af
 
u2   2u(2af + as(t))
  as(t)2
22af
(7.8)
Let ' = (2af + as(t)). Now therefore Eqn. 7.8 can be written as
  1
22af
(u2   2u')  as(t)
2
22af
(7.9)
Completing the square with respect to Eqn. 7.9, we have
  1
22af
(
 
u  ')2   '2  as(t)
22af
(7.10)
Substituting (2af + as(t)) for ' in Eqn. 7.10, we have
  1
22af
 
(u  (2af + as(t)))2   (2af + as(t))2
  as(t)2
22af
=   1
22af
(u  (2af + as(t)))2 +
(2af + as(t))
2   as(t)2
22af
=   1
22af
(u  (2af + as(t)))2 +
(4af + 2
2
afas(t) + as(t)
2   as(t)2)
22af
159
=  1
2

u  (2af + as(t))
af
2
+
2af
2
+ as(t) (7.11)
Re-arranging Eqn. 7.11, we have
as(t) +
2af
2
  1
2

u  (as(t) + 2af )
af
2
(7.12)
Substituting Eqn. 7.12 in Eqn. 7.7, we have
+1Z
lnKa
1
af
p
2
exp
(
as(t) +
2af
2
  1
2

u  (as(t) + 2af )
af
2)
du (7.13)
Eqn. 7.13 can be written as follows
exp(as(t) +
2af
2
)
+1Z
lnKa
1
af
p
2
exp
8<: 12
24u  (as(t) + 2af2 )  2af2 )
af
3529=; du
(7.14)
Knowing that from the lognormal properties of Sa(t) that lnF (Sa(t); s; t) =
as(t) +
2af
2
, Eqn. 7.14 can be represented as follows
F (Sa(t); s; t)
+1Z
lnKa
1
af
p
2
exp
8<: 12
24u  lnF (Sa(t); s; t)  2af2 )
af
3529=; du
(7.15)
Since the integration in Eqn. 7.15 is from lnKa, we have
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F (Sa(t); s; t)
(
1 N
"
ln( KaF (Sa(t);s;t)) 
2af
2
af
#)
= F (Sa(t); s; t)
(
N
"
ln(F (Sa(t);s;t)Ka )+
2af
2
af
#) (7.16)
here N() represents a cumulative distribution function for the normal dis-
tribution. From the second part of Eqn. 7.5 we have
+1Z
lnKa
1
af
p
2
exp
(
 1
2

u  as(t)
af
2)
du (7.17)
Now (lnKa   as(t))=af can be written as
lnKa  

as(t) +
2af
2

+
2af
2
af
=

lnKa   lnF (Sa(t); s; t) + 
2
af
2

af
(7.18)
Therefore Eqn. 7.17 can be written as follows
1 N
8<: ln

Ka
F (Sa(t);s;t)

+
2af
2
af
9=;
= N
8<: ln

F (Sa(t);s;t)
Ka

  
2
af
2
af
9=; (7.19)
Inferring from Eqn. 7.5 and combining Eqn. 7.16 and Eqn. 7.19, we have
that
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E[F (Sa(t); t; t) Ka; 0]+ =
F (Sa(t); s; t)N
(
ln(F (Sa(t);s;t)Ka )+
2af
2
af
)
 KaN
(
ln(F (Sa(t);s;t)Ka ) 
2af
2
af
)
(7.20)
Following from Eqn. 5.62, and incorporating the e¤ect of exchange line
activation, if it is assumed that the risk associated with a(t) is incorporated
in Sa(t), we have3
C(F (Sa(t); Ka; s; t) =(
F (Sa(t); s; t)N
(
ln(F (Sa(t);s;t)Ka )+
2af
2
af
)
 KaN
(
ln(F (Sa(t);s;t)Ka ) 
2af
2
af
))

E[a(t)]  e r(t s))
(7.21)
where4
F (Sa(t); s; t) =
exp
h
(Sa(s)
   as(s))e as(t s) + as(t) + 
2
as
4as
(1  e as(t s))
i
and where from Eqn. 5.34, the dynamics of a(t) under objective measures
is5
E[a(t) j zs] = a(s) exp

(a  
1
2
2
a
)(t  s)

(7.22)
3That is Scenario I.
4From the properties of the lognormal distribution.
5If it is assumed that the risk associated with a(t) is not incorporated Sa(t), then
EQ[a(t) j zs] applies.
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7.3 ADSL : Closed-form Analytical Generalizations
Section 7.2 developed analytical solutions of the value of the exibility of adapt-
ing to downstream value in an analogue platform. This section develops a
closed-form solution of the value of such exibility with respect to the ADSL
platform. This solution is founded on the properties of the evolution of net
average downstream value of an activated exchange line, including its drift and
volatility; intensity of exchange line activation, including its drift and volatil-
ity; the price of access to the Subscriber Network; the price of market risk;
and the price of the risk of default. Unlike the analogue platform, downstream
value in the ADSL platform, for the service studied here, does not depend on
tra¢ c. Further unlike the analogue platform, downstream value does not have
seasonal variations. The proposition in Eqn. 7.23 depicts the value of a call
on downstream value. Now Eqn. 7.24 and Eqn. 7.25 provide the underlying
lemmas and Eqn. 7.26 to Eqn. 7.39, prove the proposition. The proposition is
stated as follows:
C(F (Sb(t); s; t); Kb; s; t) =(
F (Sb(t); s; t)N
(
ln

F (Sb(t);s;t)
Kb

+
2bf
2
bf
)
 KbN
(
ln

F (Sb(t);s;t)
Kb

 
2
bf
2
bf
))

E[b(t)]  e r(t s))
(7.23)
where
F (Sb(t); s; t) =
exp
h
Sb(s)e
 bs(t s) + bs(1  e bs(t s)) + 
2
bs
4bs
(1  e bs(t s))
i
and where
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bs = bs  
1bs
bs
In the foregoing, Sb(t) represents the evolution of net average downstream
value of an exchange line6,Kb the price of access to the Subscriber Network7, bs
the volatility of the SDE describing the evolution of Sb(t), bf the standard
deviation of Sb(t), b(t) the intensity of exchange line inactivation, b the
volatility of activation, b the drift of the activation, 

bs is the risk-neutral
level around which Sb(t) oscillates, 1 is the price of market risk and 2 the
price of the risk of default. We know from Section 6.3 that Sb(t)  N(bs; 2bf )
where
bs = Sb(s)
e bs(t s) + bs(1  e bs(t s)) (7.24)
And
2bf =
2bs
2bs
(1  e 2bs(t s)) (7.25)
The proofs of the lemmas in Eqn. 7.24 and Eqn. 7.25 can be inferred from
Appendix A. Letting u = lnF (Sb(t); t; t; ); we have that downstream value on
the risk-neutral process, in an activated state, is
V (Sb(t); s; t) =
+1Z
 1
(F (Sb(t); t; t) Kb) 1
bf
p
2
exp
(
 1
2

u  bs
bf
2)
du
(7.26)
Knowing that a rational access seeker will align entry and exit and negotiate
contractual terms such that F (Sb(t); t; t) > K, the risk-neutral value accruing
to an access seeker is therefore
6Here Sb(t) = lnSb(t)
7The index t is dropped for clarity of exposition.
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From the rst part of Eqn. 7.27 we have that
+1Z
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1
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2
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bf
2)
du
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+1Z
lnKb
1
bf
p
2
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(
lnF (Sb(t); t; t)  1
2
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bf
2)
du (7.28)
Or
+1Z
lnKb
1
bf
p
2
exp
(
u  1
2

u  bs
bf
2)
du (7.29)
Eqn. 7.29 can be written as follows
+1Z
lnKb
1
bf
p
2
exp
(
bs +
2bf
2
  1
2

u  (bs + 2bf )
bf
2)
du (7.30)
Eqn. 7.30 can be written as follows
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exp(bs +
2bf
2
)
+1Z
lnKb
1
bf
p
2
exp
8<: 12
24u  (bs + 2bf2 )  2bf2 )
bf
3529=; du (7.31)
Knowing that lnF (Sb(t); s; t) = bs +
2bf
2
, we have from Eqn. 7.31 that
F (Sb(t); s; t)
+1Z
lnKb
1
bf
p
2
exp
8<: 12
24u  lnF (Sb(t); s; t)  2bf2 )
bf
3529=; du
(7.32)
Since the integration in Eqn. 7.32 is from lnKb, we have
F (Sb(t); s; t)
8<:1 N
24 ln

Kb
F (Sb(t);s;t)

  
2
bf
2
bf
359=;
= F (Sb(t); s; t)
8<:N
24 ln

F (Sb(t);s;t)
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
+
2bf
2
bf
359=; (7.33)
here N() represents a cumulative distribution function for the normal dis-
tribution. From the second part of Eqn. 7.27 we have
+1Z
lnKb
1
bf
p
2
exp
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2

u  bs
bf
2)
du (7.34)
Now (lnKb   bs)=bf can be written as
lnKb  

bs +
2bf
2

+
2bf
2
bf
=
lnKb   lnF (Sb(t); s; t) + 
2
bf
2
bf
(7.35)
166
Therefore Eqn. 7.34 can be written as follows
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bf
9=;
= N
8<: ln

F (Sb(t);s;t)
Kb

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2
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2
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9=; (7.36)
Inferring from Eqn. 7.27 and combining Eqn. 7.33 and Eqn. 7.36, we have
that
E[F (Sb(t); s; t) Kb; 0]+ =
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(7.37)
Following from Eqn. 6.40, and incorporating the e¤ect of exchange line
active, if it is assumed that the risk associated with b(t) is incorporated in
Sb(t), we have
C(F (s; t); Kb; s; t) =(
F (Sb(t); s; t)N
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where
F (Sb(t); s; t) =
exp
h
Sb(s)e
 bs(t s) + bs(1  e bs(t s)) + 
2
bs
4bs
(1  e bs(t s))
i
167
and where from Eqn. 6.25, the dynamics of b(t) under objective measures
is8
E[b(t) j zs] = exp

(b  
1
2
2
b
)(t  s)

(7.39)
7.4 Summary
This chapter has developed closed-form analytical solutions to price the value
of third-party exibility to adapt to downstream stochastic processes in the
analogue and ADSL capacity markets. These solutions are founded on the
properties of the evolution of net average downstream value of an activated
exchange line, including its drift and volatility; intensity of line activation, in-
cluding its drift and volatility; the price of access to the Subscriber Network;
the price of market risk; and the price of the risk of default. More generally,
these solutions, rst, provide a basis for checking the results from the numeri-
cal methods in Chapters 5 and 6. Second, these solutions generalize the results
and provide an option-theoretic framework for pricing access where third par-
ties have the leverage of adapting to downstream stochastic value. Based on
the plausibility of the logic of the analysis, the ndings are generalizable as the-
oretical propositions. Their extrapolation from case to case is based on logical
inference.
8If it is assumed that the risk associated with b(t) is not incorporated Sb(t), then
EQ[b(t) j zs] applies.
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Chapter 8
Results and Discussion
8.1 Introduction
In Chapters 5 and 6 frameworks were developed for valuing the exibility of
adapting to downstream value in the analogue and ADSL capacity platforms.
The subsequent empirical work in the two chapters tested whether FL-LRIC, as
a method for pricing access in telecommunications capacity markets is distor-
tionary. The analysis in the two chapters used a numerical method, Monte
Carlo Simulation. Chapter 7 developed closed-form analytical solutions to
price the value arising from the exibility of adapting to downstream stochastic
processes in the two platforms. These solutions, rst, generalize the results and
provide an option-theoretic framework for pricing access where third parties
have the leverage of adapting to downstream stochastic value. Second, these
solutions provide a basis for checking the results produced by the numerical
methods. This chapter presents the results from the numerical methods and
from the closed-form analytical solutions. We nd that the results from the
latter method corroborate those from the former method and vice versa.
Based on evidence from the analogue platform covering the period Septem-
ber 1999 to July 2007, and from the standpoint of contingent claim pricing
theory, we nd that the average distortionary e¤ect of FL-LRIC approximates
8 9% of the revenue base of an exchange line and e¤ectively results in an sub-
sidy of 16   17% on the regulated price of access, for 1   12 month contracts.
With respect to the ADSL platform, based on evidence from the period Jan-
uary 2000 to December 2008 from the ADSL capacity access for the 8 mbit/s
end-user capacity product, we nd that FL-LRIC access prices have a distor-
tionary e¤ect that approximates 7 8% of the price of end-to-end connectivity,
for 1  12 month contracts, for the 8 mbit/s end-user capacity access. Overall
169
we conclude that: (i) the distortionary e¤ect of FL-LRIC is signicant; and
(ii) the level of these distortions imply the existence of a strong incentive for
ine¢ cient entry.
The ndings in this study nd empirical support from a number of earlier
econometric studies on the e¤ect of policy variables on facilities-based deploy-
ment. Relevant examples include those studies by Crandall et al.(2004), Hazlett
(2005) and Hausman and Sidak (2005). These studies show that access seekers
did not climb the ladder of investment as would be expected under the stepping
stone hypothesis. A possible explanation is that the unpriced value arising from
cost-based access prices provide disincentives to move up the ladder of invest-
ment. Section 8.2 presents the results from the analogue platform and Section
8.3, the results from the ADSL platform.
8.2 Results: Analogue
The parameter estimates of the seasonality function and the corresponding
95% condence limits are shown in Table 8.1.1 Figure 8.1 shows the raw data
and the tted curves. The Goodness of t statistics are shown in Table 8.2.2
1While this study uses a mean-reverting process of the OU-type to describe Sa(t), and
while the explanatory power of this model in explaining the underlying data is fairly per-
suasive, it is plausible that there are alternative models, including the ARMA model, which
can be used to explain the data. The OU-type process however remains a popular model for
describing mean-reverting processes in the context of pricing commodity derivatives because
of the exibility it provides to accommodate stochastic volatility, jumps, transformation of
the underlying probability space etc. - for relevant literature see, for example, Barlow (2002),
Lucia and Schwartz (2002), Burger et al. (2004) and Cartea and Figueroa (2005). The re-
searcher is not aware of studies that have evaluated the relative versatility of OU and ARMA
models in the context of modeling the dynamics of downstream value in telecommunication
networks. Perhaps the case for doing so will get stronger as longer time series of downstream
value become available in the public domain. Intuitively, it is not immediately apparent how
the OU-type process cannot cope with the capabilities of ARMA models.
2In both cases, performing the Durbin-Watson Test on the residuals, we observe that
the null hypothesis of no correlation between the error terms is rejected at the 5% level of
signicance. A possible explanation is the use of quarterly data in this study. It may well be
that this drawback would be eliminated if monthly data is used. Such data is however not
available in the public domain.
170
Turning to the mean-reversion function with respect to Sa(t); the parameter
estimates of as and as and the corresponding 95% condence limits are 0.1896
(-0.6839, 1.0631) and 0.0063 (0.0053, 0.0072), respectively. The complete set
of statistics of the mean-reversion parameters is in Table 8.3. With respect
to the -process, the point estimates of the parameters a and a and the
corresponding 95% condence limits are -0.0023 (-0.0029, -0.0016) and 0.0033
(0.0028, 0.0037), respectively.3
The coe¢ cient correlation of Ya(t) and a(t) for the period July 1999 to
July 2007 is 0.5056, suggesting a spurious correlation, at least in the short
run. Based on this evidence, independence of the two functions is assumed.
With respect to the deterministic drivers of value at t(0), Ua(t) = $0:02 based
on Eqn. 5.11. At t(0), Ka(t) = $8:39 and remains so for the duration of a
regulatory lag.4 At t(0), Va(t) = $8:94 and remains so for the duration of a
regulatory lag.5 We the take risk-free rate, r, to be 3:5% and the risk premium
to be 4:0% at t(0) and these values are assumed to remain so for the duration
of a regulatory lag.6 We consider the valuation of rights in the 12-month period
t(0) to t(12). We separately consider 1 to 12-period discrete rights starting at
t(0). Here a single period right extends from t(0) to t(1) and a two-period right
is the sum of the discete rights in the 2-month period t(0) to t(2), etc.7 For
each block of rights, we compare the regulated price of access and the un-priced
3See Section 5.5.2 for the denition of the  process.
4Ofcom (2005), Wholesale Line Rental: Reviewing and Setting Charge Ceilings for WLR
services
5Ofcom (2005), Wholesale Line Rental: Reviewing and Setting Charge Ceilings for WLR
services
6Arithmetic mean or approximately 3.5% geometric mean. See Wright et. al. (2003). This
study uses a CAPM model to estimate the cost of capital and is based on the risk/returns
of UK utilities. CAPM has however been subjected to criticism by a number of researchers.
Whilst its proponents argue that what is relevant in calculating the cost of capital is sys-
tematic risk, its opponents have argued that investors need not necessarily have a diversied
portfolio as an investment objective, and therefore in such circumstances what is relevant in
determining the cost of capital is both systematic and unique risk. Further, while CAPM
assumes that risk-free rates, excess market returns and betas are deterministic, these are in
reality stochastic.
7Where t(0) is January 2008.
171
value of exibility.
In essence for each time interval, there is a downside risk that approximates
 Ma(t)   Ka(t), the intensity of which, through time and space is dened
by 1   a(t). Based on the theory of contingent claim valuation, the evidence
from the period July 1999 to September 2007 from the UK analogue access
market and the assumptions set out in Section 5.3.2, we nd that cost-based
access prices are distortionary. The overall results are shown in Table 8.4 with
respect to the numerical methods. Table 8.5 shows the results from analyti-
cal methods. The results from the numerical methods corroborate those from
analytical methods and vice versa. In both cases Scenario I assumes that the
risk associated with a(t) is incorporated in Sa(t) and in Scenario II it is as-
sumed otherwise. The alternative assumptions underlying Scenarios I and II
are deemed to be the two most plausible ways of investigating the questions
that are the subject of this thesis. A third contender is not obvious. Ultimately,
however the di¤erence in the results produced by the two approaches is small,
in the case here, because of the low volatility of activation. The sensitivity
analysis, shown in Table 8.6, based on Scenario II, indicates that the value of
the option is most sensitive to the level of line activation, tra¢ c levels and the
price of access to the Subscriber Network. In e¤ect a 5% change in the level of
a(0) results in about the same change in the value of the option; a 5% change
in the level of s results in a 6% change in the value of the option; and a 5%
change in the level of Ka(t) results in a -22% of the same value.
Further, the analysis in this chapter is based on quarterly data. The volatil-
ities exhibited by such data will be conservative estimates actual volatilities.
This drawback results in conservative estimates of market risk, and therefore the
value of the underlying optionality. In order to address this drawback, supple-
mentary scenarios are developed where the respective volatilities are multiples
of those in the base case - see results in Table 8.7. In doing this it is recognized
that such variation has two opposing e¤ects - on one hand a more pronounced
reduction of the underlying risk premium and on the other an increase in the
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value of optionality.
Considered in isolation, the observed low volatilities associated with market
risk and the observed level of Ka(t) suggest optionality deep in the money.
However, it is recognized that the overall value of optionality will be depend
on the composite e¤ect market risk and default risk - see Eqn. 5.1. It is
appreciated that di¤erent service lines will exhibit varying degrees of market
risk and indeed some lines will have volatilities, associated with market risk,
that are more pronounced than those observed in this study. Overall, however
the model developed for the analogue platform is versatile enough to cater for
all levels of volatility of market risk and default risk, and therefore provides a
basis for analytical generalisations.
Based on evidence from the analogue platform covering the period Septem-
ber 1999 to July 2007, and from the standpoint of contingent claim pricing
theory, we nd that the average distortionary e¤ect of FL-LRIC approximates
8 9% of the revenue base of an exchange line and e¤ectively results in an sub-
sidy of 16   17% on the regulated price of access, for 1   12 month contracts.
Overall we conclude that: (i) the distortionary e¤ect of FL-LRIC is signicant;
and (ii) the level of these distortions imply the existence of a strong incentive
for ine¢ cient entry.
8.3 Results: ADSL
The parameters of Sb(t), i.e. bs, bs and bs, and the corresponding 95% con-
dence limits are estimated to be 0:9401 ( 0:4941; 2:3744), 0:0948 (0:0754; 0:1142)
and 2:2728 (2:1752; 2:3703), respectively. With respect to the deterministic
drivers of value at t = 0, Ub(t) = $13:34; based on Eqn. 6.32, comprising
$9:73 and $3:61 in respect of conveyance in the core network and backhaul,
respectively (see relevant raw data in Tables E.7 to E.11 in Appendix E). Now at
t = 0, Mb(t) is $3:94, of which $1:44 accounts for IP Transit8 and Kb = $7:05
8Cost £ 9/month/Mbit/s - See http://www.datahop.it/DatahopTransit.php
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- see Table E.10 in Appendix E: The deterministic drivers of value remain con-
stant during the regulatory lag. We take risk-free rate, r, to be 3:5% and the
risk premium to be 4:0% at t = 0. These remain constant for the duration
of the regulatory lag. We consider the valuation of rights in the period t = 0
to t = 12. We separately consider 1 to 12-period rights starting at t = 0. As
with analogue access, a single period right extends from t(0) to t(1) and a two-
period right is the sum of the discete rights in the two-month period t(0) to
t(2), etc.9 For each block of rights, we compare the option value relative to the
price of end-to-end connectivity. As with the analysis of the analogue platform,
the analysis in this section assumes two scenarios. Scenario I assumes the case
where the risk associated with b(t) is incorporated in Sb(t), and Scenario II
assumes that the risk associated with b(t) is not incorporated in Sb(t). The
alternative assumptions underlying Scenarios I and II are deemed to be the
two most plausible ways of investigating the questions that are the subject of
this thesis. A third contender is not obvious. As with the analysis in Section
8.2, ultimately, the di¤erence in the results produced by the two approaches is
small, in the case here, because of the low volatility of activation. Tables 8.8
and 8.11 show the results under the two scenarios.
The estimates of the volatility of downstream value in the base case is based
on parameters discerned from data in the public domain including the simple
average of headline tari¤s (see raw data in Tables E.4 and E.5 in Annex E),
average churn10 and promotional discounts availed to new subscribers (see raw
data in Table E.6 in Annex E). While these provide a basis for rst order ap-
proximations, it is recognized that the actual volatility of downstream value will
be more pronounced because of, for example, the combined e¤ect of shifting
market shares and the di¤erentials in tari¤s between di¤erent service providers,
changes in the levels of promotional discounts o¤ered to new subscribers and
changes in churn rates between di¤erent service providers. Such conservative
9Where t(0) is January 2009.
10See Telebusillisestimate at http://telebusillis.blogspot.com/
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estimates of volatility will suggest low values of optionality if one considers
market risk in isolation. The value of optionality will however be more pro-
nounced if one considers the simultaneous e¤ect of market risk and default risk
- see Eqn 6.1. It is appreciated that di¤erent service lines will exhibit varying
degrees of market risk and indeed some lines will have volatilities that are more
pronounced than those observed in this study. Overall, however, the model
developed for the ADSL platform is versatile enough to cater for all levels of
volatility of market risk and default risk.
In order to accommodate a conceivable more elevated level of volatility,
further scenarios are developed where the respective volatilites are multiples of
those in the base case - see Table 8.12. Table 8.10 shows a sensitivity analysis
based on the base case. This indicates that the value of the option is most
sensitive to the level of line activation, tari¤ levels and the price of access to
the Subscriber Network. In e¤ect a 5% change in the level of b(0) results in
about the same change in the value of the option. The same pertubation in bs
results in a 16% change in the option value, and 5% change in Kb(t) results in
a -14% change.
The results from the closed-form analytical methods are shown in Table
8.9. These results corroborate those from numerical methods and vice versa.
Based on contingent claim pricing theory, the assumptions set out in Section
6.3.1 and the evidence from the period January 2000 to December 2008 from
the ADSL capacity access for the 8 mbit/s end-user capacity product, we nd
that that FL-LRIC access prices are distortionary. In essence for each unit
of time, for 8 mbit/s end-user capacity access, there is a downside risk that
approximates  Mb(t)   Nb(t)   Kb(t), the intensity of which is dened by
1   b(t). The results show that FL-LRIC access prices have a distortionary
e¤ect that approximates 7 8% of the price of end-to-end connectivity, for 1 12
month contracts, for 8 mbit/s end-user capacity access. Overall we conclude
that: (i) the distortionary e¤ect of FL-LRIC is signicant; and (ii) the level of
these distortions imply the existence of a strong incentive for ine¢ cient entry.
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8.4 Discussion
The asymmetry that arises from having the right without the corresponding
obligation to invest, and the resultant exposure to the upside without a corre-
sponding exposure to the downside renders mandatory unbundling in telecom-
munication capacity networks amenable to scrutiny using the framework of
nancial options valuation. The quantitative approaches to pricing nancial
options nd their origin in the seminal work by Black and Scholes (1973) and
Merton (1973). The Black-Scholes model nds application in circumstances
where the value of the underlying asset is dened by a continuous-time sto-
chastic process. The subsequent work by Cox, Ross and Rubinstein (1979)
provide a framework for valuing options where the value of the underlying as-
set is dened by a discrete-time stochastic process. The premise underpinning
the valuation of an option on the spot is that a portfolio consisting of n shares
in the underlying asset and risk-free borrowing can be constructed to replicate
the value of an option on the underlying asset. Since the option and the repli-
cating portfolio would have the same returns, these two assets must sell for the
same price to avoid arbitrage opportunities. Black (1976) showed how arbi-
trage arguments can be used to price options on futures contracts. The pricing
of options on futures contracts is based on the tenet that a riskless portfolio
can be constructed by creating a portfolio consisting of a short position in one
option contract and a long position in n futures contracts. In the discrete time
set-up the value of the option is given by
C(F (t; T )) = [qFu + (1  q)Fd]  e (T t) (8.1)
where Fu is the pay-o¤ on the forward in favourable circumstances and Fd is
the pay-o¤ in unfavourable circumstances. Here q represents risk-neutral prob-
abilities. In continuous time, Black derives a closed-form analytical solution to
price an option on a futures contract, where futures prices have a lognormal
176
distribution, as follows
C(F (t) : t; T ) = e r(T t)[F (t; T )N(d1) KN(d2)] (8.2)
here
d1 =
ln

F (t;T )
K

+ 1
2
2(T   t)

p
T   t
and
d2 = d1   
p
T   t
for T > t: Now F (t; T ) is the price of a futures contact written at time t for
delivery at time T . We know that F (t; T ) = EQ[S(t; T )].
This study is built on the debate in the literature by Hausman (1999),
Economides (1999), Hausman and Myers (2002), Alleman (2002), Alleman and
Rappoport (2002, 2005, 2006), Vogelsang (2003), Pindyck (2005a, 2005b, 2007)
and Cave (2006) and makes four contributions to the debate. First, it provides
a rigorous analytical framework, founded on the stochastic dynamics of down-
stream value, for valuing the exibility of adapting to downstream value. Sec-
ond, it provides empirical evidence on the symmetry or otherwise of FL-LRIC
access prices based on evidence from the analogue platform. Third, it provides
similar evidence from the ADSL platform. These contributions set this study
apart from previous studies and take the debate in the literature beyond the
current qualitative conjectures. Fourth, based on the aforesaid evidence, this
study provides closed-form analytical solutions to price the value of third-party
exibility to adapt to downstream stochastic processes in the two platforms.
These solutions generalize the results and provide an option-theoretic approach
for pricing capacity access where third parties have the leverage of adapting
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to downstream stochastic value. In this regard too, this study is signicantly
di¤erent from previous research in the eld.
With respect to the rst three contributions, this study repudiates earlier
ideas. The hypothesized neutrality of FL-LRIC has been tested to see if can
stand up to the evidence, within the framework of the hypothetico-deductive
method. From this epistemological standpoint, theories can only be held as
tentative conjectures until falsied through empirical investigation. At any time
therefore, a theory only reects the distance travelled in a particular eld. Weak
theories are driven out by new evidence and new theories emerge. Only those
theories which have not been refuted and which best correspond to empirical
evidence persist - but only until superior theories are developed. Through this
sequence more versatile theories emerge. Popper (1963) argued that deduction
and falsication - the hypothetico deductive method is central to constructing
knowledge.
This thesis nds that FL-LRIC is distortionary as an approach for pricing
capacity access. These ndings are corroborated by the ndings from a number
of earlier econometric studies on the e¤ect of policy variables on facilities-based
deployment. Relevant examples include those studies by Crandall et al. (2004),
Hazlett (2005) and Hausman and Sidak (2005). These studies show that access
seekers did not climb the ladder of investment as would be expected under
the stepping stone hypothesis. A possible explanation is that the unpriced
value arising from cost-based access prices provide disincentives to move up the
ladder of investment. Crandall et al.(2004) nd that UNE lines in access seekers
portfolios increased from 24% in 1999 to 55% in 2002. This evidence suggests
that access seekers did not migrate to facilities-based competition as would be
expected under the ladder of investment hypothesis. Hazlett (2005) nds that
during period 1999 to 2004, UNE-P lines emerged to dominate the portfolios of
access seekers. During this period UNE-P lines grew by over 300% and facilities-
based lines grew by just 20%. Hazlett nds that the correlation between the
growth of UNE-P lines and non-cable facilities-based competition is -0.99 and
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concludes that UNE-P lines crowd out facilities-based competition. Of interest
too is the fact that during the period 1999 to 2004, while the lines operated by
access seekers reected a continuous period-to-period increase, the level of their
non-cable facilities-based lines showed a decline bringing to doubt the "stepping
stone" hypothesis. Hazlett also nds that investments by incumbents and access
seekers are negatively correlated to the growth of shared lines (coe¢ cient of
correlation for 2000 to 2003: -0.94). Hazlett further nds that the rate of
deployment of DSL increased after the repeal of the mandatory line sharing
requirements in the US. Hausman and Sidak (2005) follow the evolution of
lines operated by 17 access seekers in 2000 and nd that 25% of these operators
increased the proportion of facility-based lines in their portfolio - 50% of the
rms maintained about the same proportion of facilities-based lines. Some rms
went bankrupt and others decreased their share of facilities-based competition.
It has been suggested in some literature that a possible way to deal with
the asymmetries resulting from the option-like characteristics of third-party ca-
pacity access in telecommunication networks is to top-up the wholesale access
price by a marginal amount say 5-10% (see Waverman, 2006). This remedy
however falls short of addressing the fundamental character of the asymmet-
rical distribution of risk in the access infrastructure. Increasing the wholesale
price of access is equivalent to increasing the strike price. While this reduces
the value of exibility, it does not eliminate such value. What is required, given
a portfolio of exchange lines where a third party has the leverage to migrate
from node to node, is a two-part access charge. Here the rst part would be
chargeable on account of the exibility to migrate from node to node within
a network and would take e¤ect, for each exchange line within a portfolio,
whether or not access is sought. Eqn. 7.1 and Eqn. 7.23 provide expressions
representing the value of this charge for the analogue and ADSL platforms, re-
spectively. The second part would be chargeable per exchange line if and when
access is sought, and is equal to Ka(t). Turning to directions for regulatory
policy, the results point to three possible remedies. First, binding the access
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seekers, through space and time to an extent necessary to eliminate one-sided
advantages through some form of take-or-pay arrangements, or some variation
of this type of contract. Second, migrating to a pricing mechanism that is sensi-
tive to the value of the exibility to adapt to downstream stochastic processes,
through space and time. In this regard the option-theoretic approach to pricing
access that is furthered in Chapter 7 contributes to a possible policy direction.
A third possible policy remedy is co-investment where the incumbent and the
access seekers jointly own access infrastructure and jointly share the upside and
downside potential. It is however recognized that the legal basis for e¤ecting
such an arrangement may be problematic unless such an arrangement is will-
ingly accepted by the parties to the contract. In the absence of such consent,
the basis in law to impose a shareholding structure on an incumbent may be
lacking.
While this thesis contributes to the debate, it is however constrained by
the limitations of data in the public domain. The study could be improved in
number of ways if the availability of data was not a limitation. First, this study
assumes that the intensity of exchange line activation is uniform throughout the
market studied. However relevant evidence shows that the extent of competition
varies from exchange to exchange. More specically, as discussed more fully
in Chapter 7, cable had 95%+ presence in service areas covered by 48 local
exchange. Overall subscribers have a choice of more than one access platform
in about one half of the downstream market and the magnitude of the risk of
stranded assets varies from exchange to exchange - see Figures F.1 and F.2
in Appendix F. This suggests that the stochastic state of exchange lines and
therefore the value of exibility will vary also from exchange to exchange. Given
this, a more appropriate way to structure the study is to stratify the various
exchanges areas based the stochastic dynamics of the exchange lines. This is
has not been done because of the lack of data.
Second, while this study assumes a representative portfolio of exchange lines
through space and estimates option values from this standpoint, in practice
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however access seekers have the leverage to work their way through space and
cherry pick high-end subscribers with high and stable demand. Clearly the
distortionary e¤ect of FL-LRIC increases, taking the analogue network as an
example, if Sai(t) is consistently greater than as(t). The results from the study
should therefore be seen as a conservative estimate of the distortionary e¤ect of
FL-LRIC. Third, with respect to the ADSL platform, this research is conned
to wholesale access for the 8 mbit/s end-user capacity because of lack of data on
other capacities. While this capacity accounts for 43% of the UK market (see
Ofcom, 2008), this study could be extended to other capacities if data was not
a constraint. Fourth, we use quarterly data where monthly data is not available
and interpolate to estimate monthly data points. While this approach has been
used by researchers in the face of data constraints, for example, Henisz and
Zelner (2001), it nevertheless adds noise to the data set.
Further, this is study is based on the case where a third-party purchases
end-to-end connectivity. It is however recognized that an access seeker may opt
to purchase only subset of the network elements required to provide end-to-end
connectivity, and supplement these with their own elements. Such an alter-
native results in a risk prole that di¤ers from that studied here and presents
an area for further research. The broad principles established in this study
can be extended to cover such a scenario. Lastly, this study is based on data
covering a period of 8 years with respect to the analogue platform and 9 years
with respect to the ADSL platform. While one could argue that a longer time
series should have been obtained to provide a rmer basis to model the evo-
lution of the drivers of value, it should however be noted that the length of
the historical data points used in the study was limited by what is available in
the public domain. In mitigation, one could argue that a regulatory lag is of
a short-run duration and therefore what is required is reasonable evidence of
short-run dynamics.
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8.5 Summary
From the evidence from the analogue platform covering the period January 2000
to July 2007, the assumptions set out in Section 5.3.2 and from the standpoint
of contingent claim pricing theory, we nd that the average distortionary e¤ect
of FL-LRIC approximates 8  9% of the revenue base of an exchange line and
e¤ectively results in an subsidy of 16 17% on the regulated price of access, for
1  12 month contracts. With respect ot the ADSL platform, based on option
pricing theory, the evidence from the period January 2000 to December 2008
from the ADSL capacity access for the 8 mbit/s end-user capacity product and
the assumptions set out in Section 6.3.1, we nd that that FL-LRIC access
prices have a distortionary e¤ect that approximates 7  8% of the price of end-
to-end connectivity, for 1  12 month contracts. Overall we conclude that: (i)
the distortionary e¤ect of FL-LRIC is signicant; and (ii) the level of these
distortions implies the existence of a strong incentive for ine¢ cient entry.
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Figure 8.1: Analogue - Tra¢ c (Raw Data and Fitted Curves)
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Point 95% Condence
Param eter Estim ate L im its
Tra¢ c x 5.73 (5.719, 5 .740)
x -0 .0078 (-0 .0101, -0 .0055)
x 0.02925 (0.0221, 0 .0364)
!x 2 -
x =4 -
D/S s 2.3420 (2.340, 2 .344)
Value s -0 .0018 (-0 .023, -0 .0013)
s 0.0068 (0.0052, 0 .0084)
!s 2 -
s =4 -
Table 8.1: Analogue - Seasonality (Parameter Estimates)
Tra¢ c D/Stream
Value
SSE 0.0522 0.0028
R -Square 0.5610 0.5665
Adjusted R -Square 0.5510 0.5566
RMSE 0.0244 0.0056
Table 8.2: Analogue - Seasonality (Goodness of Fit)
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Param eter 95% Condence
Estim ate L im its
as 0.1896 (-0 .6839, 1 .0631)
as 0.0063 (0.0053, 0 .0072)
Table 8.3: Analogue - Downstream Value (Mean-reversion Parameters)
Scenario I Scenario I I
Std . Std .
Option Error Cum . Option Error Cum .
Dur. Value - £ x10^-4 Value - £ Value - £ x10^-4 Value- £
1 1.4334 0.1322 1.4334 1.4333 0.1322 1.4333
2 1.4317 0.1859 2.8651 1.4314 0.1858 2.8647
3 1.4166 0.2256 4.2817 1.4162 0.2256 4.2809
4 1.3921 0.2554 5.6738 1.3916 0.2553 5.6725
5 1.3640 0.2832 7.0378 1.3634 0.2831 7.0359
6 1.3396 0.3077 8.3773 1.3388 0.3076 8.3747
7 1.3249 0.3326 9.7022 1.3240 0.3324 9.6987
8 1.3232 0.3495 11.0254 1.3222 0.3492 11.0210
9 1.3346 0.3688 12.3600 1.3335 0.3685 12.3544
10 1.3556 0.3888 13.7156 1.3544 0.3885 13.7088
11 1.3801 0.4037 15.0957 1.3788 0.4033 15.0876
12 1.4012 0.4176 16.4969 1.3997 0.4171 16.4873
Table 8.4: Analogue - Summary of Results (Numerical Methods)
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Scenario I Scenario I I
Option Option
Cum . Cum .
Dur. Value - £ Value - £
1 1.430 1.430
2 2.854 2.854
3 4.260 4.259
4 5.637 5.637
5 6.983 6.982
6 8.302 8.300
7 9.603 9.600
8 10.898 10.895
9 12.201 12.197
10 13.521 13.516
11 14.861 14.855
12 16.219 16.211
Table 8.5: Analogue - Summary of Results (Analytical Methods)
E¤ect E¤ect
of 5% of 5%
Param eter Perbutation Param eter Perbutation
1 -0 .03% as -0 .03%
ap 0.01% s 6.17%
ap 0.01% s -0 .03%
Rf Rate -0 .01% s -0 .19%
 0.03% Ka(t) -22 .21%
a(t) 5.00%
Table 8.6: Analogue - Sensitivity Analysis (Scenario II)
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Perturbation (x2) Perturbation (x5) Perturbation (x10)
Std . . Std . Std .
Option Error Cum . Option Error Cum . Option Error Cum .
Dur. Value - £ x10^-4 Val. - £ Value - £ x10^-3 Val. - £ Value - £ x10^-4 Val. - £
1 1.4319 0.2672 1.4319 1.4279 0.0690 1.4279 1.4217 0.1457 1.4217
2 1.4286 0.3756 2.8605 1.4207 0.0960 2.8485 1.4083 0.2043 2.8300
3 1.4121 0.4558 4.2726 1.001 0.1175 4.2487 1.3815 0.2476 4.2115
4 1.3862 0.5157 5.6588 1.3706 0.1329 5.6193 1.3465 0.2795 5.5581
5 1.3567 0.5717 7.0155 1.3374 0.1472 6.9567 1.3076 0.3094 6.8657
6 1.3309 0.6210 8.3464 1.3079 0.1597 8.2646 1.2725 0.3352 8.1381
7 1.3149 0.6710 9.6614 1.2885 0.1725 9.5532 1.2479 0.3616 9.3860
8 1.3118 0.7048 10.9732 1.2819 0.1810 10.8351 1.2357 0.3791 10.6217
9 1.3219 0.7435 12.2951 1.2885 0.1909 12.1235 1.2369 0.3993 11.8586
10 1.3416 0.7835 13.6367 1.3046 0.2010 13.4281 1.2477 0.4199 13.1064
11 1.3647 0.8133 15.0014 1.3241 0.2085 14.7523 1.2617 0.4353 14.3680
12 1.3844 0.8411 16.3858 1.3402 0.2155 16.0925 1.2722 0.4495 15.6402
Table 8.7: Analogue - Summary of Results, Numerical Methods (With Perturbation)
pb(0)=0.70 pb(0)=0.75 pb(0)=0.80
Option Std . Cum . Option Std . Cum . Option Std . Cum .
Dur. Value - £ Error Value - £ Value - £ Error Value - £ Value - £ Error Value - £
1 1.8440 0.0016 1.8440 1.9758 0.0018 1.9758 2.1075 0.0019 2.1075
2 1.8280 0.0021 3.6721 1.9586 0.0022 3.9344 2.0892 0.0024 4.1967
3 1.8094 0.0023 5.4815 1.9386 0.0024 5.8730 2.0679 0.0026 6.2645
4 1.8011 0.0023 7.2825 1.9297 0.0025 7.8027 2.0584 0.0027 8.3229
5 1.7872 0.0024 9.0697 1.9148 0.0025 9.7175 2.0425 0.0027 10.3654
6 1.7733 0.0024 10.8430 1.8999 0.0025 11.6175 2.0266 0.0027 12.3920
7 1.7659 0.0024 12.6089 1.8921 0.0025 13.5096 2.0182 0.0027 14.4102
8 1.7544 0.0023 14.3633 1.8797 0.0025 15.3893 2.0050 0.0026 16.4152
9 1.7464 0.0023 16.1097 1.8712 0.0024 17.2604 1.9959 0.0026 18.4111
10 1.7397 0.0022 17.8494 1.8639 0.0024 19.1244 1.9882 0.0026 20.3993
11 1.7309 0.0022 19.5804 1.8546 0.0023 20.9790 1.9782 0.0025 22.3775
12 1.7225 0.0021 21.3029 1.8456 0.0023 22.8245 1.9686 0.0024 24.3462
Table 8.8: ADSL - Summary of Results, Numerical Methods (Scenario I)
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Option Value - £
Dur. pb(0)=0.70 pb(0)=0.75 pb(0)=0.80
1 1.838 1.969 2.100
2 3.655 3.916 4.177
3 5.453 5.843 6.232
4 7.233 7.750 8.267
5 8.996 9.639 10.281
6 10.743 11.510 12.278
7 12.475 13.366 14.257
8 14.192 15.206 16.220
9 15.896 17.032 18.167
10 17.587 18.843 20.100
11 19.266 20.642 22.018
12 20.933 22.428 23.923
Table 8.9: ADSL - Summary of Results, Scenario I (Analytical Methods)
E¤ect E¤ect
of 10% of 10%
Param eter Perbutation Param eter Perbutation
1 -0 .24% bs 0.01%
b(t) 5.00% bs -0 .22%
Rf Rate -0 .01% Ka(t) -13 .88%
bs 16.54%
Table 8.10: ADSL - Sensitivity Analysis (Scenario II)
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pb(0)=0.70 pb(0)=0.75 pb(0)=0.80
Option Std . Cum . Option Std . Cum . Option Std . Cum .
Dur. Value - £ Error Value - £ Value - £ Error Value - £ Value - £ Error Value - £
1 1.8439 0.0016 1.8439 1.9756 0.0018 1.9756 2.1073 0.0019 2.1073
2 1.8277 0.0021 3.6716 1.9583 0.0022 3.9338 2.0888 0.0024 4.1961
3 1.8089 0.0023 5.4805 1.9381 0.0024 5.8719 2.0673 0.0026 6.2634
4 1.8004 0.0023 7.2809 1.9290 0.0025 7.8010 2.0576 0.0027 8.3210
5 1.7864 0.0024 9.0672 1.9140 0.0025 9.7149 2.0415 0.0027 10.3626
6 1.7723 0.0024 10.8396 1.8989 0.0025 11.6138 2.0255 0.0027 12.3881
7 1.7648 0.0024 12.6044 1.8909 0.0025 13.5047 2.0169 0.0027 14.4050
8 1.7531 0.0023 14.3575 1.8783 0.0015 15.3830 2.0036 0.0026 16.4086
9 1.7450 0.0023 16.1025 1.8696 0.0024 17.2527 1.9943 0.0026 18.4028
10 1.7381 0.0022 17.8406 1.8623 0.0024 19.1149 1.9864 0.0026 20.3892
11 1.7292 0.0022 19.5698 1.8527 0.0023 20.9677 1.9763 0.0025 22.3655
12 1.7207 0.0021 21.2905 1.8436 0.0023 22.8112 1.9665 0.0024 24.3320
Table 8.11: ADSL - Summary of Results, Numerical Methods (Scenario II)
pb(0)=0.75 - W ith Perturbation
Perbutation (x2) Perbutation (x5) Perbutation (x10)
Option Std . Cum . Option Std . Cum . Option Std . Cum .
Dur. Value - £ Error Value - £ Value - £ Error Value - £ Value - £ Error Value - £
1 1.9605 0.0035 1.9605 1.9281 0.0088 1.9281 2.0300 0.0160 2.0300
2 1.9276 0.0044 3.8881 1.8732 0.0108 3.8013 2.0844 0.0194 4.1144
3 1.8888 0.0049 5.7769 1.8021 0.0116 5.6033 2.0665 0.0209 6.1809
4 1.8722 0.0050 7.6491 1.7794 0.0118 7.3827 2.0855 0.0215 8.2664
5 1.8434 0.0051 9.4925 1.7258 0.0119 9.1085 2.0371 0.0218 10.3035
6 1.8147 0.0051 11.3072 1.6688 0.0117 10.7773 1.9722 0.0216 12.2757
7 1.7998 0.0051 13.1071 1.6385 0.0118 12.4158 1.9622 0.0217 14.2379
8 1.7759 0.0049 14.8830 1.5874 0.0114 14.0032 1.8826 0.0211 16.1205
9 1.7597 0.0049 16.6427 1.5521 0.0112 15.5553 1.8357 0.0208 17.9561
10 1.7460 0.0048 18.3887 1.5203 0.0111 17.0756 1.8064 0.0206 19.7626
11 1.7280 0.0047 20.1167 1.4812 0.0108 18.5568 1.7366 0.0201 21.4992
12 1.7106 0.0046 21.8273 1.4402 0.0106 19.9971 1.6657 0.0196 23.1649
Table 8.12: ADSL - Summary of Results, Numerical Methods (Scenario II - Per-
turbed)
188
Chapter 9
Conclusion
Mandatory third-party wholesale access to an incumbents infrastructure is dis-
cussed in the literature as a means for introducing facilities-based competition
in the xed-wire network. The rationale for this argument is that third parties
are provided with an impetus for investment in their own networks, if they are
allowed to rent bottleneck facilities at an initial stage of competition, creating
in the process rival networks, hence facilities-based competition. It has further
been argued that mere re-packaging and resale of an incumbents downstream
services, by itself, does not create value.
The search for an appropriate approach to pricing has evolved variously
in the literature through rate of return regulation, the E¢ cient Component
Pricing Rule, price-cap regulation (RPI-X) and cost-based regulation, based on
e¢ cient forward-looking costs (FL-LRIC) all in search for an approach that
would send signals for e¢ ciency to the users of the access infrastructure and
thereby facilitate the longer-term e¢ cient development of access networks. In
some literature and indeed in practice the search for an approach to pricing ac-
cess has for the time being settled on cost-based access prices based on long-run
incremental costs. This approach to access pricing has been advanced in a con-
siderable body of literature as an e¤ective instrument for incentive regulation
in telecommunication access networks. Its proponents have argued that access
seekers pay a price, and access providers receive a price that corresponds to
the costs that the latter imposes on access infrastructure. Consequently, access
seekers bear a cost that is equivalent to the cost of supply. In this respect, it
is argued that FL-LRIC, is not only equitable to the access provider but in-
duces entry from access seekers who are as e¢ cient or more so than the access
provider in the intermediate services market.
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In the EU, for example, the European Commission in its Recommenda-
tion 98/195/EC of 8th January 1998, on the subject of interconnection in a
liberalised telecommunications market, recommended the use of long-run av-
erage incremental costs as a basis for setting access charges. The European
Parliament and Council subsequently in Directive (2000) 384 on access to, and
interconnection of, electronic communication networks and associated facilities,
also adopted FL-LRIC as basis for setting interconnection prices. In November
2000 the Independent Regulators Group (IRG) endorsed FL-LRIC as basis for
setting interconnection prices. According to the IRG most of its members have
introduced FL-LRIC. Further, the European Parliament and Council, in Direc-
tive 2002/19/EC on access to, and interconnection of electronic networks and
associated facilities, stipulated cost-based access prices as a means of regulating
capacity access.
Some emerging literature questions the versatility of FL-LRIC. At the cen-
tre of the debate is the issue about the versatility of this approach to pricing
access in responding to the distribution of downstream risk. Of particular
importance is the question about whether the relative value of the exibility
to respond to downstream stochastic processes is signicant relative to the -
nancial equilibrium of access seekers, and whether therefore any such value if
unpriced adversely inuences market outcomes. These questions are central to
the regulation of capacity access in telecommunications for a number reasons.
First, from a theoretical standpoint, a material overstatement of access prices
reinforces the dominant position of the incumbent, puts upward pressure on
the price of downstream products and distorts the competitive neutrality be-
tween alternative technology platforms - a material understatement of access
prices encourages ine¢ cient entry, sties the ability of an incumbent to sustain
and improve its infrastructure and distorts the competitive neutrality between
competing technology platforms. Second, even if subsidized entry is suggested
on grounds that it stimulates competition, it has been argued that the terms
of access should mirror a voluntary exchange and reect the full economic cost
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of the underlying service.
This study has built on the debate in the literature by Hausman (1999),
Economides (1999), Hausman and Myers (2002), Alleman (2002), Alleman and
Rappoport (2002, 2005, 2006), Vogelsang (2003), Pindyck (2005a, 2005b, 2007)
and Cave (2006) and makes four contributions to the debate. First, it pro-
vides a rigorous analytical framework, founded on the stochastic dynamics of
downstream value, for valuing the exibility of adapting to downstream value.
Second, it provides empirical evidence on the symmetry or otherwise of FL-
LRIC access prices based on evidence from the analogue platform in the UK.
Third, it provides similar evidence from the ADSL platform. These contribu-
tions set this study apart from previous studies and take the debate in the
literature beyond the current qualitative conjectures. Fourth, based on the
aforesaid evidence, this study provides closed-form analytical solutions to price
the value of third-party exibility to adapt to downstream stochastic processes
in the two platforms. These solutions generalize the results and provide an
option-theoretic approach for pricing capacity access where third parties have
the leverage of adapting to downstream stochastic value. In this regard too,
this study is signicantly di¤erent from previous research in the eld.
With respect to the rst three contributions, this study questions earlier
ideas on the symmetry of FL-RIC. The hypothesized neutrality of FL-LRIC
has been tested to see if can stand up to the evidence. Theories can only be
held as tentative conjectures until falsied through empirical investigation. At
any time therefore, a theory only reects the distance travelled in a particular
eld. Weak theories are driven out by new evidence and new theories emerge.
Only those theories which have not been refuted and which best correspond
to empirical evidence persist - but only until superior theories are developed.
Through this sequence more versatile theories emerge.
The theoretical framework in this thesis is option pricing theory. This the-
ory is used because of its capacity to conceptualize and quantify the value of
exibility. This theory nds its origins in Black and Scholes (1973) and the
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subsequent enhancements in Merton (1973). This thesis draws on Black (1976)
who showed how futures prices can be used to price contingent claims, based
on arbitrage arguments. The contribution by Black is particularly important
in commodity markets where futures and forward prices are either observable
or can be reasonably inferred. We have applied the theory using risk-neutral
pricing principles developed by Harrison and Kreps (1979), and Harrison and
Pliska (1981, 1983). In applying risk-neutral pricing, the price of market risk
and the price of the risk of default are taken as handles which link P -dynamics
to Q-dynamics.
The analysis in this study draws on an intensity-based approach to contin-
gent claim valuation. This approach nds application in circumstances where
there exists a risk of default which is either totally or partially independent of
the value of the underlying assets. This approach therefore recognizes two main
sources of risk i.e. market risk and asset-specic default risk. The intensity-
based approach recognizes that at each instant, there is a possibility of default
arising from reasons other than the value of the underlying asset. Default is
allowed to occur before the maturity of the underlying asset and is triggered by
an exogenous process which is either fully or partially independent of the value
of the underlying asset.
This study nds that FL-LRIC is distortionary as an approach for pricing
capacity access. Based on evidence from the analogue platform covering the
period September 1999 to July 2007, and from the standpoint of contingent
claim pricing theory, we nd that the average distortionary e¤ect of FL-LRIC
approximates 8   9% of the revenue base of an exchange line and e¤ectively
results in an subsidy of 16 17% on the regulated price of access, for 1 12month
contracts. With respect to the ADSL platform, based on contingent claim
pricing theory and the evidence from the period January 2000 to December 2008
from the ADSL capacity access for the 8 mbit/s end-user capacity product, we
nd that that FL-LRIC access prices are distortionary. The results show that
FL-LRIC access prices have a distortionary e¤ect that approximates 7  8% of
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the price of end-to-end connectivity, for 1 12month contracts, for 8 mbit/s end-
user capacity access. Overall we conclude that: (i) the distortionary e¤ect of
FL-LRIC is signicant; and (ii) the level of these distortions imply the existence
of a strong incentive for ine¢ cient entry.
These ndings are corroborated by the ndings in a number of earlier econo-
metric studies on the e¤ect of policy variables on facilities-based deployment.
These studies point to the following conslusions - rst, that the price of access to
the local loop is positively correlated to inter-platform competition (see Crandal
et al., 2004 and Waverman et al., 2007). Second, that intra-platform competi-
tion is negatively correlated to facilities-based deployment (see Hazlett, 2005).
Third, that access seekers did not climb the ladder of investment, as envisaged
under the stepping stone hypothesis, based on US experience (see Crandall et
al. 2004, Hazlett, 2005 and Hausman and Sidak, 2005).
It has been suggested in some literature that a possible way to deal with
the asymmetries resulting from the option-like characteristics of third-party
capacity access in telecommunication networks is to top-up the wholesale access
price by a marginal amount say 5-10% (see Waverman, 2006). This remedy
however falls short of addressing the fundamental character of the asymmetrical
distribution of risk in the access infrastructure. Increasing the wholesale price
of access is equivalent to increasing the strike price. While this reduces the
value of exibility, it does not eliminate such value.
Turning to directions for regulatory policy, the results point to three possible
remedies. First, binding the access seekers, through space and time to an extent
necessary to eliminate one-sided advantages through some form of take-or-pay
arrangements, or some variation of this type of contract. Second, migrating
to a pricing mechanism that is sensitive to the value of the exibility to adapt
to downstream stochastic processes, through space and time. In this regard
the option-theoretic approach to pricing access that is furthered in Chapter 7
contributes to a possible policy direction. A third possible policy remedy is
co-investment where the incumbent and the access seekers would jointly own
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access infrastructure and jointly share the upside and downside potential. It
is however recognized that the legal basis for e¤ecting such an arrangement
may be problematic unless the arrangement is willingly accepted by the parties
to the contract. In the absence of such consent, the basis in law to impose a
shareholding structure on an incumbent may be lacking.
While this study contributes to the debate, it is however constrained by
the limitations of data in the public domain. The study could be improved in
number of ways if the availability of data was not a limitation. First, this study
assumes that the intensity of exchange line activation is uniform throughout the
market studied. However relevant evidence shows that the extent of competition
varies from exchange to exchange. More specically, as discussed more fully
in Chapter 6, cable had 95%+ presence in service areas covered by 48 local
exchanges; 65-95% presence in the service areas covered by 816 exchanges; 30-
65% presence in 293; 5%-30% in 164; and up to 5% in 4,266, at the time of
this study. Overall 857 exchanges included in the rst two clusters serve 45%
of the delivery points in the UK (Ofcom, 2006). Therefore subscribers have a
choice of more than one access platform in about one half of the downstream
market and the magnitude of the risk of stranded assets varies from exchange to
exchange. This suggests that the stochastic state of exchange lines and therefore
the value of exibility will vary also from exchange to exchange. Given this, a
more appropriate way to structure the study is to stratify the various exchanges
areas based the stochastic dynamics of the exchange lines. This is has not been
done because of the lack of data.
Second, while this study assumes a representative portfolio of exchange lines
through space and estimates option values from this standpoint, in practice
however access seekers have the leverage to work their way through space and
cherry pick high-end subscribers with high and stable demand. Clearly the
distortionary e¤ect of FL-LRIC increases, taking the analogue network as an
example, if Sai(t) is consistently greater than as(t). The results from the study
should therefore be seen as a conservative estimate of the distortionary e¤ect of
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FL-LRIC. Third, with respect to the ADSL platform, this research is conned
to wholesale access for the 8 mbit/s end-user capacity because of the limitations
on the length of this this thesis. While this capacity accounts for 43% of the
UK market, this study could be extended to other capacities if this limitation
was not a constraint.
Further, this study is based on the case where a third-party purchases end-
to-end connectivity. It is however recognized that an access seeker may opt to
purchase only subset of the network elements required to provide end-to-end
connectivity, and supplement these with their own elements. Such an option
results in a risk prole that di¤ers from that studied here and presents an
area for further research. The broad principles established in this study can
be extended to cover such a scenario. Lastly, this study is based on data from
September 1999 to July 2007 in the case of the analogue platform, and from
January 2000 to December 2008, in the case of the ADSL platform. While
one could argue that longer time series should have been obtained to provide
a rmer basis to model the evolution of the drivers of value, it should however
be noted, in the case of the former, that the length of the historical data points
used in the study was limited by what is available in the public domain. In the
case of the latter the length of the data points correspond to the short life so far
of this relatively new platform. In mitigation, with respect to both platforms,
one could argue that a regulatory lag is of a short-run duration and therefore
what is required is reasonable evidence of short-run dynamics.
The study points to two directions for future research. First, studying the
e¤ect of the distortionary e¤ect of cost-based access prices where third parties
purchase only a subset of network elements required to provide end-to-end
connectivity. Now while this is study is based on the case where a third-party
purchases end-to-end connectivity, it is however recognized that an access seeker
may opt to purchase only subset of the network elements required to provide
end-to-end connectivity, and supplement these with their own elements. The
second possible direction for future research is studying the e¤ect of cost-based
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access prices, if any, on the regulation of Next Generation Networks (NGNs).
Now the migration from legacy to NGNs is the most signicant technological
transformation of telecommunication capacity networks in recent times. NGNs
are a single IP-based network with distributed network intelligence and access
that allows seamless access to any application in any geographic area. Unlike
legacy networks which provide a series of separate products using di¤erent
technology platforms, NGNs are capable of delivering multiple products (voice,
data, video etc.) on a single platform. The migration is in its rudimentary
stages and full deployment in European countries is expected by 2020. The
migration entails considerable investment and brings with it new dimensions
of risk. Substantial segments of the NGN access infrastructure will however
not be readily replicable and incumbents will continue to exercise considerable
market power in the access market. Third-party mandatory access to economic
bottlenecks will continue to facilitate competition. The primary challenge of
third-party access regulation will be to create access regimes that facilitate
innovation and investment, and ultimately facilities-based competition.
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Appendix A
MRP: Proofs
The basis of the solution in Eqn 5.6 is as follows1 - let (t) = X(t) (t): And
let
d(t) = ((t)  (t)) + dW (t) (A.1)
consider a process e(t) = (t)e(t s) for any t > s. We obtain the following
using Itos lemma
de(t) = e(t s)d(t) + e(t s)(t)dt (A.2)
Substituting Eqn. A.1 in Eqn. A.2 we obtain
de(t) = e(t s)(dt  (t)dt+ dW (t) + (t)dt)
= e(t s)(dt+ dW (t)) (A.3)
From Eqn. A.3
e(t) = (t)e(t s) = (s) + tZ
s
e(u s)du+ 
tZ
s
e(u s)dW (u) (A.4)
From Eqn. A.4, we have
(t) = (s)e (t s)+
e (t s)
tZ
s
e(u s)du+ e (t s)
tZ
s
e(u s)dW (u)
= (s)e (t s) + e (t s)
tZ
s
e(u s)du+

tZ
s
e (t u)dW (u)
(A.5)
1The subscript/postscript ax is henceforth dropped for clarity of exposition.
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Now since
tZ
s
eudu =
1

(e(t s)   1) (A.6)
We have from Eqn. A.5 and Eqn. A.6 that2
(t) = (s)e (t s) + (1  e (t s)) + 
tZ
s
e (t u)dW (u) (A.7)
From Eqn. A.1, the parameters we need to estimate are ,  and . Now
since the Ito integral
tZ
s
g(u)dW (u) has a Gaussian distributionN
0@0; tZ
s
g2(u)du
1A,
we have from Eqn. A.7,
tZ
s
g2(u)du =
tZ
s
2e 2(t u)du
=
2
2
(1  e 2(t s)) (A.8)
We have from Eqn. A.7 that
E[(t) j zs] = (s)e (t s) + (1  e (t s)) (A.9)
And from Eqn. A.8 we have that
V ar[(t) j zs] = 
2
2
(1  e 2(t s)) (A.10)
And it follows from Eqn. A.9 that
E[X(t) j zs] = (X(s)   (s))e (t s) + (1  e (t s)) + (t) (A.11)
If we let b(t) = exp(t), then from the properties of a lognormal distribu-
2See Glasserman (2004).
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tion, we have3
V ar[b(t) j zs] =
e2((s)e
 (t s)+(1 e (t s)))+2
2
(1 e 2(t s))
(e
2
2
(1 e 2(t s))   1)
(A.12)
3
V ar[b(t) j zs] =
e(2E[(t)jzs]+V ar[(t)jzs])  (eV ar[(t)jzs]   1)
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Appendix B
Renewal Theory: Proofs
The probability that there are r cycles by time t is
Pr(t) = Gr(t) Gr+1(t) (B.1)
for r = 1 to 1. The expected or average number of life cycles of an ex-
change line, Ho(t), in the interval [0; t], given an ordinary renewal process, is
the weighted average of the probability of each possible occurrence during the
interval.1 Ho(t), the renewal function, is equivalent to E[Pr(t)] and is derived
from Eqn. B.1 as follows
Ho(t) =
1X
r=0
r[Gr(t) Gr+1(t)]
= G1(t) +G2(t) +G3(t)::::::G1(t)
=
1X
r=1
Gr(t) (B.2)
Therefore drawing on Eqn. B.15, the Laplace transform of Ho(t) is
H
o
(s) =
1
s
1X
r=1
gr(s) (B.3)
The expression in Eqn. B.3 can be simplied, by summation to provide2
H
o
(s) =
g(s)
s[1  g(s)] (B.4)
For an equilibrium renewal process, because the pdf of the rst cycle is
di¤erent from that of subsequent cycles, the r-fold convolution of gr(s) is
g1(s)g(s)
r 1. Therefore drawing on Eqn. B.3 above, the Laplace transform
of the renewal function of a modied renewal process is
1where g(t) is a convolution of f0(t) and f1(t)
2Given that gr(t) = g(t)
r. Here G(t) is the cdf of g(t):
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H
m
(s) =
1
s
1X
r=1
g1(s)g(s)
r 1
=
1
s
1X
r=1
g1(s)
g(s)r
g(s)
=
g1(s)
s[1  g(s)] (B.5)
Now h(t), the renewal density, is in essence a summation of the probabilities
of the various discrete possible occurrences at time t. We therefore have that
the renewal density for an ordinary renewal process is
ho(t) =
1X
r=1
gr(t) (B.6)
Drawing on Eqn. B.17, the Laplace transformation of the renewal density
of an ordinary renewal process is
h
o
(s) =
1X
r=1
gr(s) (B.7)
Simplifying Eqn. B.7 above, we have
h
o
(s) =
g(s)
1  g(s) (B.8)
Re-arranging Eqn. B.8 above we have
h
o
(s) = g(s) + h
o
(s)g(s) (B.9)
Inverting Eqn. B.9 above, we obtain the renewal density function for an
ordinary renewal process
ho(t) = g(t) +
tZ
0
ho(t  u)g(u)du (B.10)
Drawing on Eqn. B.7 and recognizing that the r-fold convolution of gr(s)
for a modied renewal process is g1(s)g(s)r 1, we have
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h
m
(s) =
1X
r=1
g1(s)g(s)
r 1
=
g1(s)
1  g(s) (B.11)
The Laplace Transform is used to transform functions from the t-domain to
the s-domain. To nd a Laplace transform of say f(t), the function is multiplied
by e st and then integrated from 0 to1 with respect to time. The transformed
function simplies algebraic manipulation. Once manipulated the transformed
expressions is reverted to the time domain. The results in B.12 to B.17 draw
on Cox (1967) and Bolton (1994). Now the Laplace transform of the function
f(t) is
×[f(t); s] = f(t) =
1Z
0
e stf(t)dt (B.12)
The two most important results used in the context of renewal theory are
×
24 xZ
0
k(u)du; s
35 = k(s)=s (B.13)
×
241Z
x
k(u)du; s
35 = k(0)  k(s) =s (B.14)
The above results are used to nd the Laplace transform of a cdf, as shown
below
F (s) = f(s)=s (B.15)
The above results are also used to nd the Laplace transform of a survivor
function, as shown below
F
c
(s) =

1  f(s) =s (B.16)
A further useful result is
×[fr(t); s] = f r(s) (B.17)
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Appendix C
Analogue: Matlab Codes
C.1 M-File I: Sa(t) Process
randn(state,100)% State of random variables for Sa(t)process
Tf = [Input]; % Regulatory lag
Nf = [Input]; % Number of time intervals in regulatory lag
dtf = Tf/Nf; % Length of time in each interval
tf = [0:dtf:Tf];
M = [Input]; % Number of trajectories
Lambda=[Input]; % Market price of risk
GammaS= [Input]; % Speed of reversion to mean of a(t) process
SigmaS=[Input]; % Volatility of a(t) process
MuS=[Input]; % Mean of a(t), chi-Process, under P
Sa(1)=[Input]; %Log of Sa(t)at t=0
a = [Input];% Seasonality parameter
b = [Input];% Seasonality parameter
c = [Input];% Seasonality parameter
Sa2 = zeros(1,length(tf));% To initialize Sa2 - Seasonality function
Sa2=a+b*tf+c*cos(2*pi*tf-pi/4)-(Lambda*SigmaS)/GammaS;% See Eqn. 5.57.
Sa1 = zeros(M,length(tf));% To initialize Sa1 - Process followed by a(t).
Sa1(:,1) = Sa(1)-Sa2(1);% Value of Sa1 at t=0 - a(0)
for i=2:length(tf);
Sa1(:,i) = Sa1(:,i-1).*exp(-GammaS*dtf)+MuS*(1-exp(-GammaS*dtf))...
+SigmaS*sqrt((1-exp(-2*GammaS*dtf))/(2*GammaS)).*randn(M,1); % See Eqn.A.9
and Eqn.A.10 in Appendix A
end
Sa3 = zeros(M,length(tf));% To initialize Sa3 - Process followed by ln(Sa(t))
under risk neutral expectations
for i=1:M
for j=1:length(tf);
Sa3(i,j)=Sa1(i,j)+Sa2(:,j);
end
end
Sa4 = zeros(1,length(tf)-1);% Process followed by ln[F(Sa(t);s,t)]
for i=2:length(tf);
Sa4(i)=(Sa(1)-Sa2(1))*exp(-GammaS*tf(i))+Sa2(i)+((SigmaS^2)/(4*GammaS))*.....
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(1-exp(-2*GammaS*tf(i)));%See Eqn. 5.60
end
Sa5 = zeros(1,length(tf)-1);% Process followed by F(Sa(t);s,t)
for i=2:length(tf);
Sa5(i)=exp(Sa4(i));
end%See Eqn. 5.60
Sa6 = zeros(M,length(tf-1));% To initialize Sa6 - Process followed by F(Sa(t);t,t)
for i=2:length(tf);
Sa6(:,i)=Sa5(i)+sqrt((exp((2*(Sa(1)-Sa2(1))*exp(-GammaS*tf(i)))+....
(((SigmaS^2)/(2*GammaS))*(1-exp(-2*GammaS*tf(i))))))*.......
(exp(((SigmaS^2)/(2*GammaS))*(1- exp(-2*GammaS*tf(i))))-1)).*randn(M,1);
end %See Eqn. A.13 in Appendix A
C.2 M-File II: Line Activation
randn(state,100)% State of random variables for Y process
Tf = [Input]; % Regulatory lag
Nf = [Input]; % Number of time intervals in regulatory lag
dtf = Tf/Nf; % Length of time in each interval
tf = [0:dtf:Tf];
M = [Input]; % Number of trajectories
Pa(1)= [Input];% Value of P-Process at t=0
Lambda=[Input];% Market Price of Risk
MuPa=[Input];% Gradient of path under P-dynamics
SigmaPa=[Input]; %Volatility of P Process
MuPa2=MuPa - (SigmaPa*Lambda);%Gradient of path under Q-dynamics
RP=[Input];%Risk Premium - UK Utilities
dW = SigmaPa*sqrt(dtf)*randn(M,Nf+1); % Increments across time
W = cumsum(dW,2); % Cumulative increments across time.
Pa = Pa(1)*exp((MuPa2- 0.5*SigmaPa^2)*repmat(tf,[M 1]) + SigmaPa*W);%
P-Process under P/Q-Dynamics
Pa2=mean(Pa,1);% Expected risk-neutral P-Process through time
Pa3=zeros(M,length(tf));%Initializing PT
for i=1:length(tf);
Pa3(:,i)=(rand(M,1)<=Pa2(i));% Bernouli Process - Pt(i)
end
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C.3 M-File III: Contingent Claim Valuation
RF=[Input]; %Risk-free rate of interest
K=[Input];%Price of access to Subscriber Network
Tf = [Input]; % Regulatory lag
Nf = [Input]; % Number of time intervals in regulatory lag
dtf = Tf/Nf; % Length of time in each interval
tf = [0:dtf:Tf];
M = [Input]; % Number of trajectories
Sa7 = zeros(M,length(tf));% To initialize Sa7 - Payo¤s on F(Sa(t);t,t)
for i=1:M
for j=1:length(tf)
if Sa6(i,j)-K>0
Sa7(i,j)=Sa6(i,j)-K;
else
Sa7(i,j)=0;
end;
end;
end;
Sa8 = zeros(M,length(tf));% To initialize Sa8 - Payo¤s on F(Sa(t);t,t) incorpo-
rating the e¤ect of the intensity of activation.
for i=1:M
for j=1:length(tf)
Sa8(i,j)=Sa7(i,j)*Pa(i,j);
end
end
Sa9 = zeros(M,length(tf));% To initialize Sa10 - Discounted value of pay-o¤s on
F(Sa(t);t,t).
for i=1:M
for j=1:length(tf)
Sa9(i,j)=Sa8(i,j).*exp(-tf(j)*RF);
end
end
Sa10=mean(Sa9,1);% Mean per period option value
Sa11=cumsum(Sa10,2);%Option value per blocks of time [*]
K2 = zeros(1,length(tf));%To initialize K2
for i=1:length(tf)
K2(i)=K.*exp(-tf(i)*RF);%Discounted value of regulated access price
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end
K3=cumsum(K2,2);% Value of regulated access price for blocks of time[*]
for i=1:length(tf)
SD(i)=std(Sa9(:,i));% Standard deviation of options values.[*]
end
for i=1:length(tf)
SE(i)=SD(i)/(sqrt(M));% Standard error of options values.[*]
end
C.4 M-File IV: Parameter Estimation - Sa(t)
global PARMIN PARMAX;
PARMIN = [0.0001 0.0001]; %
PARMAX = [5 5];
initial=[0.5 0.5]; % Initial Estimates [0.5 0.5 2]
options=optimset(maxfunevals,20000, maxiter,5000,TolFun,1.e-4,TolX,1.e-4,Display,iter);
[values, fval, exitag] = fminsearch(@mlemrp,initial,options)
function x = mlemrp(param)
global PARMIN PARMAX;
T = [Input]; % Regulatory lag
N = [Input]; % Number of time intervals in regulatory lag
dt = T/N; % Length of time in each interval
t = [0:dt:7.5];% Time intervals in regulatory lag
MuS=0;
S1=[Data];
GammaS=param(1);% Speed of reversion to mean
SigmaS=param(2);% Volatility of log of S(t) process
for(p=1:length(param))
if(param(p)<PARMIN(p) j param(p)>PARMAX(p))
x = 1e+32;
return
end
end
SS=zeros(n-1,1); % To accommodate n-1 transition densities
for i=2:n
SS(i-1)=-.5*log((SigmaS^2)/(2*GammaS))- .5*log(1-exp(-2*GammaS*dt)) -........
(GammaS/SigmaS^2)*((S1(i) - MuS-(S1(i-1)- MuS)*exp(-GammaS*dt))^2)/.....
(1-exp(-2*GammaS*dt));
end % Maximum Likeliwood Estimation - See Eqn. 5.46
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x= - sum(SS);% Minimizing negative function
C.5 M-File V: Parameter Estimation - a(t)
global PARMIN PARMAX;
initial=[0.1 0.1 ];
PARMIN = [0 0];
PARMAX = [10 2];
options=optimset(maxfunevals,20000, maxiter,1000,TolFun,1.e-4,TolX,1.e-4,Display,iter);
[values, fval, exitag] = fminsearch(@mlegbm,initial,options)
global PARMIN PARMAX;
sigma=param(1);
mu=param(2);
for(p=1:length(param))
if(param(p)<PARMIN(p) j param(p)>PARMAX(p))
x = 1e+32;
return
end
end
Z=[Data];
Z1=log(Z);
n=length(Z1);
V=zeros(n-1,1); % There are n-1 transition densities
dt=1;
for i=2:n
V(i-1)=-.5*(log(2*pi*sigma^2*dt) + (Z1(i) - Z1(i-1)-(mu-.5*sigma^2)*dt)^2/(sigma^2*dt))
; % See Equation 5.48
end
for i=2:n
Z3(i)=log(Z(i));
end
loglikelihood = sum(V) + log(1/sqrt(2*pi*sigma^2)*exp(-(Z1(1)-mu)^2)/(2*sigma^2))
- sum(Z3);
x= - loglikelihood; % the negative log-likelihood
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Appendix D
ADSL: Matlab Codes
D.1 M-File I: Sb(t) Process
randn(state,100)% State of random variables for Sb(t)process
Tfb = [Input]; % Regulatory lag
Nfb = [Input]; % Number of time intervals in regulatory lag
dtfb = Tfb/Nfb; % Length of time in each interval
tfb = [0:dtfb:Tfb];
Mb = [Input]; % Number of trajectories
Lambda=[Input]; % Market price of risk
GammaSb=[Input]; % lnSb(t) - Speed of reversion to mean
SigmaSb=[Input]; % lnSb(t) - Volatility
MuSb=[Input]; % lnSb(t)- Mean under P
MuSb2=MuSb-Lambda*(SigmaSb/GammaSb);% lnSb(t)- Mean under Q
Sb=[Input]; %lnSb(t) at t=0
Sb1 = zeros(Mb,length(tfb));% To initialize Sb1 - Process followed by lnSb(t)
Sb1(:,1) = Sb;% lnSb(t) at t=0
for i=2:length(tfb);
Sb1(:,i) = Sb1(:,i-1).*exp(-GammaSb*dtfb)+MuSb2*(1-exp(-GammaSb*dtfb))...
+SigmaSb*sqrt((1-exp(-2*GammaSb*dtfb))/(2*GammaSb)).*randn(Mb,1); %
See Eqn. A.11 and Eqn. A.12 in Appendix A.
end
Sb2 = zeros(1,length(tfb));% To initialize Sb2 - Process followed by ln(F(Sb(t),t,s))
for i=2:length(tfb);
Sb2(i)=Sb*exp(-GammaSb*(tfb(i)-tfb(1)))+MuSb2*(1-exp(-GammaSb*tfb(i)))....
+(1/4)*((SigmaSb^2)/(4*GammaSb))*(1-exp(-2*GammaSb*tfb(i)));
end
%See Eqn. 6.12
Sb3 = zeros(1,length(tfb));% Process followed by F(Sb(t),t,s)
for i=2:length(tfb);
Sb3(i)=exp(Sb2(i));
end%See Eqn. 5.61
Sb4 = zeros(Mb,length(tfb));% To initialize Sb4 - Process followed by F(Sb(t);t,t)
for i=2:length(tfb);
Sb4(:,i)=Sb3(i)+sqrt(exp((2* Sb*exp(-GammaSb*tfb(i))+MuSb2*........
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(1-exp(-GammaSb*tfb(i))))+((SigmaSb^2)/(2*GammaSb))* (1- exp(-2*GammaSb*..........
tfb(i))))*((exp(((SigmaSb^2)/(2*GammaSb))*........
(1- exp(-2*GammaSb*tfb(i)))))-1)).*randn(Mb,1);
end %See Eqn. A.12 in Appendix A
D.2 M-File II: Line Activation
randn(state,100)% State of random variables for Pb(t) process
Tfb = [Input]; % Regulatory lag
Nfb = [Input]; % Number of time intervals in regulatory lag
dtfb = Tfb/Nfb; % Length of time in each interval
tfb = [0:dtfb:Tfb];
Mb = [Input]; % Number of trajectories
RP=[Input];%Risk Premium - UK Utilities
Pb(1)=[Input];% Value of Pb(t) at t=0
Lambda=[Input];% Market Price of Risk
MuPb=[Input];% Gradient of path under P-dynamics
SigmaPb=[Input]; %Volatility of Pb(t)
MuPb2=MuPa-(SigmaPa*Lambda);%Gradient of path under Q-dynamics - See
Eqn. 6.25 and Eqn. 6.29
dW = SigmaPb*sqrt(dtfb)*randn(Mb,Nfb+1); % Increments across time
W = cumsum(dW,2); % Cumulative increments across time.
Pb = Pb(1)*exp((MuPb2- 0.5*SigmaPb^2)*repmat(tfb,[Mb 1]) + SigmaPb*W);%
Pb(t) under P/Q-Dynamics
Pb2=mean(Pb,1);% Expected risk-neutral Pb(t)through time
Pb3=zeros(M,length(tf));%Initializing - Bernouli Process
for i=1:length(tfb);
Pb3(:,i)=(rand(Mb,1)<=Pb2(i));% Bernouli Process - Pt(i)
end
D.3 M-File III: Contingent Claim Valuation
RF=[Input]; %Risk-free rate of interest
Kb=[Input];%Price of access to Subscriber Network
Tfb =[Input]; % Regulatory lag
Nfb = [Input]; % Number of time intervals in regulatory lag
dtfb = Tfb/Nfb; % Length of time in each interval
tfb = [0:dtfb:Tfb];
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Mb = [Input]; % Number of trajectories
Sb7 = zeros(Mb,length(tfb));% To initialize Sb7 - Payo¤s on ln(Sb(t);t,t) under
risk-neutral expectations
for i=1:Mb
Sb5 = zeros(Mb,length(tfb));% To initialize Sb5 - Payo¤s on F(Sb(t);t,t)
for i=1:Mb
for j=1:length(tfb)
if Sb4(i,j)-Kb>0
Sb5(i,j)=Sb4(i,j)-Kb;
else
Sb5(i,j)=0;
end;
end;
end;
Sb6 = zeros(Mb,length(tfb));% To initialize Sb6 - Payo¤s on F(Sb(t);t,t) incor-
porating the e¤ect of the intensity of activation.
for i=1:Mb
for j=1:length(tfb)
Sb6(i,j)=Sb5(i,j)*Pb(i,j);
end
end
Sb7 = zeros(Mb,length(tfb));% To initialize Sb7 - Discounted value of pay-o¤s
on Sb(t)under risk-neutral expectations
for i=1:Mb
for j=1:length(tfb)
Sb7(i,j)=Sb6(i,j).*exp(-tfb(j)*RF);
end
end
Sb8=mean(Sb7,1);% Mean per period option value
Sb9=cumsum(Sb8,2);%Option value per blocks of time [*]
K2 = zeros(1,length(tfb));%To initialize K2
for i=1:length(tfb)
K2(i)=Kb.*exp(-tfb(i)*RF);%Discounted value of regulated access price
end
K3=cumsum(K2,2);% Value of regulated access price for blocks of time[*]
for i=1:length(tfb)
SD(i)=std(Sb7(:,i));% Standard deviation of options values.[*]
end
for i=1:length(tfb)
210
SE(i)=SD(i)/(sqrt(Mb));% Standard error of options values.[*]
end
D.4 M-File IV: Parameter Estimation - Sb(t)
global PARMIN PARMAX;
PARMIN = [0.001 0.001 0.001]; % Upper Limit for each of the 3 parameters
[0.001 0.001 0.001]
PARMAX = [5 5 20]; % Lower Limit for each of the 3 parameters[5 5 20]
initial=[0.5 0.5 2]; % Initial Estimates [0.5 0.5 2]
options=optimset(maxfunevals,20000, maxiter,5000,TolFun,1.e-4,TolX,1.e-4,Display,iter);
[values, fval, exitag] = fminsearch(@mlemrp,initial,options)
function x = mlemrp(param)
global PARMIN PARMAX;
Tb = [Input]; % Regulatory lag
Nb = [Input]; % Number of time intervals in regulatory lag
dtb = Tb/Nb; % Length of time in each interval
tb = [0:dtb:7.5];% Time intervals in regulatory lag
S1b=[Input];%ln(Net Downstream Value)
n=length(S1b);
GammaSb=param(1);% lnSb(t) - Speed of reversion to mean
SigmaSb=param(2);% lnSb(t) - Volatility of
MuSb=param(3);% lnSb(t) - Level at which lnSb(t)uctuates
for(p=1:length(param))
if(param(p)<PARMIN(p) j param(p)>PARMAX(p))
x = 1e+32;
return
end
end
SSb=zeros(n-1,1); % To accommodate n-1 transition densities
for i=2:n
SSb(i-1)=-.5*log((SigmaSb^2)/(2*GammaSb))- .5*log(1-exp(-2*GammaSb*dtb))
- (GammaSb/SigmaSb^2)*((S1b(i) - MuSb-(S1b(i-1)- MuSb)*exp(-GammaSb*dtb))^2)/(1-
exp(-2*GammaSb*dtb));
end % Maximum Likeliwood Estimation - See Eqn.6.36
x= - sum(SSb);% Minimizing negative function£
211
Appendix E
Data
Tra¢ c/ Tra¢ c/ Tra¢ c/ Tra¢ c/
L ine/ L ine/ L ine/ L ine/
Year Q tr. M onth Year Q tr Month Year Q tr Month Year Q tr Month
1999 4 326.21 303.13 315.59 2006 1 304.16
322.26 302.78 2004 1 317.19 297.98
318.31 2002 1 302.44 310.49 291.80
2000 1 314.36 299.33 303.79 2 285.63
309.95 296.23 2 297.09 286.83
305.54 2 293.12 297.42 288.03
2 301.13 289.60 297.75 3 289.24
299.35 286.09 3 298.08 291.29
297.57 3 282.57 302.85 293.35
3 295.80 288.66 307.62 4 295.41
301.86 294.75 4 312.40 291.92
307.92 4 300.85 311.43 288.42
4 313.98 299.97 310.46 2007 1 284.93
313.91 299.10 2005 1 309.48 277.36
313.85 2003 1 298.23 305.60 269.79
2001 1 313.79 294.16 301.72 2 262.23
308.49 290.09 2 297.84 260.02
303.20 2 286.02 294.95 257.81
2 297.90 287.53 292.06
297.60 289.05 3 289.17 2007
297.29 3 290.57 294.83
3 296.99 297.84 300.50
299.15 305.11 4 306.16
301.31 4 312.37 305.50
4 303.47 313.98 304.83
Source: O fcom - Market Data Tables
Table E.1: Analogue - Monthly Average Tra¢ c/Exchange Line - Minutes
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Exchange Exchange Exchange Exchange
Year Q tr. L ines Year Q tr L ines Year Q tr L ines Year Q tr L ines
1999 4 20,082 2002 1 20,028 2004 2 19,748 2006 3 16,868
20,066 20,037 19,720 16,829
20,051 20,047 19,691 16,789
2000 1 20,035 2 20,056 3 19,663 4 16,750
20,021 20,051 19,643 16,711
20,007 20,047 19,622 16,673
2 19,993 3 20,042 4 19,602 2007 1 16,634
19,975 20,057 19,573 16,585
19,958 20,071 19,545 16,536
3 19,940 4 20,086 2005 1 19,516 2 16,487
19,937 20,077 19,402 16,407
19,935 20,069 19,289 16,328
4 19,932 2003 1 20,060 2 19,175
19,944 20,037 19,041
19,957 20,014 18,906
2001 1 19,969 2 19,991 3 18,772
19,971 19,973 18,654
19,974 19,956 18,537
2 19,976 3 19,938 4 18,419
19,933 19,932 18,249
19,889 19,926 18,079
3 19,846 4 19,920 2006 1 17,909
19,910 19,842 17,692
19,974 19,763 17,475
4 20,038 1 19,685 2 17,258
20,035 19,706 17,128
20,031 19,727 16,998
Source: O fcom - Market Data Tables
Table E.2: Analogue - Active Residential Exchange Lines in BTs Infrastructure
(000s)
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Estim ated Estim ated Estim ated Estim ated
Year Q tr. U tilisation Year Q tr Utilisation Year Q tr Utilisation Year Q tr Utilisation
1999 4 91.55% 2002 1 91.2% 2004 2 90.0% 2006 3 76.8%
91.4% 91.3% 89.8% 76.7%
91.3% 91.3% 89.7% 76.5%
2000 1 91.3% 2 91.4% 3 89.6% 4 76.3%
91.2% 91.4% 89.5% 76.1%
91.1% 91.3% 89.4% 76.0%
2 91.1% 3 91.3% 4 89.3% 2007 1 75.8%
91.0% 91.4% 89.2% 75.6%
90.9% 91.4% 89.0% 75.3%
3 90.8% 4 91.5% 2005 1 88.9% 2 75.3%
90.8% 91.5% 88.4% 75.1%
90.8% 91.4% 87.9% 74.7%
4 90.8% 2003 1 91.4% 2 87.4%
90.9% 91.3% 86.7%
90.9% 91.2% 86.1%
2001 1 91.0% 2 91.1% 3 85.5%
91.0% 91.0% 85.0%
91.0% 90.9% 84.4%
2 91.0% 3 90.8% 4 83.9%
90.8% 90.8% 83.1%
90.6% 90.8% 82.4%
3 90.4% 4 90.8% 2006 1 81.6%
90.7% 90.4% 80.6%
91.0% 90.0% 79.6%
4 91.3% 2004 1 89.7% 2 78.6%
91.3% 89.8% 78.0%
91.3% 89.9% 77.4%
Table E.3: Analogue - Estimated Activation (BTs Residential Exchange Lines)
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Tari¤/ Tari¤/ Tari¤/ Tari¤/
Year Q tr. M onth Year Q tr Month Year Q tr Month Year Q tr Month
2000 1 60.49 50.49 30.49 28.49
60.49 2 50.49 3 30.49 2007 1 30.32
60.49 50.49 29.82 30.32
2 60.49 50.49 29.16 30.30
60.49 3 40.49 4 28.49 2 29.82
60.49 40.49 28.49 29.83
3 60.49 40.49 28.49 29.83
60.49 4 40.49 2005 1 28.49 3 29.83
60.49 40.49 28.49 29.83
4 60.49 40.49 28.49 29.83
60.49 1 37.50 2 28.49 4 29.83
60.49 37.50 28.49 29.66
2001 1 50.49 37.50 28.49 29.66
50.49 2 37.50 3 28.49 2008 1 29.65
50.49 37.50 28.49 29.27
2 50.49 37.50 28.49 28.96
50.49 3 40.49 4 28.49 2 28.28
50.49 40.49 28.49 28.19
3 50.49 40.49 28.49 28.19
50.49 4 37.50 2006 1 28.49 3 29.19
50.49 37.50 28.49 28.19
4 50.49 37.50 28.49 28.19
50.49 2004 1 37.50 2 28.49 4 28.20
50.49 37.50 28.49 28.20
50.49 37.5 28.49 28.20
2002 1 50.49 2 30.49 3 28.49
50.49 30.49 28.49
Sourrce: Point Topic and Pure Pricing
Table E.4: ADSL - Average Headline Tari¤s (8 mbit/s)
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BT Orange P ip ex O2 T iscali Toucan V irgin P lus Net
2007 January 28.99 30.99 30.99 - 28.99 28.99 - 32.99
February 28.99 26.49 30.99 - 28.99 28.99 - 32.99
March 28.99 26.49 30.99 - 28.99 28.99 - 32.99
April 28 .99 26.49 30.99 - 28.99 28.99 28.99 32.99
May 28.99 26.49 30.99 - 28.99 28.99 28.99 30.99
June 28.99 26.49 30.99 - 28.99 28.99 28.99 30.99
Ju ly 28.99 26.49 30.99 - 28.99 28.99 28.99 30.99
August 28.99 26.49 30.99 - 28.99 28.99 28.99 30.99
September 28.99 26.49 30.99 - 28.99 28.99 28.99 30.99
Octob er 28.99 31.00 30.99 - 28.99 28.99 28.99 30.99
November 28.99 31.00 30.99 28.50 28.99 28.99 28.99 30.99
December 28.99 31.00 30.99 28.50 28.99 28.99 28.99 30.99
2008 January 28.99 31.00 30.99 28.50 28.99 28.99 28.99 30.99
February 28.99 31.00 30.99 28.00 25.99 28.99 28.99 30.99
March 28.99 31.00 30.99 28.00 25.99 28.99 - 30.99
April 26 .49 30.50 - 28.00 25.49 28.49 - 30.49
May 26.49 30.50 - 28.00 25.49 28.49 - 30.49
June 26.49 30.50 - 28.00 25.49 28.49 - 30.49
Ju ly 26.49 30.50 - 28.00 25.49 28.49 - 30.49
August 26.49 30.50 - 28.00 25.49 28.49 - 30.49
September 26.49 30.50 - 28.00 25.49 28.49 - 30.49
Octob er 26.49 30.50 - 28.00 25.49 28.49 - 30.49
November 26.49 30.50 - 28.00 25.49 28.49 - 30.49
December 26.49 30.50 - 28.00 25.49 28.49 - 30.49
Source: Pure Pricing Database (www .purepricing.com )
Table E.5: ADSL - Headline Tari¤s from Service Providers (8 mbit/s)
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Plus
BT Orange P ip ex 02 T iscali Toucan V irgin Net
2007 January 2.88% - - - - - - 7 .88%
February 2.88% - - - - - - 7 .88%
March 2.88% - - - - - - 7 .88%
April 2 .97% - - - - - - 7 .88%
May 2.97% - 5.27% - - - - 8 .05%
June 2.97% - - - - - - 8 .05%
July 2.97% - - - - - - 8 .05%
August 2.97% 2.42% - - - - - 8 .05%
September 2.97% 2.42% - - - - - 8 .05%
Octob er 2.97% - - - - - - 8 .05%
November 2.97% - - 7 .95% - - - 8 .05%
December 2.97% - - 7 .95% - - - 8 .05%
2008 January 2.97% - - 9 .12% 5.86% - - 8 .05%
February 2.97% - - 9 .12% 4.23% - - 8 .05%
March 2.97% - - 9 .12% 4.23% - - 8 .05%
April 1 .26% - - 9 .12% 5.39% - - 8 .05%
May 1.26% 6.56% - 7.95% 5.39% - - 8 .05%
June 1.76% 6.56% - 7.95% 6.93% - - 8 .05%
July 1.76% 6.56% - 7.95% 6.93% - - 8 .05%
August 1.26% 6.56% - 7.95% 6.93% - - 8 .05%
September 1.26% 6.56% - 7.95% 6.93% - - 8 .05%
Octob er 1.26% - - 7 .95% 6.93% - - 8 .05%
November 1.26% - - 7 .95% 6.93% - - 8 .05%
December 1.26% - - 7 .95% 6.93% - - 8 .05%
Source: Computed from Pure Pricing Database
Table E.6: ADSL - 8Mbit/s, Indicative Headline Promotional Discounts
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Capacity
Mbit/s Local Regional National Handover
0.25 325 475 590 295
0.5 450 660 815 410
1 700 1,025 1,270 635
2 1,200 1,750 2,180 1090
3 1,700 2,475 3,090 1,545
4 2,200 3,200 4,000 2,000
5 2,700 3,925 4,910 2,455
6 3,200 4,650 5,820 2,910
7 3,700 5,375 6,730 3,365
8 4,200 6,100 7,640 3,820
9 2,200 3,200 8,400 2,000
10 5,200 7,550 9,460 4,730
12 6,200 9,000 11,280 5,640
14 7,200 10,450 13,100 6,550
16 8,200 11,900 14,920 7,460
18 9,200 13,350 16,740 8,370
20 10,200 14,800 18,560 9,280
22 11,200 16,250 20,380 10,190
24 12,200 17,700 22,200 11,100
26 13,200 19,150 24,020 12,010
28 14,200 20,600 25,840 12,920
30 15,200 22,050 27,660 13,830
32 16,200 23,500 29,480 14,740
34 17,200 24,950 31,300 15,650
Source: BT - Broadband Wholesa le Serv ices
Table E.7: Price Per VP/annum (£ ) - VBnrt
218
Capacity
Mbit/s Lo cal Regional National Handover
0.25 351 513 638 319
0.5 486 713 880 443
1 756 1,107 1,372 686
2 1,296 1,890 2,354 1,177
3 1,836 2,673 3,337 1,669
4 2,376 3,456 4,320 2,160
5 2,916 4,236 5,303 2,651
6 3,456 5,022 6,286 3,143
7 3,996 5,806 7,268 3,634
8 4,536 6,588 8,251 4,126
9 5,076 7,371 9,234 4,617
10 5,616 8,154 10,217 5,108
Source: BT - Wholesa le B roadband Serv ices
Table E.8: Price per VP/annum (£ ) - VBrt
Capacity
Mbit/s Lo cal Regional National Handover
0.25 358 523 649 325
0.5 495 726 897 451
1 770 1,128 1,397 699
2 1,320 1,925 2,398 1,199
3 1,870 2,723 3,399 1,700
4 2,420 3,520 4,400 2,200
5 2,970 4,318 5,401 2,701
6 3,520 5,115 6,402 3,201
7 4,070 5,913 7,402 3,702
8 4,620 6,710 8,404 4,202
9 5,170 7,508 9,405 4,703
10 5,720 8,305 10,406 5,203
Source: BT - Wholesale Broadband Serv ices
Table E.9: Price Per VP/annum (£ ) - CBR
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Capacity
Mbit/s Connection Rental
0 .5 34.86 84.60
1 34.86 84.60
2 34.86 84.60
DataStream Max 34.86 84.60
DataStream Prem iu im 34.86 84.60
Source: BT - Broadband Wholesa le Serv ices
Table E.10: ADSL - Ender-User Access Charges (£ )
Capacity
Mbit/s Connection Rental Booking Ratio
155 2,000 50,000 100%
155 2,000 50,000 200%
155 2,000 50,000 300%
155 2,000 50,000 400%
622 4,000 175,000 100%
Source: BT - Broadband Wholesa le Serv ices
Table E.11: ADSL - Customer Access Link Charges (£ )
Local M ain Local- Lo cal- Lo cal Inter-
Exchange Exchange Tandem Tandem Tandem Tandem Tra¢ c
Pro cesser Sw itch ing Sw itch Transm ission Sw itch Length M ix
Unit Cost (£ ) 0 .107 0.048 0.026 0.018 0.037 0.003
Useage Factors
Lo cal Calls 1 .860 0.170 1.787 24.850 0.151 7.299 61%
National Calls 1 .949 1.584 1.768 27.803 1.501 164.896 26%
Calls to Mobiles 1 .016 1.441 1.272 16.731 0.401 25.172 10%
International Calls 1 .026 0.917 1.034 10.880 0.345 24.034 4%
Source: BT - Current Cost F inancia l Statem ents
Table E.12: Analogue - Conveyance Charges and Useage Factors
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Appendix F
ADSL: Distribution of Exchange Lines
Source: Ofcom (2006)
Figure F.1: Local Exchanges by Size
221
Source: Ofcom (2006)
Figure F.2: ADSL and Cable Overlap
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